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Tuesday, 29 January 2002
Desert Mounted Corps (DMC), General Allenby's Despatches, Part 4
Topic: AIF - DMC

DMC

Desert Mounted Corps

General Allenby's Despatches, Part 4

 

Field Marshal Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, 1st Viscount Allenby GCB, GCMG, GCVO.

 

Field Marshal Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, 1st Viscount Allenby GCB, GCMG, GCVO (23 April 1861–14 May 1936) was a British soldier and administrator most famous for his role during the First World War, in which he led the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in the conquest of Palestine and Syria in 1917 and 1918.

 

Full text of "A brief record of the advance of the Egyptian expeditionary force under the command of General Sir Edmund H. H. Allenby ... July 1917 to October 1918" General Sir Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, g.c.b., g.c.m.g., Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force FROM June 1917.

 

A BRIEF RECORD OF THE ADVANCE OF THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE UNDER THE COMMAND OF GENERAL SIR EDMUND H. H. ALLENBY. G.G.B.. G.G.M.G.

JULY 1917 TO OCTOBER 1918.

Compiled from Official Sources.

LABOUR IN THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

General Remarks.

Under the above heading was included all the unskilled Egyptian personnel and a large proportion of the skilled and semi-skilled personnel which Egypt was called on to furnish towards the needs of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. It fell to the Directorate of Labour to arrange for its provision and distribution.

The numbers involved eventually reached a total of 135,000 men, engaged on six months' contracts giving an annual turn-over of some 270,000 men, apart from replacement of casualties. The figures before the attack on Gaza in 1917 and the figures reached during 1918 were as under in the various corps : — 1917 1918 Egyptian Labour Corps 4S,472 •100,002 labourers Camel Transport Corps 20,000 23,462 drivers Donkey Transport Corps — 1,992 „ Horse Transport (A.S.C.) 3,200 4,349 „ Remount Service 1,200 1,433 syces Veterinary Service 1,100 3,496 „ Imperial Camel Corps TOTi 280 247 drivers LS 74,252 . . 134,971 Recruiting.

The modest needs of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in 1915-16 in unskilled Egyptian personnel had been adequately met by collecting the men required in the large cities and sending a few recruiting agents to Upper Egypt at intervals. Towards the end of 1916, however, demands for Egyptian personnel, especially for Camel Transport Corps, became insistent and it was found necessary to set up a small recruiting staff in Upper Egypt to provide for Camel Transport Corps, leaving the hitherto untapped Delta as a field for Egyptian Labour Corps recruiting. Early in 1917, between calls * Includes 6,406 skilled or semi-skilled Egyptians.

108 THE ADVANCE OF THE for Egyptian labour for service in France, Mesopotamia, and Salonika, and the rapidly growing needs of the Egyptian Expeditionary E'orce, it became obvious that provision for recruiting on an extensive scale should be made. An Inspectorate of Recruiting (Directorate of Labour) was therefore established consisting of twenty-six officers whose activities extended throughout Egypt from Alexandria to Assouan. A strict system of medical inspection and examination was enforced and an advance of L.E. 3 made to all recruits accepted to enable them to provide for their dependents.

The appointment of Inspector of Recruiting was filled by a senior Inspector of the Ministry of the Interior, whose services were placed at the disposal of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force by the Egyptian Government ; this arrangement subsequently proved to be of very great assistance and was attended with most successful results.

Recruiting camps for the reception of Egyptians were opened at Sohag, Assiut, and Roda Island, Cairo, whence special trains, conveying 2,000 recruits at a time were run to the respective Base Depots on the Suez Canal (Kantara) where the men were disinfected, clothed, equipped, and organized into companies or detachments. The Inspectorate of Recruiting also made provision for some 6,000 skilled or semi-skilled personnel constantly required in the Egyptian Labour Corps, Organization of Labour.

Apart from the recruitment of Egyptian personnel generally, the allotment of labour to employers was dealt with by authorized demands being put forward locally by services and departments to Assistant Directors or Deputy Assistant Directors of Labour.

The following table shows the chain of responsibility : — D. of L. (at G.H.Q.) A.D.L.

(Egypt) 1 D.A.D.L's.

1 Labour Areas E.L.C.

Mil. Labour Bureaux.

1 Companies E.L.C.

1 Casual local labour A.D.L. (Palestine and Sjia) I D A.D.L's.

I Labour Areas E.L.C.

I Companies E.L.a Mil. Labour Bureaux.

Casual local labour.

(The Inspector of Recruiting and Inspector, Egyptian Labour Corps, were in direct communication with Director of Labour, G.H.Q.) The system outhned above, whilst ensuring decentrahzed control, did away to a great extent with the practice of and necessity for employers holding reserves of labour at their own disposal ; it enabled a " pool " of labour to be established at various centres of activity and especially at the base ports of Alex- andria, Port Said, Suez, and Kantara, and subsequently at Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut, Tripoli, and Alexandretta.

Very great savings, financially and otherwise, were efiected thereby.

Egyptian Labour Corps.

The strength of the corps was as under : — In Jan., 1916 In Aug., 1916 In Aug., 1917 In Aug., 1918 In Nov., 1918 In 1916, 10,463 Egyptian Labour Corps were sent to France ; 8,280 to Mesopotamia ; 600 to Salonika ; whilst in Oct., 1918, 7,000 labourers were held ready for despatch to Salonika before Turkey had capitulated.

Among many difficulties experienced, but successfully overcome, in dealing with the above extra- ordinarily rapid expansion, was the question of finding suitable officers. Egypt had been thoroughly tapped by the spring of 1916 in order to furnish Arabic-speaking officers for the various local corps and for Intelligence duties. The original and experienced officers of the Egyptian Labour Corps who had done excellent service in Mudros, Egypt, and elsewhere were required for senior appointments in the corps, and they represented only a fraction of the increased numbers now necessary. Consequently, if Officers.

Men.

39 ...

2,973 88 ...

24,838 292 ...

55,592 418 ...

85,547 504 ...

100,002» * luuludes 6,106 skilled or semi-skilled K.L.C.

EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 109 Egyptian labour was to be properly organized it became essential to draw suitable officers with a know- ledge of discipline from some other source. The problem was solved by offering temporary commissions to selected candidates from the ranks of British units, and ensuring them facilities for the acquisition of Arabic with extra duty pay on becoming proficient. Only those candidates who showed an aptitude in the handling of Egyptians, after a thorough practical test extending over several weeks, were accepted, and it is of interest to state that out of over 800 candidates dealt with 401 have been commissioned.

Although Egypt could make no further provision in officers, it could still produce large numbers of local subjects of European descent, who by their knowledge of the fellahin and their proficiency in languages proved to be most valuable material for foremen. Advantage was taken of this fact to engage and train large numbers as serjeant-foremen and corporal-foremen. Meanwhile, practical experience in working Egyptian Labour Corps in the field had led to the evolution of the organization best suited to its many and varied activities.

The smallest unit in the corps is the gang. It consists of fifty men, viz. a reis and forty-nine labourers. The reis, usually, is personally known to all the men in his gang, and frequently all come from the same village or markaz. Thus in a company of 600 labourers there are twelve gangs, and in a double company of 1,200 labourers, twenty-four gangs. To such companies skilled personnel were frequently attached. The proportion of officers handling labour is one officer to each section of 200 men.

The organization of the Egyptian Labour Corps was as follows on Sept. 19, 1918 : — Headquarters (Inspector, E.L.C.) I-udd Base Depot, E.L.C. Advanced Depdt, E.L.C. Double companies Single companies Kantara Ludd 24 75 " Labour areas " for purposes of administration, and consisting of the requisite number of com- panies, were formed as circumstances demanded.

It is not possible in a short survey to enter into particulars as regards the detailed employment of 100,000 men ; therefore it must suffice to enumerate the main classes of work on which these consider- able numbers were engaged : — (a) Railway construction and maintenance (broad and narrow gauge), and bridge building.

(6) Roadmaking and metalling ; constructing and laying " wire roads " ; clearing tracks.

(c) Laying pipe-lines.

{d) Construction of buildings and reservoirs ; carpentry and general Royal Engineer work, (e) Quarrying stone.

(/) Well-boring.

(g) Formation of supply dep6ts and general Army Service Corps labour.

(A) Stretcher bearing and conservancy ; drainage of malarial areas.

(i) Ammunition depots and general Ordnance labour.

(j) Loading and discharging ships ; stevedoring, including working winches and derricks.

(k) Boatmen — manning surf boats landing stores along the coasts of Palestine and Syria.

{I) Labour for Royal Air Force, for " Signals," and for salvage.

To all members of the force the Egyptian Labour Corps were well-known in small detachments ; it was given to few to observe them at work where large numbers were employed ; but those who have seen many thousands of Egyptian Labour Corps labourers on task work, either driving a cutting with pick and fasse through Palestine clay, or in their thousands carrying baskets of earth to pile .up some railway embankment, will long remember such examples of intensive labour. No less striking was it to watch the line of laden boats leaving the storeships off the coast and making their way through the surf to the beach, there to be hauled high up by teams of cheerful Egyptians working to whistle signal under their own officers.

Nor must their equally important work at the base ports of Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, and Kantara be forgotten. Trained stevedore gangs under Egyptian Labour Corps officers were always in readiness to board incoming ocean-going steamers, work their discharging gear, and empty the holds as rapidly as had hitherto been done by skilled contractor's personnel ; or, conversely, to load outgoing vessels with supplies, ammunition, and stores required for operations on the Syrian coast or in Salonika.

It stands to the lasting credit of the officers of the Egyptian Labour Cor]is, that certain companies, under selected Egyptian Labour Corps officers, reached such a high standard in connection with work on roads, railways, pipe-line, and other services, that they were able to make satisfactory progress without constant expert supervision.

110 THE ADVANCE OF THE Among the skilled trades represented by over 6,000 Egyptians in the Egyptian Labour Corps, the following are examples : — Basket- menders ; blacksmiths ; carpenters ; fitters ; hammermen ; masons ; plasterers ; quarry- men ; saddlers ; stevedores ; stokers ; teutmenders ; tinsmiths ; well-borers ; wheelwrights ; winchmen.

The accompanying maps (inset on Plates 44 and 52) show in a general way the distribution of the Egyptian Labour Corps throughout Palestine and Syria in connection with the advance of the force, but it should be borne in mind that equally large numbers were employed in Egypt particularly in the Suez Canal Zone and at Alexandria.

Military Labour Bureaux.

In order to effect economy and utilize ail local sources of casual labour. Military Labour Bureaux had been successfully established at Alexandria and Port Said in 1916.

Concurrently with the advance from Gaza-Beersheba in 1917, immediate steps were taken by the Directorate of Labour- to collect and organize the labour resources of the newly occupied territory in conformity to the military requirements.

The first Military Labour Bureau in Palestine was opened at Jaffa shortly after the town was occupied. Labour requirements to clear the streets, repair roads, and prepare the quay for the arrival of shipping were immediate and any labour that could be utilized at once was of especial value.

Certain notables, sheikhs, and muktars were called together, the situation explained and notices issued calling for volunteers.

The chief difficulty at the onset was the natural tendency of the population to hold aloof until they understood the new regime and government, and this was augmented by the necessity of their becoming accustomed to receive wages in a new currency. In fact, at every Labour Bureau opened, the initial work was largely concerned in creating confidence in the local inhabitants with totally new conditions and in every case such confidence was uniformly and quickly established.

Payment initially was made in coin to each separate labourer at the finish of each day's work. As soon as confidence was assured and the number of employees consequently increased, a weekly system of payment — partly in paper and partly in coin — was instituted. Each labourer had a numbered green armlet and a pay-slip which was marked up and checked at least twice a day.

It soon became necessary to open a Bureau at Jerusalem, and very shortly some 10,000 local labourers were engaged on work extending from Hebron to Jerusalem and Jerusalem to Jaffa, controlled and organized by two bureaux.

These large numbers had absorbed most of the available able-bodied men and both women and boys were then allowed to volunteer for certain classes of work on which they could be suitably employed.

Where food was scarce millet was issued in part payment to individual labourers, at their option.

The Military Labour Bureaux ensured that regular work was provided in Palestine for thousands of people who in many cases would otherwise have been destitute.

The currency question was thus very materially helped, both by the circulation of large sums in the new coinage as wages and because every case of trafficking or depreciating the official paper currency was immediately taken tip by the Labour Bureaux officers whenever one of the employees reported that he could not obtain full value for his wages when paid in notes.

In addition to the labourers, some 1,500 skilled men were registered and engaged on casual employ- ment by these bureaux, boatmen from Jaffa and stone dressers from Jerusalem being particularly successful and freely volunteering for work in any locality required.

Similar steps were taken for opening labour bureaux currently with the advance of 1918. Within seven days of the commencement of operations, labour Bureaux were opened at Tul Keram, at Haifa, and shortly afterwards at Beirut.

All Bureaux were organized on the same lines as proved successful at Jaffa and Jerusalem, and the rates of pay of casual labour were standardized throughout Palestine and Syria.

EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 111 THE NAVY AND ARMY CANTEEN BOARD.

Under tlie title of the Army Canteen Committee, an organization was established by the War Office in April, 1916, to control the operations of Army Canteens managed by Contractors. In Dec, 1916, the actual conduct of canteens was vested in this Committee. Its functions were subsequently enlarged to include the operation of Naval Canteens ashore and on board His Majesty's Ships, and the name was changed to the Navy and Army Canteen Board.

In June, 1917, a Commission under Major-General Sir G. C. Kitson, appointed by the Quartermaster- General, arrived in Egypt and at once proceeded to take over the canteens previously managed by civihan contractors west of the Suez Canal and in the Sudan.

In Sept., 1917, the Board took over the control of the forty-one canteens on the Canal and to the east of it, formerly provided by the Expeditionary Force Canteens (a temporary organization).

Then came the advance of Oct., 1917, and it was during this difficult period that the Board's activities, so far as the advanced sections were concerned, commenced. At that time the canteen organization was not provided with its own transport, and was insufficiently staffed, but, nevertheless, by the time the troops had settled down north of the Jaffa-Jerusalem line canteen facilities were available at Jaffa, Ludd, Bir Salem, Latron, and Jerusalem. During the spring of 1918 these facilities were extended by the provision of canteens at Sheikh Muannis, Sarona,Bir ez Ziet, Mulebbis, Wilhelma, Hot Corner, in the Wady Ballut, Khurbetha ibn Harith, Ain Sinia, Ramallah, Jericho, and on the Auja.

The summer of 1918 was a time of preparation, during which upwards of sixty motor vehicles arrived, and at the moment of the advance in September arrangements were complete by which it was hoped that the advancing infantry would never be out of touch with an Army Canteen. In pursuance of this object army canteens were opened at Tul Keram on Sept. 25, Nablus on Sept. 28, Haifa on Oct. 2, Beirut on Oct. 19, Tripolis on Oct. 23, Aleppo on Nov. 6, and at Damascus. The previously existing canteens at Ras el Ain, Jiljulieh, and Messudieh supplied the wants of those divisions that were withdrawn. One division was accompanied during its advance to Tiberias by a mobile canteen comprising five lorries.

It is of interest to study a few points in connection with the administration of the Navy and Army Canteen Board in the area of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

The unit forms a section of the Royal Army Service Corps and has an establishment of twenty-seven officers and 372 other ranks, with 135 personnel attached. It employs upwards of 800 European and Egyptian civilians.

It is charged with the supply and conduct of all Army canteens, now ninety-eight in number. In addition it operates four mineral water factories, the Jerusalem Hotel, the Summer Camp Hotel at Alexandria, and the Winter Camp Hotel, Cairo.

It has, or has had, bakeries at Cairo, Alexandria, Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Beirut, and it maintains refreshment tents or rooms for officers and men at railhead and intermediate stations on the Palestine MiHtary Railway.

In Egypt, where Egyptian personnel is available, each Canteen consists, as at home, of a coffee bar, a grocery bar, and a beer bar, and in addition, in some cases, of a recreation room and a wholesale grocery bar. Owing to the shortage of personnel it was not found possible in the advanced sections to provide more than wholesale and retail grocery bars with, where possible, refreshment rooms for officers and men. During the summer of 1918, however, a number of kiosks containing soda fountains where such articles as cigarettes, sweets, and cakes, were available, were provided as near to the line as possible. Among such kiosks were those opened at Sheikh Muannis, Hot Corner, Bir ez Zeit, and Ain Sinia.

In the Egyptian Expeditionary Force the canteen sales amount to a yearly total of upwards of four and a half million sterling, and the approximate value of the canteen stores in Egypt is one million pounds. Regimental and other funds are largely maintained by means of a rebate or discount of eight per cent on all cash sales to soldiers, and the Christmas issue of half a pound of plum pudding per man, in addition to many other amenities, was provided by the Army Council out of an additional two per cent which is paid by the Board to it, 112 THE ADVANCE OF THE THE ROYAL AIR FORCE.

In July, 1917, the Eoyal Air Force on this front consisted only of two squadrons, of which one was Austrahan. The AustraUan Squadron was chiefly employed in long distance reconnaissance, bomb- dj o:)ping and photography ; while the other carried out the tactical work and artillery co-operation. Tue machines with which these squadrons were equipped were of an old type and much inferior to those used by the enemy. As a result, little could be achieved towards acquiring the superiority in the air.

Shortly before the attack on the Gaza-Beersheba front, a second artillery squadron arrived, thus enabling the nucleus of a fighting squadron to be formed. The machines of the latter included one flight of Bristol fighters, which were held in reserve until a few days prior to the attack. One memorable morning four Bristols left the ground in response to a hostile aircraft alarm ; they met and engaged an enemy formation, and, for the first time on this front, shot down an enemy machine in our lines. The German pilot who was captured stated that he had been taken completely by surprise, never having doubted that his own machine was superior to anything that we had.

From that day onward the tables were turned in our favour, and during the next few weeks other German machines shared the fate of the first. In all ninety-three enemy machines were brought down, fifty-nine of them behind the enemy's lines, eleven in our own lines, and twenty-eight out of control. Our long distance reconnaissance machines, which on previous occasions had been attacked on sight by the enemy, were now carefully avoided by him.

On Sept. 29, 1917, the Commander of the Sinai Front informed the Yilderim Group Command that, " The mastery of the air has imfortunately for some weeks completely passed over to the British." He adds that, " Our aviators estimate the number of British aircraft at from thirty to forty." Though the enemy considered our Bristol fighter as far superior to their own machine, and were fond of attributing their want of success to the " machine," the following remark indicates that there were also other factors : — " The shooting down of a second fighting plane, which again was fighting alone, points to the necessity of an experienced O.O., Aircraft." (Von Papen, 16/10/17.) During the Gaza operations, formations of slow aeroplanes escorted by one or two Bristols, bombed and fired upon the retreating enemy without interference on the part of the German Flying Corps.

Late in November the Bristol fighters were reinforced by S.E.5 scouts, a faster machine than any on this front ; and this type, with the Bristol fighters, gained for us the complete superiority in the air, which we held until the end.

By the time our troops had taken up the Jerusalem-Jaffa line, the position of the Koyal Air Force as regards machines and personnel rendered possible a continuous policy of offensive action against enemy aircraft, which were in all cases, without exception, attacked whenever met and in whatever numbers. The following extracts from captured enemy documents show the cumulative effect of this policy on the moral of the German Air Forces : — '20/S 18-31/8/ IS.

" In oon.scquence of lively hostile flying activity, no reconnaissances could be carried out." " 1/9/18-7/9/18.

" No flights over enemy country." "8/9/18-14/9/18.

" No flights over enemy country." This was confirmed in the weekly reports from enemy Air Force Headquarters, as follows : — "25/8/18-31/8/18.

" The loss of two more machines of 301st Abteilung coa|>elled the suspension of all reconnaissance in front of Vlllth Army.

" An attempt will be made to continue flights on the rem.«ind6r of the front occasionally." Thus it will be seen that the enemy was unable to obtain any information from aerial reconnaissance at a period when this was of vital importance.

This is even more remarkable when it is realized that at the commencement of the advance in Sept., 1918, the enemy Air Force was in considerable strength and equipped with up-to-date types of machines, which, if properly handled, were greatly superior in performance to our artillery machines.

On the night of Sept. 18-19, a Handley-Page, carrying over half-a-ton of bombs flew over enemy country and attacked Afuleh Station and Aerodrome. This machine, which had previously flown all the way from England, started the offensive as far as the Royal Air Force is concerned.

At dawn the next morning, that is, " Z " day, a perfect orgy of bombing took place. A special squadron, detailed solely for bombing, had arrived a few weeks before operations commenced. This squadron attacked all telephone and telegraph exchanges far behind the line ; while the Corps squadrons bombed the smaller exchanges just behind the trenches, with the result that enemy commimication by telephone or telegraph was completely deranged.

EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 113 To ensure that tho enemy should not be aware of the massing of our cavalry just before the attack and their subsequent movements after the infantry had broken through, it was necessary to prevent enemy machines from leaving the ground. With this objective, two scouts at a time patrolled over Jenin aerodrome. Each machine carried four bombs, which were dropped on any sign of activity on the aerodrome. Each pair was relieved while still patrolling over the aerodrome and on relief came down and fired machine guns into the hangars, with the result that enemy aircraft were prevented from taking any part in the battle.

During the infantry attack, three artillery machines continually patrolled the front of the XXIst Corps and, co-operating with the artillery, located and engaged thirty-two active batteries.

On Sept. 20 and 21, every available machine was used for bombing the retreating enemy. Of these, the column retreating on the Nablus-Kh. Ferweh road on the 21st sustained the greatest losses. Early on the morning of the 21st a column of enemy troops and transport was reported by a strategical reconnaissance machine moving along the Nablus-Wadi Farah road, just south of Kh. Ferweh. It was of the utmost importance that this movement should be stopped, as, although the cavalry had blocked the enemy retreat by way of Beisan, the road to the bridge over the Jordan, at Jisr ed Damieh could not possibly be closed by our troops for some hours ; nor could the crossings over the Jordan between that place and Beisan be guarded in time. All available machines were at once mobilized for this attack, and departures were so tuned that two machines should arrive over the objective every three minutes, and that an additional formation of six machines should come into action every half hour. These attacks were maintained from 0800 till noon, by which time our troops were in touch with the column. The road was completely blocked and was strewn with a mass of debris of wrecked wagons, guns and motor lorries, totalling in all eighty-seven guns, fifty-five motor lorries, four motor cars, and 932 wagons.

Very few flights took place in the air during operations, for the simple reason that practically no enemy machines were met with ; but, just prior to the capture of Aleppo, an interesting combat occurred. Two Bristol fighters belonging to the AustraUan Flying Corps met an enemy aeroplane anA after a rimning fight drove him down, forcing him to land behind his own lines. The occupants left the stricken machine, seeing which, the Bristol landed beside it and, while our observer held up the two German airmen, the pilot set fire to the hostile machine. Owing to the soft nature of the ground, he was prevented from bringing back the two Germans as prisoners, who were released and left where they were.

A comparison of the strength of the Royal Air Force in Palestine in July, 1917, and Sept., 1918, is interesting. On the former date it consisted of one Wing, with two Squadrons, and a Balloon Company ; whilst in Sept., 1918, it consisted of a Brigade, with two Wings, seven Squadrons, and a Balloon Company.

EXPLANATORY NOTE TO THE MAPS ILLUSTRATING OPERATIONS.

The movements of troops during any fixed period are frequently so complex that it is not possible to illustrate such moves in detail on maps of a scale which is, of necessity, small in order to include the wide area of country over which the troops were disposed.

Consequently, the following maps, with a few exceptions, show the dispositions of our forces and those of the enemy as they were known at General Headquarters at certain fixed times, and are based on the situation maps which were issued nightly during the major operations. Considerable information has been added, such as the location of heavy artillery and aerodromes, and alterations made where later information proved the original maps to be incorrect.

In order to avoid overcrowding the maps, the words " division " and " brigade " have been omitted except where brigades have been acting separately from their divisions ; and in all cases the positions are approximate only. Thus, in the case of the heavy artillery, it has frequently been impossible to show each battery, or even the Royal Garrison Artillery brigade, in the actual position occupied, and the conventional sign has been placed close to the headquarters of the formation with or under which it was operating.

Regiments and battalions are only shown when acting apart from their higher command, and then only when space permits.

It should be realised that the Turkish regiment {i.e. three battalions) is a similar formation to our brigade, and is the enemy's principal fighting formation. This fact, and the number of odd imits on the front, especially east of the Jordan, tends to make the Turkish troops appear on the maps in an imdue preponderance.

Throughout, the activities of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force are shown in red, and those of the enemy in green.

For details of the moves of any particular unit reference should be made to the "Brief Record of Service" of the formation concerned.

Owing to the abnormal weather conditions in Cairo during the period in which the maps were printed, the unequal expansion and contraction of the paper caused unusual difficulty in obtaining correct colour registration, and the paper shortage in Egypt and the limited time in which delivery was required, made reprinting impossible.

LINES OF COMMUNiCATION, 1917.

British.

In June, 1917, the " Palestine Lines of Communication " comprised the bases Port Said and Kantara, and a smgle line of railway track from Kantara to Deir el Belah, the railhead station which had been opened in April, 1917. {See Plate 2.) Great stress was thrown upon all departments by the erection of efficient railway, ordnance, and engineer workshops, the construction of wharves along the Canal bank, the laying out of thirty miles of metalled roads, the development of the terminus of the military railway, and the transfer of all the more To face Plate 1.

REFERENCE TO CONVENTIONAL SIGNS

In the most difficult and most important work of all, that is to say, in transforming Kantara into a port at which many ocean-going steamers can discharge, the Suez Canal Company gave its fullest and most effective support. Essential as these works were for the army in the field, the Canal was not constructed with a view to such developments, and the harbour works might well have been regarded by the Company as of doubtful value. Nevertheless, the Company entered sympathetically into the programme, and, not content with giving its formal consent to the proposed works, technical advice and assistance were freely placed at the disposal of the army.

- While the work was going forward at the main base of the lines of communication during the summer of 1917, developments were also taking place further east. El Arish was made into a hospital centre in order to ease the transference of sick and wounded from railhead to the base hospitals ; advanced depots of supplies, stores, and ammunition were established at Rafa, Khan Yunis, and at Deir el Belah ; while the work of doubling the railway track across Sinai was pushed forward rapidly, the double track to El Arish being opened for traffic by mid-November. Two months previously the lines of communica- tion had been extended to include the new railhead at Shellal on the Rafa-Shellal branch.

The operations which began in October resulted in the extension of the lines of commimication, first to Beersheba to the east and to Meidel to the north. This was quickly followed by the inclusion of Ramleh (Dec. 24), Jaffa (Jan. 30) and Jerusalem (Feb. 4). In the meantime the defence and admini- stration of the lines of communication were placed under one commander.

During this period and until the arrival of railhead in the neighbourhood of Ramleh, there were many periods of anxiety and difficulty owing to the weather conditions.

The movement of supplies, reinforcements, and remounts was seriously interrupted both by rail and road, as owing to the heavy floods during November and December, the railway track wBs repeatedly breached in the low-lying coastal plain, and this made the movement of all forms of transport impossible for days together. No metalled road existed across this plain between the Wadi Ghuzze and JuHs, a distance of over twenty miles, and parties of reinforcements marching from the ever-advancing railhead to the front line foimd themselves isolated in a waste of mud and water, rmable to move forward or back, and suffered considerable hardships before arriving in the front line. It was due to the persistent efforts of the railway construction parties and of engineers, who did what could be done with the " roads," such as they were, that the lines of communication were kept open under the difficult conditions which prevailed.

Turkish.

The Turkish lines of communication, which extended from Bozanti to Beersheba {see Plate 2), were under the Syrian Western Arabia Command, and the G.O.C. (Ahmed Jemal Pasha) did not work har- moniously with the Yildirim Army group as he was jealous because his command had been taken over by a foreigner.

The task of keeping up supplies, even under the best of conditions, was not an easy one, for at this time the Amanus and Taurus tunnels were incomplete, and all supplies from west of Bozanti had to be unloaded, and either re-loaded into narrow-gauge trucks, which were drawn by engines driven by com- pressed air, or transported by motor lorry or pack animals to the east end of the tunnels. The same procedure was adopted over the Amanus range, thus entailing four separate transhipments of all supplies. A further transhipment took place at Rayak owing to the change from the normal guage line to the metre gauge of the Hejaz and Palestine railways. {See Plate 2.) Thus the only means of communication for the Turkish force in Palestine with their main base at Haidar Pasha (Constantinople Station in Asia), was by a single line of rail about 1,275 miles in length, which had in addition to carry all ordnance stores for the force in Mesopotamia, as far as Muslimie, and for the Hejaz, as far as Deraa. {See Plate 2.) The roiling stock was neither good nor numerous, and the wood fuel which was used in place of coal did not tend to accelerate the service. An instance occurred of a train being stopped between stations so that the wood fuel could be chopped into pieces small enough to feed the fire. Numerous short lines were constructed for the purpose of bringing the requisite wood from the timbered areas. In order to release rolling stock, reinforcements frequently marched from Rayak to the front line,* a distance of about 250 miles.

In addition to the above difficulties, the inefficiency of Turkish officials and their amenity to bribery, made the supply and equipment of the Yildiiim armies no easy problem.

To face 1 late 2.

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October* 28.

The concentration for the attack on Beersheba had been proceeding for a week past, and troops were gradually moving to their concentration areas. On Oct. 27 the line of observation (the Rashid Bek-El Buggar -Point 720-Point 630 ridge), was held by the 8th Mounted Brigade, and at dawn the enemy laimched a determined attack on Points 630 and 720, and eventually succeeded in occupying the crests of both hills, despite the very gallant and determined resistance of the 1st County of London (Middlesex) Yeomanry. The garrison on Point 720 were, save for three men, all killed or wounded, and that on Point 630 held on in a support trench close behind the crest, in spite of heavy casualties and though ahnost surrounded. It was eventually relieved by 158th Brigade, and the whole line re- occupied in the evening, on the enemy withdrawing.

Much work on the ever-pressing question of water supply was necessary, wells being developed and water stored at Esani, Asluj, Khalasa for the cavalry, and at Abu Ghalyun and Maalaga for the infantry.

On Oct. 28, the outpost line was held by the 53rd Division, plus the 229th Brigade (74th Division), covering the construction of the railway to Karm. The remainder of the XXth Corps was concentrating about Tel el Fara, while Desert Mounted Corps was moving to its concentration area about Khalasa and Asluj.

It is not uninteresting to review the enemy situation at this period :¦ — The German Staff in Sinai had, so far back as August, decided that the British would make another effort to break through on that front, and with such forces that, unless the Turks were heavily reinforced, the result could only be in favour of the British. That the weaknesses of their position were its extent and the exposed left flank at Beersheba, was fully realized by the Command in the field, and during August and September repeated requests were made to the Higher Command for a shortening of the line by withdrawing from Beersheba, or generous reinforcements so that Beersheba could be held a Voutrance.

The sotmdness of these demands was fully realized by the German advisers of the Turks, but there existed a policy which was a veritable millstone to those who wished to conduct the operations in accor- dance with clear strategic principles. This policy was directed towards the recovery of Baghdad. Baghdad, a former capital of the Khalifs, and therefore important to the pan-Islamic party, was ever before the Young Turk, soldier, and politician, and the plan had received the backing of Berlin. A composite German force had been formed and one of the first of German soldieis, Marshal Erich von Falkenhayn, lent for the carrying through of this imdertaking. If Baghdad was to be retaken, every man and gun must be sent to Irak and every man sent to Sinai decreased the chance of success. But to this was the unanswerable argument of those who asked that reinforcements should be sent to Sinai : " If the Sinai front is broken, Palestine and Syria will fall into the enemy's hands, and not only will Baghdad not be retaken, but the armies in Irak will be caught like a rat in a trap, with the British across their lines of communication at Aleppo." It was not until mid-October that this argument prevailed and then it was too late. Troops being diverted from Mesopotamia were still on the lines of communication and the aircraft were still being rmpacked and put together on their aerodromes, when the British troops attacked and captured Beersheba on Oct. 31, 1917.

The German Command had, however, estimated the date of the British attack with fair accuracy, which they considered would take place, owing to weather conditions, early in November. But they were totally incorrect in their estimate of its direction.

Various circumstances made them believe that it would consist of a third and final assault on Gaza, combined with a landing to the north, which would turn their right flank and enable the British to occupy the fertile coastal plain. To meet this primarily, all defensive work was concentrated for many weeks on the Gaza sector, and their main reserves — the 7th and 19th Infantry Divisions — were concentrated behind Gaza.

Von Fallfenhayn proposed, by a concentration of forces, to deliver an attack on the British right flank, and so drive back General Allenby out of Palestine into the waterless and difficult country east of the Wadi el Arish. In addition to its strategical effect, this would have had the political result of clearing that portion of the Turkish Empire from the invader.

This attack was originally timed for the latter half of October, to precede and forestall the British attack. Owing, however, to indecision, general procrastination, poor transport facilities, and, above all, to the jealousy and opposition of Ahmed Jemal Pasha, G.O.C. of the Fourth Army and Governor of Syria, it had to be postponed, and was eventually timed for early December.

By Oct. 28 the organization of the Turkish forces under the Yildirim Army Group into the seventh and eighth armies was nearing completion. The headquarters pf General Kress von Kressenstein (G.O.C, Eighth Army) had moved back from Huj to Huleikat so that the former, now connected to the main railway by a light line, might be used as a reserve area, and Fevzi Pasha (G.O.C, Seventh Army) was about to move forward his headquarters from Hebron to near Beersheba, finally to take over the troops allotted to his command. Marshal von Falkenhayn was at Aleppo en route for Jerusalem.

The front had been strengthened by three fresh divisions — the 19th (Sedad Bey), 24th (Wilmer Bey, a German), and 26th (Fakhr-ed-Din Bey), and the 20th Division was rooving towards the front on the lines of commrmication, south of Aleppo.

To face Plate 3, ADVANCE THROUGH PHILISTIA

OcTOBEB 28th — continued.

Tte Gaza sector was a network of trenches, wire entanglements, and strongly fortified posts, con- veniently sited for mutual support and cross fire, which extended to the south-east until the defences of Beersheba were reached. The German Staff appears to have been very well satisfied as to the security of the line against frontal attack and any second- line system of defence had been almost totally neglected. A wide turning movement on the east was considered impossible owing to the broken nature of tiic coimtry and lack of water. Although the possibility of a landing on the coast north of Gaza had always been considered, the following telegram, despatched on Oct. 24 to the Yildirim Army Group Headquarters by Major von Papen (of espionage notoriety in the U.S.A.), Liaison officer between the armies and the group, is indicative of the accepted views on this point : — " Reconnaissance undertaken to-day along the coastal sector shows that sufficient positions for local defence arc in existence near Askalon and Wadi Hesy. Disembarkation, which might be tactically possible, could not, from the nature of the country, take place north of Wadi Hesy. Employment of naval guns and a few machine guns seems desirable for local defence." October 29.

On Oct. 29 the process of concentration continued. The Desert Mounted Corps continued its move towards Khalasa and Asluj. In the XXth Corps area, the 53rd Division continued to cover the front and left flank of the concentration, and the enemy made no further attempt to interfere with or to recon- noitre the movement. The 60th Division moved up from Tel el Fara to Bir el Esani, the advanced brigade moving to a point south of Maalaga. One brigade of the 74th Division moved forward to link up the 60th and 53rd Divisions, while the 10th Division commenced to move from Rafa to Tel el Fara.

The enemy were still unaware of the real British intentions : — " An outflanking attack on Beersheba, with about one infantry and one cavalry division is indicated, but the main attack, as before, must be expected on the Gaza front." So ran the enemy appreciation, based on reports of our tactical deployment for the offensive as received from their air service.

The standing camps left in the whole area around Deir el Belah, and inhabited by only a few details, also misled the enemy, who, about this period, estimated that there were "six infantry Divisions in the Gaza sector, deeply echeloned." To face Plate i.

ADVANCE THROUGH PHILISTIA

10 zo Mile* ¦:i Situation at.6p,nn,on29-|0-17.as knownat G.H.Q.E.E.K November 1.

After the capture of Beerslieba, preparations were at once commenced for the attack on the Kauwukah and Eushdi trench systems covering Tel esh Sheria and Abu Hareira. Accordingly, on the morning of Nov. 1, the 53rd Division, with the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade on its right, moved to Towal abu Jerwal in order to protect the flank of the corps during the coming attack.

The question of water supply for mounted units raised great difficulties, as the surface water remaining after the thunderstorm of Oct. 25 had dried up, and the supply from the Beersheba wells was not equal to the demand. Accordingly, on Nov. 1 the Australian Mounted Division was withdrawn into reserve, and the Anzac Mounted Division advanced, and, after a certain amount of opposition, occupied the line Bir el Marruneh-Towal abu Jerwal, capturing 179 prisoners and four machine guns.

To assist in completing the rout of the Turkish troops retiring from Beersheba, a small mobile force on camels, consisting of Lewis gunners, machine gunners, and a few Sudanese Arab scouts, under Lieut.- Col. S. F. Newcombe, R.E., D.S.O., left Asluj on Oct. 30. It had a number of machine guns and Lewis guns, a large quantity of small arms ammunition, and carried three days' rations. Moving rapidly, it established its headquarters at Yutta, and on Oct. 31 occupied some high ground west of and com- manding the road between Dhaheriyeh and Hebron. It was hoped that the Turks retiring by night from Beersheba would encounter this force, which, taking them by surprise, would by its large fire power put them to rout, and cause a general debacle on the Turkish left wing. However, as the Anzac Mounted Division had cut the road further south, the Turkish forces from Beersheba retired north to Tel esh Sheria. The force, nevertheless, succeeded in intercepting and capturing the motor transport with supplies which was endeavouring to reach Beersheba from Jerusalem.

The Turks were surprised by the appearance of this force, and having no idea of its numbers, despatched the 12th Depot Regiment from Hebron, and the 143rd Regiment from Tel esh Sheria — six battalions in all — to dislodge it. It held out resolutely, but, after sustaining heavy casualties and having exhausted all its ammunition, was obliged to surrender on Nov. 2 or 3.

To fdce I'late 8.

ADVANCE THROUGH PHILISTIA

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« Novomber 2.

The role which had been allotted to the XXIst Corps in the operations of Oct.-Nov., 1917, was to pin down as many enemy troops as possible in the coastal sector, and to endeavour to attract his reserves to this neighbourhood. In order to accomplish this, it was decided, while holding the line in sufficient strength, to repulse any attack made by the enemy to relieve the pressure of the Beersheba operations, to attack the works in front of Gaza and, eventually, if possible, to capture the town.

To carry out this plan, it was first of all essential to smash the elaborate system of defences which the enemy had spent the past six months in constructing. Accordingly, on Oct. 27 the bombardment commenced, increasing day by day, and carried out by two 60-pounder batteries, five and a half 6-inch howitzer batteries, one 8-inch 'howitzer battery and the divisional artillery of the 52nd, 54th, and 75th Divisions. On the 29th the Navy joined in' with H.M.S. "Grafton," and H.M.M. 15,29,31, and 32. The river gunboats "Ladybird," and "Amphis," and the destroyers "Staimch" and "Comet" also co-operated. The bombardment was highly successful, as prisoners and captured docmnents testify.

Owing to the great width of " No man's land," averaging 1,000 yards, it was necessary to carry out the attack by night. Accordingly, on the night of Nov. 1-2 at 2300, the 156th Brigade assaulted and captured Umbrella Hill. At 0300 on Nov. 2 the enemy's front-line trenches were treated to an intense bombardment, and the 161st and 162nd Brigades attacked, capturing the whole of the front line system at once. The 163rd Brigade were not so successful in their assault on the support trenches at 0345. meeting with stiff resistance, the 5th Suffolk Regt. alone being able to secure all its objectives. The 162nd Brigade cari'ied on the attack and by 0630 had reached Sheikh Hassan. Six tanks participated in the later parts of the attack, rendering material assistance.

During the afternoon of Nov. 2, the eneniy launched three counter-attacks, two on Sheilch Hassan, the first of which was broken up by naval and heavy artillery fire with severe loss to the enemy, and one from the direction of Crested Rock. All were successfully repulsed.

Some 650 prisoners were taken and over 1,000 Turkish dead were buried in the positions. The enemy also lost three guns, one Hotchkiss, twenty-nine machine guns, seven trench mortars, and a large quantity of rifles, ammunition, and stores.

Meanwhile, on the right flank the XXth Corps moved its headquarters to Beersheba. The left of the 53rd Division's line was taken over by the 229th Brigade, while the remainder of the 74th Division moved to the neighbourhood of Point 910. The 10th Division occupied Abu Irgeig without opposition, and was in touch with the 74th Division on the right.

The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade and 7th Mounted Brigade advanced towards Dhaheriyeh and the Khuwcilfeh area respectively. Stiff opposition was met in very difficult country, but by nightfall the line Bir en Nettar-Deir el Hawa-Ras en Nagb -Point 1580, had been reached, linking up with the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade about one mile NNE. of Towal Abu Jerwal. The position of Ras en Nagb, to which the enemy attached great importance was captured by the 7th Mounted Brigade, which took eleven prisoners and two guns.

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November 3 to 6.

On Nov. 3 the 53rd Division attacked the Khuweilfeh lines but was only able to occupy part of the position in view of the stout resistance made by the enemy who had diverted a considerable proportion of his reserves to this sector of the front. He was by this time probably imder the impression that a wide outflanking movement was to be undertaken rather than a break-through. This attack continued day and night against superior forces and the division was at last able to capture Tel el Khuweilfeh on Nov. 6. Once the enemy succeeded in regaining the position with a great counter-attack but was again dislodged with the loss of many hundred prisoners and some guns. There is no doubt that the obstinate fighting of the 53rd Division, which came temporarily under the G.O.C., Desert Moimted Corps from XXth Corps did much to confirm the enemy in his erroneous estimate of our intentions, and by attracting his reserves to the Khuweilfeh area to contribute to the subsequent success of the 10th, 60th, and 74th Divisions at Kauwukah, although such action naturally increased the difficulty of its own attack.

Meanwhile the lack of water in the operations area occupied by our right and right centre made it necessary for the Australian Mounted Division, which had passed into reserve on Nov. 1, to return to Karm for water. The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade which was manoeuvring against the Turkish 3rd Cavalry Division and his 12th Depot Regiment in front of Dhaheriyeh, was able to draw sufficient water locally. From this point, the extreme right of our line, there was a good deal of cavalry fighting during these days in which the 5th Mounted, the New Zealand Moimted Rifle, and Imperial Camel Brigades, repulsed determined enemy counter-attacks, inflicting satisfactory losses in the process. The 5th Mounted Brigade was withdrawn to the Tel el Saba area after the first day, when the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade came south-west from Dhaheriyeh, and on Nov. 6 the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade also came out of the line. Meanwhile the Yeomanry Division came right roimd the back of the front from near Shellal on Nov. 3 and during the night of the 5th came into line on the right of the 74th Division two miles south of Ain Kohleh in order to free the infantry for movement into its position for deploying for the Kauwukah operations. The horses were then sent back to Beersheba.

In order to facilitate the operations of Nov. 6 a detachment for the defence of the right flank of the army was formed under Major-General G. de S. Barrow. C.B., consisting of the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, the 53rd Division, the Yeomanry Mounted Division, the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade, and part of the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade. At the same time the 60th Division was temporarily attached to the Desert Mounted Corps which was rejoined by the Australian Mounted Division on its return from Karm to Bir Imleih.

On Nov. 6 at dawn the three infantry divisions, 10th, 60th, and 74th, with the Yeomanry on the extreme right, attacked the series of Kauwukah positions held in strength by the Turkish Vllth Army under Fevzi Pasha. The 74th Division met with obstinate resistance on its extreme riglit, but was able to capture all its objectives by 1315. Wire cutting was sufficiently far advanced for the attack on the main Kauwukah system to be launched at 1230, and two hours later the 60th and lOtb Divisions had broken through. The 60th Division then advanced to Sheria and occupied the station but was much delayed in its further advance by the explosion of a Turkish ammimition depot at the station which caused a large fire which unduly exposed its movements. In consequence of this the division was imable to cross the Wadi Sheria that night. After the break-through at Kauwukah a Brigade of the 10th Division took over the captured works while the remainder of the division passed into Corps reserve near Samarra Bridge and the 74 th Division faced north-east.

To face Plate 8.

ADVANCE THROUGH PHILISTIA PLA TE .8 Situation at 6 p.m. on 6-11-17 aahnmrnat fill a TJ-PV November 7.

On Nov. 7 the main interest shifts to the coastal sector, where the intense bombardment carried out by the Navy and the XXIst Corps on the 5th and 6th, had produced so strong a feeling of unease among the Turks that a considerable part of their forces were carefully withdrawn. To such an extent had this retirement been carried out, that British attacks during the night of Nov. 6-7 on Outpost Hill and Middlesex Hill, met with only half-hearted opposition, and the occupation of Ali Muntar itself was effected by the 75th Division at 0740 without much trouble. A little before this, at 0700, the 54th Division was able to establish a line from Sheikh Redwan to the sea, and two squadrons had passed up the beach at 0630, to push patrols up to the Wadi Hesi. The Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade advanced towards Beit Hanun, after passing right through the ruins of Gaza at 0900. Two brigades of the 52nd Division, withdrawn from the trenches, moved off at 1000 and, after advancing under cover of the cliffs along the beach, seized the high ground on the right bank of the Wadi Hesi, in the face of considerable resistance on the part of the 53rd Turkish Division (Mehmet Salah-ed-Din Bey). The 52nd Division by this move passed behind the 54th and formed the extreme left of the British line.

Gaza itself was found to be in a deplorable condition. Its civilian population had been evacuated and the greater part of the wood-work of the houses, floors, roofs, doors, and fittings, window sashes and shutters, removed to be used either for the revetting of Turkish trenches in the sandy soil, or for firewood. Many trees had been cut down and immense damage effected by the explosions of the Turkish ammunition stored in prominent buildings and detonated by British gun fire. The place was, in conse- quence, entirely ruinous and destitute of any economic value to the victor. On the other hand. General AUenby was not called upon to make arrangements for the feeding of a large civilian population.

Away on the right, the 10th Division captured the Hareira Tepe redoubt, in face of considerable machine-gun fire, thereby making it possible for a junction to be effected with the extreme right of the XXTst Corps near the Wadi Baha. The intention had been for the Desert Mounted Corps to pass imme- diately through the gap in the Tiu-kish line made by the three Infantry Divisions at Kauwukah, but the Turks were not yet too disorganized to offer sturdy resistance in places, and the 60th Division had some difficulty in dislodging them from Tell esh Sheria at 0600 as a necessary preliminary to an advance of two miles beyond the Wadi Sheria. This cleared the way finally for the cavalry. Passing through the gap, the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade captured the station east of Kh. Um Ameidat, four and a half miles north of Tell esh Sheria, with 300 prisoners and much material. The Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division was then engaged with enemy rear-guards and was only able to advance to the positions shown — a distance of two and a half miles — by nightfall. The Australian Mounted Division filled the gap between the advanced cavalry and the 60th Division to the north of the Wadi Sheria. The lack of water in this area was severely felt.

Tv fane Plate 9.

u ADVANCE THROUGH PHHJSTIA PLATE 9 3V MED I TERR AN BAN Jaffi ""SV.

r/r/i 'Sa/I\ eir Turc'i hi/ton hi, or/ 2»>X Abud ubbartot J KhSurafegO 5/ DekaMin*<»y Vl Han >-e/6ha>ti\ ferbtto ¦;„ Mtnihy 'Tr/lt/H pSeit Khura r>i/i ,a *°' "•«/ i2C*\r 2v '\/ % «" nAUiv 6 - 0irg/lh/mm/c 59* BailitldS "• • UmmA/ua.

\ fl/re' O 7fdr M.O Ras ¦! I , 3«90 cfS«ft*u

November 8.

The desperate r(sistance made by the enemy and the lack of water had delayed the Desert Mounted Corps during the few hours required by the Turks to withdraw the greater part of their 26th and 54th Divisions, commanded respectively by Fakhr-ed-Din Bey and Nasuhi Bey, through the gap which still remained between the XXLt Corps at Beit Hanun and the newly- won positions to the west. The Desert Mounted Corps, however, was in bad country and the " break through " after the Battle of Sheria was vastly handicapped by natural as well as human obstacles in comparison with the " break through " after the Battle of Sharon ten months later. During this day, Nov. 8, the Australian and New Zealand Moxmted Division fought its way to water at the Wadi Jemmameh, capturing 300 prisoners and two guns. The 7th Mounted Brigade heartily repulsed a Turkish counter-attack near Tell Hudeiwe, while the Australian Mounted Division came up on the left and occupied a line from Umm Rujum to the north side of Huj, which, with its large accumulations of ammunition was occupied by the 60th Division after an advance of ten miles, during which the enemy had been defeated in three successive rearguard actions. In one of these at 1500 ten troops of 1/lst Worcester and 1/lst Warwick Yeomanry of the 5th Mounted Brigade (Australian Mounted Division) charged a detachment of Turks holding a position one mile west of Huj, with complete success in spite of the stout resistance of the enemy who served his guns until the last moment. Further west the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade got into touch with the XXIst Corps at Beit Hanun.

Meanwhile the XXIst Corps had been actively pushing forward, and the 75th Division was able to hnk up with the 10th afte'r occupying the Beer Trenches, Tank Redoubt, and Atawineh, which had been found to be lightly held by the enemy, by patrols from the Composite Force, early in the morning. In the afternoon the Composite Force relieved the 75th Division which moved on the 9th to Beit Hanun. Here the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade had estabhshed itself, after considerable difficulty, on the ridge to the east whence it was able to link up with the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade, and then pursue the enemy to Tumrah and Deir Sineid. Between the cavalr}' and sea the 52nd Division continued to advance, toiling in heavy sand, and opposed strongly by the Turks, who made a formidable counter- attack from the direction of Ascalon. Four times did the enemy drive the Lowlanders off the high ground north-west of Deir Sineid only to lose it once more and find our men arrayed a fifth time against them on the top of the hill.

This sweeping advance on nearly the whole front appears to have contributed much to the break- down of the Turkish moral. In places the enemy was still dangerous and made sturdy resistance but many of his people became increasingly anxious to remove themselves from the unpleasant vicinity of the front. This frame of mind betrayed itself in the behaviour of certain units, and aerial reports gave warning that the enemy was becoming disorganized.

To face Plate 10.

ADVANCE THROUGH PHILISTIA

20 Miles Situational $ p.nr»- on 8."|1.~V7. as knownat G.H.Q. E.E P November 9.

On this day the 52nd Division continued its advance, and by noon had occupied the line Deir Sineid- Beit Jerjah-Ascalon. At 1400 Hamame, the northern point of the Mejdel oasis among the sand dunes, was reached, and the cavahy located the Turkish rearguard at 1830 in the Sua fir group of villages about seven miles away. During the night the 75th Division arrived at Deir Sincid and the Imperial Service Cavalry returned to the Gaza area. Further inland the cavalry was beginning to feel the want of water. The Yeomanry Division, which had been engaged on the previous day in the pursuit of the enemy retreat- ing on Hebron, had been called across to the more important front and rejoined the Desert Mounted Corps at Huj, where it was delayed in consequence of the difficulties in watering described in para. 13 of No. 1 Despatch. The same cause prevented the Australian Mounted Division from moving far, and only the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division with the 7th Mounted Brigade could advance. By night they had reached the line Arak-El Menshiye-Suafir esh Sherkiye-Beit Duras, and were close up to the Turkish main rearguard, in advance of the positions shewn on the map which are those reported up to 1800 at General Headquarters.

Tofaoa Plate U.

ADVANCE THROUGH PHH.ISl lA PLATE II.

MEBITE RRANEAN SEA Jaff Sarona,-fbtTar, — ' NoKr Ria>.

*irRafHft 'tubbanoi Abud .

Nahh X: XIKubab 44 OX r4-soq >*

A>/''' r \ > / ll«0 J.alNai-k J ImitiwnN l«'<«/ eu/Ln «v* iMOv Sjo lO'O, gOeiSlwrmf .>* J.ll«!)»r/ /N. JV 21)20 / I'UO Kurnub ifitiintd ci'n] •Rhhma. 3|6' .e Survey of Egypt, Dec 1918(0453) Miles 10 s o t-H I — I I— i T=~T=r~:E Reprinted in Encfland 13/9.

S ituation at 6 p, m.on 9 -.\ )." .17. as known at G . H.Q E .E .F 20 Miles =1 November 10.

A khamsin, or sciroque, as it is often called in Palestine, began to blow on Nov. 10, lasting two days. This hot wind was an additional trial to all troops, particularly to the cavalry already suffering from water-shortage. The Australian and New Zealand Division, however, was able to capture Esdud, the Ashdod of the Philistines, and its bridgehead before being brought to a halt owing to the water diffi- culty. During the previous night the Australian Mounted Division had marched north-east from Huj via, Tell el Hesi (the Lachish of the Old Testament), and linked up on the right of the line at Arak el Menshiye on Nov. 10. It was joined soon afterwards by the Yeomanry Division which had left Huj early in the morning. Thus, with the exception of the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade and the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, the whole Desert Mounted Corps was now in position for further pursuit across the open country of Philistia and the foothills, after having captured over 1,000 prisoners and sixteen guns in the two days. During the day the 52nd Division moved into the Esdud-Mejdel- Herbiah area, and the 157th Brigade engaged the enemy north of Beit Duras, capturing the position and three machine guns with, a bayonet charge in spite of having already marched fourteen miles over heavy sand in a khamsin.

The 75th Division advanced into the Es Suafir-Juhs-Burberah-Beit Jerjah area, and the 10th and 60th Divisions (which latter rejoined the XXth Corps) began to fall back on Karm and the railway to facilitate supply work. The 54th Division, at Gaza, gave up all its transport to assist in the forward move, aad was able to maintain itself without transport on a supply of five days' rations in depots close at hand.

'Jo face Plate 12.

ADVANCE THROUGH PHH.ISTIA PLATE. IZ Jaffs Mikw€ lire * MS Renti.

I 'it Hi ma

oSa/ihye '-kA eir Ture'f rqfenif . KhSurafena El Dekahin /" W MED ITER r\aNEAN j[ %i& p.

l/AjA<( aS" fstfa ShuklM r\> 9*''*<"' A aJtSf.imyif''""' \frAkai /<• . Ik /i2*»/<: \8irNebgluy x, to latin \Jo \\ • — A \ vS KhKha 'S;rusal Herbieo El Heikaltj, 3» jk'r/ON •''''iSj, •ItJiiH fO/- Ku>vel

November 11 and 12.

During these two days XXIst Corps Advanced Headquarters moved up to Deir Sineid (Nov. 11) and two important actions were fought on the banks of the Nahr Sukereir. In one of these, the 1st Austrahan Light Horse Brigade drove back the enemy, forced the passage of the stream, and captured Tel el Murro. This was an important step towards securing control of the mouth of the river, which was afterwards most useful as a temporary landing-place for stores. In the other the 52nd Division, with two battalions of the 75th Division, the 1st Austrahan Light Horse Brigade, and the 8tli Mounted Brigade, assaulted and captured Burkah, in spite of determined resistance and a strong counter-attack. On the right of the 75th Division, the Australian Mounted Division, after hard fighting succeeded in advancing as far as Berkusie on a general line running south-eastwards to Zeita ; but under pressure of a determined counter-attack by an enemy force, estimated at 5,000 men of the 19th and 53rd Turkish Divisions (commanded by Sedad Bey and Mehmet Salah ed Din Bey respectively), the cavalry had to retire two or three miles to Arak el Mensbiye and Summeil.

During the night of the 12th, the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade was reheved by the Yeomanry Mounted Division, which had been brought right across from one end of the line to the other, by way of Mejdel, and now took over the country to the north of the mouth of the Nahr el Sukerier, advancing almost to Tell el Kharrube and Beshshit. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles had now rejoined the division, which was also reinforced by the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, which had rejoined the Desert Mounted Corps at Julis on Nov. 11. Owing to the exhaustion of their horses on account of the lack of water, the 7th Mounted and the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigades had to be withdrawn into corps reserve.

The enemy was beginning to show signs of recovery and made efforts to reconstruct his line of resis- tance, and make a front in hopes of maintaining control of the lateral line of communications along the railway from Ludd to Jerusalem. This is clearly shewn on the map, and the importance of a further advance before the line could harden into a prepared front, is obvious.

Tu face Plate 13.

ADVANCE THROUGH PHII.ISTIA PLATE 13 3' NOTE: /cfentJfic»tions mebiterhanean ,„ firwn alt enemy Corps •'ssv.. "->TT~- rnrt ivtfre obtain id by contact on 10-n-J7.'*''""> 'rjTSS-ovj nmt; They do not show pre sence of these j \ /*>-yo£/Jj!ri Corps in en< my line out rat/ier T n 'SafiKit fr-\roirTureif indicate dii -organisation. Locations of Divisions unknown.

'iubhano 1 Ahud ShuMya EIDekakm , KhSurafhnd l\ Ramte). , \Anna6e oPt \ ,,v,, Barrrye Ijss HOT S'dun NoKr SulMTwr -niya Am A/7/i fa/re /fim) Ma l\g\i \BirNebcua "-'"' Katanne Reprinted in EnUjnd i9J9- Situaticmat. 6.p,ro.on. ll"11-17.a8kaownatG.H.Q.E.E.F.

November 13.

Up to the evening of Nov. 12 the advance of XXIst Corps had been northward, but on the morning of Nov. 13 it was necessary for the proper execution of the Commander-in-Chief's plans to advance eastward. The 52nd Division on the left flank was thrown well forward and the 75th Division wheeled on it.«i right. To guard the northern flank of the troops advancing eastward, two battalions and a battery of Royal Field Artillery occupied Yebna (the Jamnia of the New Testament period, the Ibelin of the Crusades) which had been captured at 1100 by the Yeomanry and Imperial Camel Corps. A similar force was subsequently detailed to hold the high ground north of Mughar, and one battalion and a battery of Royal Field Artillery held Akir after its capture early next morning. All these detachments were furnished by the 52nd Division until the arrival of the 54th Division several days later.

The enemy position on the ridge to the north-east of El Mughar was captured by infantry of the 52nd Division and the 6th Mounted Brigade of the Yeomanry Division. The attack had to pass over 4,500 yards of open ground near Katrah. It was entirely successful and resulted in the capture of 1,096 prisoners, two guns, and fourteen machine guns. Over 400 dead Turks were counted in one field. The village of El Mughar itself was captured in the evening by two squadrons of the 1/lst Berkshire Yeomanry who entered the village on foot and took 400 prisoners. The 75th Division had a good deal of trouble with the Turks along the line from Mesmiyeh to Kh. Sallujeh. The 232nd Brigade, advancing through Yasur, was engaged on the left, while the 233rd, advancing just to the north of Kustine, was engaged on the right. This brigade finally stormed Mesmiyeh from the south, and the division took 292 prisoners and seven machine guns. The 234th Brigade then came through in the centre as far as Kh. el Mugliarah on the railway, where it was strongly counter-attacked during the night by the Turks covering Junction Station less than two miles distant. The 6th Mounted Brigade opera- ting towards Akir captured seventy-two prisoners, one gun and two machine guns. XXIst Corps advanced headquarters moved up to a point near Beit Duras.

2'u face Plate. 14.

ADVANCE THROUGH PHII.ISTIA PLATE I A ENEMY UNITS UNLOCATED : 24,26,27divNS. Alt reports tend to show that the Units are fbsed into other Dtvns 136Regt.,3 CAV.

NoXr RixijuyJ EIDtkakm, MED I TE R R\ANEAN /.zf '''" SEA Jaffa MikMt Ih Sal me BJo' residue of these Rant/t) lftgsi-flYtifdie — II Pent'.

«rg\ otv.

urafend Furhha , tubbano i iH>: eitHtma 'adit VarrtyeP Sfit/tfba.

KtilUqdia NeUYunts __/ 'Sba'fft, p-_ a'fat mi/iAi\ TC'-'TBeit Nuba X. „ .„, Esdud/i 'X\ I aCNTVl Vr»A7j,.. »*t ' As xalan.

Situation at.6...p,m, on 1.3 -11:17 as known at G .H.Q. E .E .F November 14.

At 0400 on Nov. 14 the 234th Brigade of the 75th Division had seized the high ground west of Junction Station, and at 0730 the station itself was captured with 100 prisoners, two guns, two undamaged locomotives, and much rolling stock. Two armoured cars of No. 12 Light Armoured Motor Battery co-operated very effectively in the capture of the station, inflicting some 200 casualties upon the enemy. At 0900 the 52nd Division captured Mansura two miles further north, and the 22nd Mounted Brigade of the Yeomanry Division drove the enemy from Akir and captured Naane, another two miles to the north, with seventy-two prisoners and one machine gun. Further north again the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division reached the outskirts of Ramleh and the ridges north of Surafend by noon. Here the New Zealand Mounted Rifles were vigorously counter-attacked by the enemy who approached to within bombing distance and had to be discomfited with a bayonet charge. The headquarters ol the Desert Mounted Corps moved up to a point near Yebna.

Tofaoe Piute IS ADVANCE INTO JUDiSA PLATE 15 SO M:EDITEnRANEA.N SEA Aine/Yezi TellSubi-k KhtlZn r'Nakcir rZad : eivrt Kusi, 'rA<arona.,-fJfbT1ari D9tr£stia Jaffi ¦\.

"i f/ Dekakmj I.CJ f SM.BJ )M.CI 261- 'ura/hna VAbud FurHha , if Pa-mf f/fCudts /VprAmmar yui fema fiani M07 NoKr SuIcccMV KhKly ''l Katanne ,,-->. <;.<•«<» vai-r.

Beifma El Hulfika aSumm9i/ \.jfffana it Lf.hi M- o Dim PC I KhUinnRuium «»> 157 W T.JI>bi oZu/iei/im ''Arak Mtnsh, sTuffu T El Shaikh V\Sof*/ Nairn Wl Beit ©44!?*"""/ Abu HuUinsI Tj Btns.74, A|«.i n':;?? - ( IOJ3 T«ll al KnuwMlfi luweiydAJ I 91 J i'/«B»r.ieA-"J*JJf'' WJ*! P.

ted by the Survey of Egypt . Dec 1918(0453} 'J Far "'|eS(tftBft(SlP'-''>"' // l*afa.n Miles 1.0 s fa . .-i >.... . . \ 10 Situation at 6p.monl4:tt"l7 asknown at G.HO. E.E.F.

20 Miles Reprirted in £ni'anc/ i9,'9 November 15 and 16.

Gn Nov. 15 the 75th Division had occupied the high ground east of Junction Station and next day advanced to the line Kezaze Khulde and Abu Shusheh where, on Nov. 15, the Yeomanry Division and part of the Imperial Camel Corps had had a very satisfactory engagement. The enemy was driven back on Amwas leaving 400 dead and 360 prisoners, in addition to another ninety captured as the yeomanry passed near Ramleh in their advance. Ramleh itself, and Ludd, were taken by the 1st Aus- tralian Light Horse Brigade on the same day with 360 prisoners. After this the section of the Imperial Camel Corps engaged at Abu Shusheh moved off to rejoin the other section which was operating among the sand dunes in the Jaffa area. The Austrahan Mounted Division advanced close up to Latron which was still held by the Turks after their defeat at Abu Shusheh, and on the north front the New Zealand Mounted Rifles occupied Jaffa at noon Nov. 16 without opposition, and Kefr Ana, while the rest of the division kept in touch with the yeomanry in the Ramleh-Ludd area.

During these two days the break up of the enemy forces into two widely separated bodies begins to be strongly marked. The Vllth Army was being shepherded up into the hill-country of Judaea along the dead end of a narrow gauge railway to a position of immense natural strength, but hampered by the lack of good communications with his base — all his transport being of necessity confined to the roads from Jerusalem through Nablus to the railway at Messudiyeh some forty miles away, or through the Jordan Valley to the railway at Amman, a difficult journey of about sixty miles. The other body, formed by the Vlllth Array was being driven out of Phihsuia into the plain of Sharon, but it was able to keep astride of its railway and had hopes of being able to take refuge behind tne Nahr el Auja.

Meanwhile, the 54th Division had begun to move north from Gaza, and to make this move possible it was necessary for the transport borrowed from this division to be sent back. This greatly increased the difficulty of supplying the troops at the front, as railhead, in spite of the energetic work on the rail- way, was still a long way off.

Up in the hills to the north of Beersheba the Turks, under the tactical pressure of the advance along the coast, saw fit to withdraw from Dhaheriyeh to the Hebron area.

Tojace Plate 10.

ADVANCE INTO JUDiSA PLATE 16 '1 ENEMY UNITS UN LOCATED 26 o\-y\ Both these 53 Div. 1 16.24,27 D! are MEBITEnnANEAN Am el Yezefrk TellSubi-wC, [tJfrulKera ufunsa El ¥hW4 ¦'>-7 [IRasat"* tSk "f/akun stie EIVA jnfnfant 'vns. and very weak.

TdlalReld ._. .Wulebbis' Jaffa amiW-NiVr Ian Smlme a r icI/fin (feflyjf Htntii " *- [[ITire Urh Furkha .

Atud Beitf usl too J'tHughu, rfjhfkafi_ 3 tita ' DetrS/net. ' Lihi Bea%/ra El HiUikat, lllldbts Turnip V — T _-» -Tor If \ yyv.

r : . Dimre I Kh Unin Kuium », p*!!/* ,-__ . Jiaosepot Re Tufru " VElTWufii'iat •ti.'AMJxf •! N,jjry — wTTik? \ jfAt/ Antr 113 V El Camh o Zuheilh \ \ liira'Uu A(M Hui«inili\ AOuHush ' Stre/Oommia 84»«JNukb T«ri •! Khuwalfe 2023 "v Utrci'birf R!>lmlc( •I f»r»A R!lmlcil „»>/(.* — -O Bittir K / \ SJ54Q -T A Jedur f fmA""

November 17 and 18.

The weather had been unusually hot and the dust and khamsin added greatly to the trials of the troops and animals, who were also much distressed by the shortage of water. This was accen- tuated by the practice of the enemy in doing his best to destroy the small and very deep wells of the area through which he had been retreating. Owing to the loss of transport caused by the return of the 54th Divisional Train to its own division, it became necessary to rearrange the transport, and this, together with the desirability of resting the troops for a few hours, made a day's halt almost necessary. The Commander-in-Chief held a conference at XXIst Corps advanced headquarters on Nov. 18, and orders were issued in obedience to which the 52nd Division moved to Ludd during the afternoon while the 54th Division, which had now come up from Gaza, moved up a Brigade from Kustineh to Beshshit and occupied Yebna. The 234th Brigade of the 75th Division covered Junction Station, while the rest of the division prepared to advance towards Latron.

Meanwhile the cavalry had advanced a little across open country occupying Sarona, Mulebbis, and Wilhelma without opposition. They came in contact with the enemy at Eantieh and held the line Nahr el Auja-Beit Nabala-El Yehudieh-Point 265-Jerisheh. On the afternoon of Nov. 18 the Austrahan Mounted Division executed an outflanking movement which compelled the Turks to evacuate Amwas and Latron during the night, and the Yeomanry Division forced its way into the hills to within two miles of Lower Bethhoron (Beit ur et Tahta). At 1630 the 22nd Mounted Brigade reached Shilta, but the 13-pdr. battery and all wheels had to be sent back owing to difficulties of country.

In the XXth Corps area. Advanced Corps Headquarters on Nov. 18 moved to the Red House on the Wadi Ghuzze. On the same day the 60th Division concentrated at Gaza preparatory to a further move forward, while the 10th and 74th Divisions moved to areas north of Deir el Belah.

To face Plate V.

ADVANCE INTO JUDiEA PLATE 17 Repr/ntec/ /n Erty/ana/ /9/9.

20 Miles Situation atfi .pL.m..onl.8-ILi7. aslmown at G.H.O. E£.F.

November 19.

When the fresh advance approached the hills, on Nov. 19, the 75th Division encountered consider- able opposition east of Amwas and Latron, which had been occupied by the 232nd Brigade at noon. The main road to Jerusalem begins to rise at this point and enters narrow defiles flanked by precipitous and rock-strewn heights. On these the enemy had constructed a series of defences commanding all approaches. Our artillery had few positions from which the infantry could be assisted, but the avail- able few were utilized to the utmost and the advance of the division was pressed forward. The experience of the Gurkhas and Indian Frontier troops in mountain warfare, was of great value during these opera- tions. As the road had been destroyed by the Turks in several places, the problem of getting the guns up the pass was one of considerable difficulty, the more so as heavy rain had set in. This downpour, accompanied as it was by a considerable drop in temperature, was a severe trial for troops in summer clothing without greatcoats or blankets, who had, until a few hours before, been suffering from excessive heat. In spite of it the troops worked splendidly and took such rest as was possible in the rain among the rocks. Meanwhile the 52nd Division had advanced on a roughly parallel line along the Beit Likia road, where the badness of the track only permitted three sections of artillery to be brought up, and even these had to be double-horsed with the teams of the sections left at Ramleh.

In the Bethhoron area the 8th Mounted Brigade occupied Tahta at an early hour and then advanced through the Wadi Sunt where it met with opposition from some 400 Turks on the heights. The going here was extremely bad and later became impassable for horses. As advance in this direction was not possible the brigade held its position until the 6th Mounted Brigade could turn the enemy's flank by way of Beit ur el Foka. This brigade, with divisional headquarters, one battery of 13-pdrs., and the Hong- Kong and Singapore battery, reached Tahta at 1400, but the road difficulties were very great as the Roman road had deteriorated almost out of existence. Even greater difficulties were experienced by the 22nd Mounted Brigade, which, with one section of the Hong-Kong and Singapore battery struggled part of the way to Ain Arik, where but little enemy opposition was experienced.

On the plain the Australian and New Zealand Division sent patrols into Rantieh and located the enemy in occupation of redoubts at Nebi Tari and entrenched north of Hadrah on the Nahr el Auja.

On this day the 60th Division started north from the Gaza area.

To face Plate 18.

ADVANCE INTO JUDA PLATE 18 3 0- E/veMV UNtT UNLOCATED 53 DIV.

MEDITBHTIANEAN Ain el Yezakf rZtHi ¦i-T Tc<'6e NoKr SuJccrMT i ::!- less Sjtfl0N rS latruLAl\ Emdu S M<

"*t»r_*-'' ue AsiaJa HaMfmet, -u. Btit 7Suder e/ 6ha>pi}i I \ J/attifo ..I \ if V \ AijucM'~K yAldHi < „UmwAju

Atu/tu.

•I f «/» A Wreiq zOGtHi tee Si/r.-e/ of Eyypt . Dm 1918(0453} Miles 10 s Ifeprintei 'D fnMnc/ /9/9 SituaUon at 6 p m<,n 1.9- 1.|-)7 asknownat G.H.Q. E.E.F.

20 Miles November 20 and 21.

On Nov. 20 the advance was continued against a very determined resistance on the precipitoua slopes above Haris. The village itself, standing on a steep hill, was strongly held and was not stormed until 1415. The enemy left many dead among the rocks, and over fifty prisoners, including a battalion commander, were taken. The remainder of the Turkish force, estimated at a minimum of 2,000 rifles with many machine guns, covered by light guns, retired to the commanding ridge protecting Kurvet el Enab, being satisfactorily shelled by 4"5 howitzers from the road below the Makam Imam Ali during their retreat, The capture of such a position might well have cost the division dear had not a providen- tial fog rolled up, which enveloped the Turkish lines while the attacking force was deploying. Under cover of this at 1700 the 2/3rd Gurkhas, the l/5th Somersets and the l/4th Wilts (232nd and 233rd Brigades) attacked with the bayonet, and hsteners were able to deduce what was happening from the different timbre of the cheering which came back through the fog. By 1800 the Turks had lost Kuryet el Enab, and the division had seized the whole of the enemy's positions and bivouacked for the night in pouring rain. Next day Kustal and Soba were captured after some opposition had been overcome, by the 232nd and 234th Brigades respectively. During the advance along the crest of the ridge towards Biddu and Kubeibeh the Turkish small arm and artillery fire from Nebi Samwil (Mizpah of the Old Testament, Montjoye of the Crusaders) caused much annoyance. 4 separate attack, supported by the guns at Kuryet el Enab, was made on this position, and by 2345 Nebi Samwil was taken by the 234th Brigade, with the 3/3rd Gurkhas and the 2/4th Hants attached. The 75th Division had thus reached the furthest point of King Richard's advance in Jan., 1192. Reinforcements had been sent up by the 52nd Division and every effort was being made to make a track good enough for the guns to advance from Likia to Kubeibeh (four and a quarter miles).

Some three miles to the south, on the right of the 75th Division, the 5th Mounted Brigade of the Austrahan Division advanced astride of the railway up the narrow valley of Sorek (Wadi es Surar).

The 52nd Division had advanced as far as Beit Anan and Beit Dukku, three and four miles further north, while keeping a strong force at Beit Likia.

To the north of the 52nd Division the yeomanry in the Bethhoron country were being held up alike by the difficulties of the terrain and the tenacity of the Turks. The badness of the country along the left of this division's line of advance was in itself a protection, and the Turks refrained from attempting an attack from the north, but shewed great obstinacy on the ridges between Upper Beth- horon (Beit ur el Foka) and Beituna to within half a mile of which the 6th Mounted Brigade was able to advance before it was held up at 1100 by a force of over 3,000 Turks with four batteries of •77s and some camel guns. In spite of the arrival of two regiments of the 8th Mounted Brigade at 1145 and one from the 22nd at 1400, the yeomanry found that further advance was impossible, and when the Turks were reinforced at 1600 and out-ranged our mountain guns there was nothing for it but to retreat to Beit ur el Foka, an operation which began at 1930 and was successfully covered by the 8th Mounted Brigade. The 22nd Mounted Brigade during the day was engaged near Ram Allah.

In the plain the 60th Division arrived in the Mejdel area and the 54th Division was lent to the Desert Mounted Corps for the defence of the Ludd-Jaffa line, in front of which cavalry patrols rode uf) ro Rentis, Shukba, and Shebtin. The enemy still held the high land at Deir el Kuddis in this region as well as the northern bank of the Nahr el Auja.

By this date the moral ascendancy of the British had reached such a pitch that the following re- marks occur in a letter written by a German staff officer on Nov. 21 :— "We have had a very bad time. After having Had to reliiiquisli gocid positions which had been lield for so hmg, the breakdown of the army is greater than ever I could have imagined. But for this complete dissolution, we should still be able to make a good stnd at Jerusalem — now the Vllth Army bolts from any cavalry patrol." To face Plate Tfl, ADVANCE INTO JUDAEA PLATE. 19 30 UNLOCA TED ENEMY UNITS JLV CORPS, 1J9&20 DIVS. Probably N. ofUEFtUSALEM- A,n0/Y9i ¦ T«MSubi-( 'Wi'''- yL. ¦5''**Kf K \; "KhSetKih tlHiual .U Stie MEBITEnRANEAN T«l!.lf nrsuf f£l Hanurt rlrAd MeuJerrfp 2«4« Hasi&t is rl Ain \die o , , nian.

Jaffa RantitL J:»si SEA £1 DtUalttn /'v'SrjXI'C 3U0 Airrfebrdd El Kusr wan NoKrSuIwr* " " ~ ' _s /' '. .=«-« tttd by thr Survey of Egypt. Ore 1918 (0453) Miles 10 5 >m >M l-H I I I I I ,, SitxiatioiLat 6.f,m.oii2lJi.J7 asknownatG.H.O E.E.F fffprintea/ /n Siiff/anc/ /9/9, wMiles November 22-24.

The Turkish Vllth Army on Nov. 22 tried to recover some of the grotmd which it had lost, and launched in succession three formidable but fruitless coanter-attacks on Nebi Samwil. On the other hand, the enemy so strongly opposed our attack on El Jib that he was able to retain that position, although he lost Beit Izza to the 52nd Division. Next day the 75th Division made another attempt to take El Jib, supported by all available guns, but the enemy was in such strength, and his artillery and machine-gun fire so formidable, that no progress could be made. The 52nd Division reUeved the 75th during the night and began a fresh attack on the morning of Nov. 24. Simultaneously, the northern end of the ridge was also attacked, the Yeomanry Division made a demonstration towards Beitunia and a brigade was pushed forward against the high land north-west of El Jib. The third assault had no better result than its predecessors and it became apparent that cold and casualties had, for the moment, enabled the Tarks to bring the advance to a standstill within sight of Jerusalem. In conse- quence of this the 60th Division next day reheved the 75th Division from Soba northwards, while the 52nd Division was directed to discontinue the attack. The 60th Division had arrived at Junction Station on Nov. 22, where it was attached to the XXIst Corps and then proceeded to Latron.

The 5th Mounted Brigade, having the 10th Australian Light Horse regiment attached during these three days, moved up to Artuf on the 23rd and sent strong patrols as far as Ain Karim and Bittir next day. The 8th and 22nd Mounted Brigades successfully withdrew to Tahta during Nov. 22 and next day, owing to the difficulty of getting water and supplies, many horses were sent down to Ramleh. The Yeomanry Division on this day was attached to XXIst Corps and got into touch with the infantry east of Dukka on occupying Et Tire.

In the lower foothills the 7th Mounted Brigade on Nov. 22 entered Belain, Deir el Kuddis, and Shukbah without opposition, and the Turks were found to have fallen back to Abud. Next day this brigade, on being reheved along the line Sheikh el Gharbawy-Kh. Harmush by the 54th Division, withdrew to Zernukah into corps reserve. The Desert Mounted Corps was now holding the line Kh. Midieh-Kh. Harmush-Haditheh-El Yehudiyeh-Point 265-Birket el Jamus-Sheikh Abd en Neby, and the redistribution of troops shewn on the map was completed by the morning of the 24th, when the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, supported by two companies of infantry, crossed the Nahr el Auja and occupied a line covering Kh. Hadrah and Sheikh Muannis.

Meanwhile XXth Corps advanced headquarters had moved to Junction Station, and the 74th Division started north from Deir el Belah on 23rd, reaching Gaza on the afternoon of the next day. Patrols from Mott's detachment on the 24th established the fact that Ed Dhaheriyeh had been evacuated by the enemy.

To face Plate 20.

ADVANCE INTO JUDjSA PLATE 20 ENEMY UNITS UNLOCATED: 16,19 & 20 Dtvs.

MEBlTEIlItANBAN lM, Ain e/ Yeieh'fi IO>tlZ* Tell Sub- ™ * a Tin rZeid Mrsuf ff / haram < JsirAda, Tell«l Rehkeit/if, «*Ao , oKhSebah MamK eiKasot i/Hy nrzvn ctBeita .Futi hK\Mis /VarAmmar /rAI

Til tl SkuV 4lKud < 4**0 '"'IZTl nttd by tht Survey of £fypt. Ore 1918(0453) Miles 10 Ne/irintfd in Sny/-3f?a' /9/i).

xpMiles SiluationatS p.m oiiE4-|l-I7 asknownat G.H.O EEF.

November 25.

The enemy almost at once replied to the advance across the Auja. At 0300 he attacked Kh. Hadrah and by 0800 the position could no longer be held. The infantry retired across the river and two com- panies of infantry in support on the south bank suffered considerably while covering the withdrawal, as they had no artillery to help them. The Auckland Mounted Eifies remained until the infantry had crossed, and then withdrew behind Sheikh Muannis, while a detachment of the N.Z.M.E. Brigade Machine Gun Squadron crossed at Kh. Hadrah bridge. During the morning the enemy, who was hi some strength, also recovered Sheikh Muannis, and the rest of our people had to retire to their original line, in course of whieh the cavalry had to gallop the ford over the bar at the mouth of the Nahr el Auja. As a measure of precaution the 7th Mounted Brigade was brought five miles north to Kishon Ic Zion for a night, but the Turks were content with having recovered the line of the Auja and made no attempt to do anything more .

On the mountain front the enemy shelled Biddu and Nebi Samwil and attempted to attack Beit Izza with 300 men, but nothing came of it, and the Turks, who were quite as exhausted as the two British divisions on that front, were otherwise quiescent, except for their activity in digging-in, an opera- tion in which they were compulsorily assisted by drafts from the local population. In the Bethhoron area at 1400 about 200 Turks with machine guns were engaged by the Leicester Battery near Foka and the Stafford Yeomanry near Kh. Meita. Their advance was checked and an attack made at 1600 was broken up. Yeomanry Divisional Headquarters was established at Beit Ur et Tahta.

The 74th Division, hurrying up from the south, reached the Mejdel area.

r. face Plate 21.

ADVANCE INTO .JUDA:A PLATE 21 ~w ¦iES4Y UNITS UNLOCATED 16. 19 aj 20 01 VS.

AVf, okhSel>ohi\ ( "f nrsuf W£fHarajn if iA/AfA KtfrLuh Ur.

MEDITEURANEAN K'Ek-M.

DeirUtia 1 lr-«eflt'KB'id,f , Kasii uwara ShAt< Etdud/i Yasur / le? , Jel t/ TJrmusliooJ'iiluahuli IT* ir e/ Sha/piie 59 Aijup.

Mss5M.p K'AUi , , , . .

''Sun tyra 1(auitaba.\ d el Majeiiji Surrfo oScinj El Huleikat luje ¦Araki Mmnshn yt Jibr,\ Deir S'neiof Simsim Dim re * KhUnUnuium V\ Tn!&" : l/mn t/BeitAoft 102 " \ «*«.,. o Zuhtilik 9, ttW Bait SSflf'ili'ira/i/ Abu KuuirithX fW-19.

\ BtrelDumn tIKt BirA 1«il * Khuweiire 9I» ?k:; , -

/"/ ijnmh ( 3__ De ershebj* 1001/ Waiar.

OLZ/Wf 'rinfdby the Survty of Egypt. Dr<. 1918 (053) Miles 10 S Rf printed in Enqfland J9I3.

_tpMil«» Situationate p.m. on.25-lJ .l7...aslaiowiat G.H.Q.EJEP.

November 26 and 27.

During these two days the 60th Division reheved the 75th and the 52nd Divisions on the mountain front. The 75th withdrew down the pass to Latron and the 52nd began to move over into the Beth- horon area. Apart from sheUing there was no enemy activity on this part of the front. In the plain, however, on the 27th the enemy reinforced the garrison of Ferrekiyeh and the defences of the bridge across the Auja were improved. One battahon of the enemy was reported by the AustraUan and New Zealand Division to be advancing towards Mulebbis and another down the narrow gauge railway to Rantieh. In addition to this a number of Turks were seen digging in between Et Tireh and Eantieh and a detachment with machine guns advanced to Deir Tureif where the 54th Division was eno-aged as well as at Yehudiyeh. In the afternoon 4,000 Turks advanced to Mulebbis from the north.

On Nov. 27 three ofBcers and sixty men of the 6th Mounted Brigade, held the Zeitun post against 600 Turks with machine guns who were supported by artillery from Beitunia from 1400 until dark. The garrison, by then reduced to two officers and twenty-six men was reinforced during the night by another fifty men, and successfully held until dawn in spite of enemy attacks which lasted all night, and the destruction by shell fire of the building which they had been occupying. At 1500 enemy patrols were reported to be active to the north and in the neighboiu-hood of Deir Ibzia, and it became apparent that the enemy was hoping to work round the left flank of the thinly held ten-mile British line to the gap of five or six miles between the left flank of the yeomanry and Shilta, the nearest post of the 54th Division. Zeitun Post was ordered to hold out as long as possible, and No. 2 Light Armoured Car Battery was posted one mile west of Tahta on the Beit Sira road to prevent the enemy from advancing by way of Suffa. A staff officer had to ride down to Berfilya, seven miles away, before he could get in touch with communications and thus secure reinforcements, and at 2130 on Nov. 27, the 7th Mounted Brigade, which had come from Rishon le Zion and Zernulcah, left Deiran and reached Beit Ur et Tahta before dawn.

The stubborn defence by the Turkish forces in the hills can be explained by an appreciation of the situation written by Major von Papen on Nov. 23, 1917. In this, he states that an assault group, com- posed of the 19th, 20th, and 54th Infantry Divisions, will be formed by the end of the month at Tul Keram. In the meantime, every effort must be made, pending the attack of the assault group, to defend Jerusalem with the XXth Corps and the El Bire Group (Ilird Corps). He does not, however, hold out much hope of retaining Jerusalem, as the Turkish forces had been so shattered as to reduce the com- parative strength to a ratio of one to six.

On Nov. 21 the same writer had already reported to Count BernstorfE on the condition of the Turkish forces at this time : — " We have had a very bad time.

" The breakdown of the army, after having had to relinquish the good positions in which it had remained for so long, is 90 complete that I could never have dreamed of such a thing. But for this complete dissolution, we should still be able to make a stand south of .Jerusalem, even to-day. But now the Vllth Army bolts from every cavalry patrol.

" Many reasons have contributed to this sorrowful result, chiefly incapacity on the part of the troops and their leaders. Single men fight very pluckily, but the good officers have fallen and the remainder have bolted ; in Jerusalem alone, we arrested 200 officers and 5,000-6,000 men deserters.

" Naturally Enver presses very strongly to hold on to Jerusalem with all possible means, on account of the political effect. From a military point of view, it is a mistake, for this shattered army can only be put together again, if entirely removed from contact with the enemy and fitted out with new divisions. This, however, can only take place after the lapse of months.

" Now it is just a to.ss-np." That an army which had been so hammered as to break up into a condition meriting such criticism as the above should have been able to recover during the brief breathing space afforded to it by British difficulties over transport, and offer the stiu-dy resistance which our divisions had to overcome in tie motmtains of Judaea, is a fvu-ther illustration of the immense recuperative power of Turks in strong defensive positions.

To fare Plate 22.

ADVANCE INTO JUDiEA PLATE 22.

ensmy unn\ unlocated 16div.

Am el Yz ""¦trCI Muahait \nirii .rt«*w(_j KhtlZti El rtujibt Sh Maiudi oKhSeba EITir MEIfiaram M,t tTirAo.

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'rinfdby the Survey of Egypt. Dec 1918(0*53) Milec 10 »er, .'- '• mMIU* Situation. at 6 p.m,0n.27':.l.| -J7 asknowuat G.H.Q.E.E.F.

November 28, 29, and 30.

On Nov. 28, at noon, the XXth Corps took over the line from XXIst Corps, and its headquarters moved up from Junction Station to Latron. The line as then held by the 60th Division was from Soba on the south to Kustul-Beit Surik-Nebi Samwil-Beit Izza. Near here contact was made witli the Yeomanry Mounted Division which held Dukka-Beit Ur el Foka-Et Tahta, and thence to the new sector held by the 52nd Division at Suffa and Shilta after its relief by the 60th Division.

In view of the increasing stubbornness of the enemy and the coasequent need to prepare a more deliberate method of attack, it was of prime importance to improve communications. New roads were begun between Latron and Beit Likia to link up with the road made by XXIst Corps between Beit Likia and Biddu, and another was started from Kuryet el Enab to Kubeibeh, while the existing roads and tracks were improved into usefulness. Even so it was found that traffic beeame difficult after a few hours of rain, and that during wet weather camels were of little use. Consequently the Corps trans- port had to be supplemented by 2,000 donkeys to assist in supplying troops in the advanced positions. At this time the rear communications of the troops on the " Mountain Front " were limited to the partly metalled road from Gaza through Mejdel and Junction Station to Latron, and the Turkish .light railway, of which the maximum daily capacity was about 100 tons of Ordnance stores.

At 0500 on Nov. 28, as soon as the 7th Mounted Brigade had come into the line on the left of the 22nd Mounted Brigade at Hellabi, the Turks developed a formidable attack from Beit LTr el Foka to Suffa with some 3,000 rifles, four batteries of "77's, and some camel guns. To meet this a composite Artillery Brigade of the 74th Division was sent up from Latron to the neighbourhood of Point 1746, and the 155th Brigade of the 52nd Division came into the line on the left of the Yeomanry Division about noon. After considerable fighting Zeitun Post was withdrawn and Foka evacuated. A new line was taken up along a wooded ridge half way to Tahta, and during the evening a battalion of the 156th Brigade and the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade (Australian Mounted Division) came up in support.

At 1600 the 8th Mounted Brigade fell back on Dukka and the Turkish attack on Tahta was driven back by the 7th Mounted Brigade and the howitzers of the 52nd Division. At 1800 the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade came up in support of the 6th Mounted Brigade, and half an hour later a battalion of the 156th Brigade arrived in support of the 7th Mounted Brigade.

The enemy renewed his attacks during the night, advancing south of .Suffa until compelled to retire at 0800 by the fire of the 268th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery. As he was retiring he suffered satisfactory losses from the enfilade fire of the 7th Mounted Brigade's machine guns. By 1600 on Nov. 29, the Turks were tired of attacking and contented themselves with artillery work and sniping. During the after- noon and night the 8th and 6th Mounted Brigades were relieved by the 231st Brigade of the 74th Division which had now come up into the line, and the 22nd and 7th Mounted Brigades by the 157th Brigade of the 52nd Division. The reliefs were completed by 0500 on Nov. 30, and the four mounted brigades moved back to Beit Sira where they were joined in the afternoon by the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade, on the way to Divisional Headquarters at Annabeh, where the Yeomanry Division concentrated that evening and rejoined the Desert Mounted Corps.

At a Corps conference held near Yalo, in the Valley of Ajalon, it was decided, on account of the absence of roads and shortage of water in the country to the north-west, to attack the Turkish positions covering Jerusalem from the south-west and west instead of from the north-west.

To face Plate 23.

ADVANCE INTO JUDAIA PL H' ;-r nl-'?a' in £r/cf/nc/ /ff/S.

Situationat 6 p,rn, joil30JJ,I.7 ..asloiowiat G.H.OEJE.F.

December 1 and 2.

In the morning at 0120 shock troops belonging to the 19th Turkish Division attacked the point of junction between the 3rd and 4th AustraUan Light Horse Brigade near El Burj. At 0150 the 8th Aus- traUan Light Horse Eegiment were strengthened by some Gloucester Yeomanry and a company of the l/4th Royal Scots Fusiliers (155th Brigade) who came up in support. The enemy was exposed to a cross-fire from rifles and machine gims as well as to that of the 268th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, and of the Hong-Kong and Singapore Battery. At 0530 an encircling movement was made which resulted in the capture of 112 prisoners. The enemy also lost over 100 killed and twenty wounded, who were picked up. At the same time a determined attack was made on the 157th Brigade (52nd Division) holding the Tahta defences. An important position was lost for a time, but recovered after stubborn hand-to-hand fighting at 0430. After this the enemy withdrew a little, and abandoned further attempts to dislodge our troops from this sector of the front. On the same day three determined Turkish attacks were made on the Nebi Samwil positions held by the 60th Division. In these the enemy appears to have lost more than 500 killed.

On the first of the month the 10th Division, which had started north from Belah on Nov. 27, took over the line Wadi Zait-Tahta-Kh. Faaush, a mile to the north of Beit Sira, and the 52nd Division reverted to XXIst Corps.

The 5th Mounted Brigade came into Divisional Reserve at El Burj on the night of Dec. 1 and, on the 2nd, the 7th Mounted Brigade left the Australian Mounted Division and went into Corps Reserve near Akir, where the Yeomanry Division had arrived from Annabeh during the previous day.

To face Piute 24.

ADVANCE INTO JUDA:a PLATL 24.

Reprinted /'n fnar/anc/ /9f9.

Situationat 6. p.tnoiL 2-12-17 asknownat G.H.Q E.EP.

December 3 and 4.

On Dec. 3 the Royal Devon Yeomanry Regiment of the 229th Brigade (74th Division) re- captured Beit Ur el Foka with seventeen prisoners and three machine guns, and repulsed a series of counter-attacks. Owing, however, to the fact that the enemy still held high ground from which the village could be dominated with machine-gun fire, the place was evacuated and our troops withdrew to their original line, leaving fifty dead Turks in the village of Foka alone.

On the night of Dec. 3-4 the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade raided Bald Hill. Further to the left the 2nd Austrahan Light Horse Brigade killed twenty Turks and captured five prisoners. During the next night the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade relieved the Imperial Camel Corps in the line about Point 265. The latter withdrew to Yebna and thence to Shellal. During the same night the 10th Division relieved the 229th and 230th Brigades of the 74th Division and extended its line to cover Beit Dukku.

December 5, 6, 7, and 8.

In the process of concentration for the great attack which was to result in the fall of Jerusalem, a process which occupied from Dec. 4 to 7, the 53rd Division, with the exception of the 158th Brigade, and the XXth Corps Cavalry, began to move north along the Beersheba-Hebron road and reached the Bilbeh area on Dec. 6, getting into touch with the 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment which had occupied El Kudr. On Dec. 5 the enemy withdrew a little in front of the 10th Division. This enabled our troops to occupy Kh. Hellabi and Suffa, and the Australian Mounted Division also moved forward a short distance. That night the 231st Brigade of the 74th Division relieved the 60th Division in the Beit Izza and Nebi Samwil sector, and during the next night the 74th Division took over the line as far south as the Makam of Sheikh Abdul Aziz, one mile south-east of Beit Surik. At 0700 on Dec. 5 patrols reported that Kefr Rut, about one mile west from Suffa, had been evacuated by the enemy. Accordingly, an hour later, the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade and the 5th Mounted Brigade moved forward, and at 1530 the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade occupied a line about 1,000 yards north-north-east of El Burj further to the west. Thus, in the evening, the Desert Mounted Corps held a line running through a point 500 yards east-north-east of Kh. ed Daty, another point 1,500 yards north of that place, Shilta, and a point 500 yards west of Shilta. This filled the gap between the 31st Brigade of the 10th Division on the right and the 233rd Brigade of the 75th Division on the left.

On Dec. 7 the XXIst Corps took over the line covering Ramleh, Ludd, and Jaffa. The 75tb Division had the eastern sector on the right, the 54th Division the central sector, and the 52nd Division the coastal or western sector on the left.

On the eve of the attack the Turks were holding a line covering Bethlehem on the south and running north past Ras el Balua, Ain el Hand, Kibriyan, Kulat el Ghuleh, to the west of Ain Harim and along the formidable ridge running above the Wadi es Surar in front of Deir Yesin and Beit Iksa. It continued north to the east of Nebi Samwil, to the west of El Jib and thence in a westerly direction past Kh. ed Dreihemeh, Et Tireh, Beit Ur el Foka, Kh. Ilasa. Kh. Aberjan to a point near Suffa. As a prehminary to the main attack the 179th Brigade with the mountain batteries crossed the Wadi Surar during the night and by 0330 had captured the high ground south of Ain Karim. In spite of rain the main attack began at dawn on Dec. 8. It was supported by the Divisional Artillery, the 96th Heavy Artillery Group of three 6-inch batteries — the 383rd, 387th, and 440th — one 60-pounder battery and one section of the 195th Heavy Battery, the Hong Kong and Singapore Battery attached to the 74th Division, the 10th and 16th Moimtain Batteries attached to the 60th Division and the 91st Heavy Battery attached to the 53rd Division. The 60th and 74th Divisions attacked at 0515 and by 0700 had captured the line of Turkish trenches crowning the formidable hills to the east of the Wadi Surar. Considerable difficulty was experienced before the great Heart and Liver Redoubts and the carefa'ly prepared works at Deir Yesin could be taken by the 60th Division. The main road past Kulonieh and up the steep ascent to Lifta was exposed to Turk- ish artillery and machine-gun fire, which greatly interfered with the advance of this division and the movements of its guns. The country traversed was very broken and precipitous and the rain and darkness greatly increased the difficulty of the advance. The weather and strenuous Turkish resistance had delayed the 53rd Division and it was only at 0900 that it could get into position to attack the high ground west and south-west of Beit Jala, consequently this division was unable effectively to protect the right flank of the 60th. The necessity for securing this flank made it impossible for the 60th Division to advance so far as its right was concerned. On the left it encountered serious opposition at 1330 which was only overcome by a bayonet charge at 1600. Further north the 74th Division reached Beit Iksa by 1100, but was there held up by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, and was unable to capture the El Burj ridge to the north-east owing to enfilade fire from the right. The attack was suspended and at nightfall both divisions consolidated the fine to which they had advanced while the 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment at Malhah and the 1/1 Worcester Yeomanry (the Corps Cavalry Regiment) maintained communication amid the rain and mist with the 53rd Division near Beit Jala. In the morning the Worcester Yeomanry worked right across the front of the 53rd Division and cut the enemy's line of retreat by getting astride of the Jericho road where it turns east from the Valley of Jehoshaphat.

During the night the 53rd Division had pusjied forward to the outskirts of Bethlehem from which the enemy withdrew, and by 0830 on Dec. 9 the division had advanced to a line two and a half miles Tu face Plate 25.

n ADVANCE INTO JUDMJl PLATE 25 30' Uf (LOCATED 2 Cavalry Reqts.&e/ementsof 150" Regt .3rriving from AMMAN.

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south of Jerusalem. The enemy, having no hope of holding Jerusalem now that his positions overhauging the Wadi Surar had been forced, made no counter-attacks during the night but retired to a line north and north-east of the city which was surrendered at 0830 by the Mayor who approached the outpost of the 180th Brigade. Major-Gen. Shea commanding the 60th Division, was instructed to accept the surrender, and did so at 1300.

On the morning of Dec. 8 large numbers of the inhabitants of Jerusalem, with the remaining religious chiefs, were personally warned by the police to be ready to leave at once. The extent to which the Turks were prepared to clear the city is shown by the fact that out of the Armenian community of 1,400 souls 300 received this notice. Jemal Pasha, when warned that vehicles were unavailable for the transport of the unhappy exiles to Shechem or Jericho, telegraphed curtly that they and theirs must walk. The fate of countless Armenians and many Greeks has shown that a population of all ages suddenly turned out to walk indefinite distances under Turkish escort is exposed to outrage and hardship which prove fatal to most of them ; but the delay in telegraphing had saved the population, and the sun had risen for the last time on the Ottoman domination of Jerusalem, and the Txirks' power to destroy faded with the day.

Towards dusk the British troops were reported to have passed Lifta, and to be within sight of the city. On this news being received, a sudden panic fell on the Turks west and south-west of the town, and at 1700 civilians were surprised to see a Turkish transport column galloping furiously cityward along tho Jaffa road. In passing they alarmed all units within sight or hearing, and the wearied infantry arose and fled, bootless and without rifles, never pausing to think or to fight. Some were flogged back by their officers and were compelled to pick up their arms ; others staggered on through the mud, augmenting the confusion of the retreat.

After four centuries of conquest the Turk was ridding the land of his jresence in the bitterness of defeat, and a great enthusiasm arose among the Jews. There was a running to and fro ; daughters called to their fathers and brothers concealed in outhouses, cellars, and attics, from the police, who sought them for arrest and deportation. " The Turks are rimning," they called ; " the day of dehverance is come ". The nightmare was fast passing away, but the Turk still lingered. In the evening he fired his guns con- tinuously, perhaps heartening himself with the loud noise that comforts the soul of a barbarian, perhaps to cover the sound of his own retreat. Whatever the intention was, the roar of the gimfire persuaded most citizens to remain indoors, and there were few to witness the last act of Osmanli authority.

Towards midnight the Governor, Izzet Bey, went personally to the telegraph ofiice, discharged the stali, and himself smashed the instruments with a hammer. At 0200 on Sunday tired Turks begfn to troop through the Jaffa gate from the west and south-west, and anxious watchers, peering out through the windows of the Grand New Hotel to learn the meaning of the tramping, were cheered by the sull( n remark of an officer, "Gitmaya mejburuz" ("We've got to go"), and from 0200 till 0700 that morning the Turks streamed through and out of the city, which echoed for the last time their shuffling tramp. On this same day 2,082 years before, another race of conquerors, equally detested, were looking their last on the city which they could not hold, and inasmuch as the liberation of Jerusalem in 1917 will probably amehorate the lot of the Jews more than that of any other commimity in Palestine, it was fitting that the flight of the Turks should have coincided with the national festival of the Hanukah, which com- memorates the recapture of the Temple from the heathen Seleucids by Judas Maccabaeus in 165 B.C.

The Governor was the last civil official to depart. He left in a cart belonging to Mr. Vester, an American resident, from whom he had " borrowed " an hitherto imrequisitioned cart and team. Before the dawn he hastened down the Jericho road, leaving behind him a letter of surrender, which the Mayor as the sun rose set forth to deliver to the British commander, accompanied by a few frightened police- men holding two tremulous white flags. He walked towards the Lifta Hill and met the first representa- tives of the British Army on a spot which may be marked in the future with a white stone as the site of a historic episode.

The last Turkish soldier is said to have left Jerusalem at about 0700 by the east gate of the city, which is named after St. Stephen, but even later armed stragglers were still trickling along the road just outside the north wall, requisitioning food and water at the point of the bayonet. This is no grevious crime on the part of defeated troops, uncertain of their next meal, but is recorded as the last kick of the dying Ottoman authority in a city where it had been supreme for four centuries.

As the Turkish flood finally ebbed away into the shadowy depths of the Valley of Jehoshaphat the townsfolk roused themselves from the lethargy into which hunger and the Turkish poUce had plunged them and fell upon a variety of buildings, official or requisitioned for official purposes, and looted them, even stripping roofs, doors, and floors from the Ottoman barracks next to the Tower of David for firewood. It must be admitted tliat, as the Government had furnished and maintained itself almost entirely by uncompensated requisitions, the crowd was only trying to itidemiiif\- itself. But this disorder ceased as suddenly as it had aiiaen on the appearance of the British infantry, T» ffUM Plata ii.

ADVANCE INTO JUDA:a PLATE 26 30 Am el Yfiehf El TfiM Sh Maioi/A EIRasoi"! UfrZeKi IMrsuF 4,EI Maram eiTir Ku$e\p o fla/a \ T«llclRel

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jpMiles December 9 and 10.

After tho surrender of Jerusalem the 74th and 60th Divisions wheeled northwards pivotting on Nebi Samwil. The 74th met with no great opposition but the 60th Division on debouching shortly after 1030 from the suburbs to the north of the Lifta road came under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from the ridge to the west of Sir John Grey Hill's house on the Mount of Olives, which was strongly held by the enemy. At about 1600 the Turks were dislodged from this at the point of the bayonet, leaving seventy dead. Meanwhile on the left of the division the 180th Brigade which was advancing along tho ridge to the east of the Wadi Beit Hannina, occupied Shafat and Tel el Ful on the Shechem (Nablus) road.

By 1100 the 53rd Division was at Mar Elias with its advanced guard on the Jericho road to the south-east of Jerusalem. The Mount of Olives was strongly defended by the Turks, and the division was not able to drive them off until nightfall.

The same day the Desert Mounted Corps extended its front to the east so as to include Sufla. This move brought the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade from El Burj up into the neighbourhood of Kh. ed Daty. During this period the enemy line ran westwards just in front of Khurbetha ibn Harith, Jurdeh, Deir el Kuddis, and Nalin.

On Dec. 10 the 53rd Division was engaged to the east of Jerusalem in pushing the enemy back off the ridges from which he could observe the Holy City.

Note on the Surrender of Jerusalem.

Before the arrival of the flag of truce on Dec. 9 the movement of the crowds accompanying it had been observed and reported by patrols, but definite news of the impending surrender was first actually communicated to British soldiers by civihans, who informed Pte. H. E. Church and Pte. R. W. J. Andrews of the 2/20th Battalion London Regiment. These men, who had advanced into the outskirts of Jerusalem in order to obtain water, reported what had been told to them without meeting the flag of truce. Shortly before 0800 Sergt. Hurcomb and Sergt. Sedgewick, of the 2/19th Battalion London Regiment, met the Hag of truce andj shortly afterwards. Major W. Beck, R.A., and Major F. R. Barry, R.A., came upand entered into conversation with the Mayor. They turned back to report the presence of the flag of truce, and met Lieut. -Col. H. Bailey, D.S.O., and Major M. D. H. Cooke. Lieut. -Col. Bailey, as senior officer, declmed to accept the surrender and reported the Mayor's wishes to Brig.-General C. F. Watson, C.M.G., D.S.O. , Commanding 180th Brigade, who rode up a few minutes later and reassured the Mayor. Brig.-General Watson transmitted the olfer of the surrender of Jerusalem to Major-General J. S. M. Shea, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C. 60th Division, who was then at Enab. Major-General Shea communicated with Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode, Bt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C. XXth Corps, and about 1100 was instructed to accept the surrender of the city. In the meantime Brig.-General Watson (with' a small mounted escort, followed by the Mayor in his carriage) had ridden forward to reassure the people, and was the first British soldier to arrive at the Jaffa Gate. Guards were posted at 0930 from the 2/171 h Battalion London Regiment over the Post Office, which had been occupied in the interval by Major Cooke, at some hospitals, and outside the Jaffa Gate. Shortly after Brig.-General Watson's arrival a mounted patrol from the 53rd Division appeared. Major-General Shea, on arriving in a motor car outside the Post Office, sent for the Mayor and Chief of Pohce. These functionaries were informed that Major-General Shea accepted the surrender of the city in the name of the Commander-in-Chief, and Brig.-General Watson was directed to make the necessary arrangements for the maintenance of order.

To face Plate 27.

OCCUPATIOIsr OF JERUSALEM PLATE 27 Reprinted in England /9/9. Miles .tf-na-f-irt-n at- A r\ m ra\ Q ""1—17 aalm/i'MTn nt C\ W C\ T<*. T. n Dacembar 11 and 12.

On Dec. 11 the Comraander-ia-Cliief, followed by representatives of tlic Allies, made his formal entry into Jerusalem. The historic Jaffa Gate was opened, after years of disuse, for the purpose, and he was thus enabled to pass into the Holy City without making use of the gap in the wall made for the Emperor William in 1898. When the time came for the great and simple act of the solemn entry of General Allenby into Jerusalem, and the Arab prophecy was fulfilled that when the Nile had flowed into Palestine, the prophet (Al Nebi) from the west should drive the Turk from Jerusalem, the inhabitants mustered courage to gather in a great crowd. They were themselves amazed, for during more than three years an assembly of more than three persons in one place was discouraged by the police by blows, fines, imprisomnent, and even exile. Eye-witnesses of all three events state that the crowd gathered at the Jaffa gate to greet the General was larger than that which met the Emperor William when on his fantastic political pilgrimage, and denser than the gathering which greeted the revival of the Ottoman Constitu- tion when it was proclaimed, ten years later, at the Damascus Gate, where there is more space. Many wept for joy, priests were seen to embrace one another, but there were no theatricalities such as the hollcw reconciliations which made the triumph of the Young Turk in 1908 memorable, and sicken the memories of those who know the horrors and calamities which that triumph was doomed to bring. The General entered the city on foot, and left it on foot, and throughout the ceremony no Allied flag was flown, while naturally no enemy flags were visible.

A proclamation announcing that order would be maintained in all the hallowed sites of the three great religions, which were to be guarded and preserved for the free use of worshippers, was read in English, French, Arabic, Hebrew, Greek, Russian, and Italian, from the terrace of the entrance to the citadel below the Tower of David. When this was done the chief notables and ecclesiastics of the different communities who had remained in Jerusalem were presented to General Allenby. After this brief cere- mony the Commander-in-Chief left the city by the Jaffa Gate.

In the neighbourhood of Jerusalem there was no fighting on this day apart from an attack by a small party of Turks near Tel el Ful which was repulsed by the 179th Brigade.

In the XXIst Corps area the 75th Division advanced its front to the line Midieh-Kh. Hamid-Budrus- Sheikh Obeid Rahil, meeting with slight opposition in the process. An enemy counter-attack, after prehminary bombardment of the Zeifizfiyeh Ridge, at 1000 was repulsed.

On Dec. 12 the 53rd Division improved its position by advancing several hundred yards, but there was otherwise little activity on either side.

The 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade relieved the ith Austrahan Light Horse Brigade in oho Suffa-Ih. ed Daty sector of the line.

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December 13 to 22.

On Dec. 13 the 53rd Division further advanced its line, and the 181st Brigade of the 60th Division captured Ras el Kharrubeh (near Anata) with forty-three prisoners and two machine guns. During the fine weather which lasted until the afternoon of Dec. 14 much road work was done. Preparations were being made for the further advance which was to drive the enemy back to a respectful distance from Jerusalem, and at dawn on Dec. 17, two battalions of the 160th Brigade attacked the high ground east of Abu Dis. The ridge was captured with a loss to the enemy of forty-six killed, 126 prisoners, and two machine guns. The 53rd Division, which was taking over the line as far north as the Wadi Anata, was again engaged on Dec. 21, when the 159th Brigade stormed Ras ez Zamby (about two and a quarter miles west-north-west of Jerusalem) and White Hill. There was a good deal of fighting and the position with three machine guns was not taken until noon. The Turks made three counter-attacks which cost them a further loss of fifty killed.

The 60th Division, relieved as far as the Wadi Anata by the 53rd, took over the Ime east of Nebi Samwil from the 74th Division, which in its turn extended to Beit Ur et Tahta on the west. This read- justment was effected by Dec. 21.

On Dec. 14 the 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment which had been attached to the 60th Division during the operations against Jerusalem, rejoined the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade in the Desert Mounted Corps area.

On Dec. 15 the 75th Division again advanced their line and took in Kibbiah and Kb. Ibbaneh, while the 54th Division took Khirbet el Bornat and moved up to Et Tireh. At this place and at Kh, . Ibbaneh the enemy made some resistance.

In the coastal sector preparations were being made by the XXIst Corps to remove the enemy from his positions at the mouth of the Nahr el Auja, which menaced the town and landing place of Jaffa and the main road thence to Ramleh. The River Auja, some forty yards wide and ten feet deep between abrupt banks, was in itself a formidable obstacle to an advance. The enemy had entrenched the high northern bank and also held Bald Hill with a line of trenches about a mile to the south of Mulebbis and Fejja.

Major-General Hill, Commanding the 52nd Division, on Dec. 14 submitted a plan for making a sur- prise passage of the river. The requisite preparations were made — portable bridges were constructed by the Engineers, under cover of the orange groves of Sarona, pontoons were assembled and canvas corracles, capable of carrying twenty men apiece, were built from local materials. A considerable con- centration of artillery was also effected and, on Dec. 18 and 19, the 52nd Division was relieved in the trenches by the 161st Brigade of the 54th Division and the Auckland and Wellington Mounted Rifle Regts. At the same time the 75th Division extended its front westwards so as to enable the 54th Division to spare the 161st Brigade from near lAidd.

Three days' heavy rain followed which considerably increased the volume of water in the Auja and did much to render its south bank difficult of access by turning the plain into a mud swamp. In spite of this the surprise attack was successful. The covering parties crossed unperceived during the night of Dec. 20 amid wind and rain in their corracles, and the bridges were placed in position. Owing to the extreme lightness of their construction (they were designed to be carried nearly two miles), some of them collapsed after a time, and the 156th Brigade had to link arms and cross breast-dee]) at the ford.* The enemy's trenches covering the river were rushed in silence and captured. Sheikh Muannis was carried at the point of the bayonet, Kh. Hadrah was rushed and captured, and by the dawn of Dec. 21 the 52nd Division had occupied the whole line from Hadrah to Tel el Rekkeit on the sea two miles north of the river-mouth. The enemy had been completely taken by surprise and lost many killed in addition to 316 prisoners and ten machine guns.

Throughout Dec. 21 preparations were made to enable the rest of the division to cross, and during the night of Dec. 21-22, while the 52nd was establishing itself to the north of the Auja, the 54th Division stormed and captured Bald Hill, two miles south of Mulebbis, in spite of the determined resistance of the enemy, who lost fifty-two killed and forty-four prisoners. As a result of this the enemy retired from Mulebbis f and Fejja at dawn and the 54th Division was able to occupy these villages without further opposition. A little later in the day Rantieh was also occupied.

During Dec. 22 the 52nd Division advanced to the line Tel el Mukhmar at the confluence of the Wadi Ishkar and the Auja-Sheikh el Ballutah-Arsuf, on the cliffs above the sea. This operation was greatly assisted by the co-operation of a squadron composed of H.M.S." Grafton," flying the flag of Rear- Admiral Jackson, H.M.M. 29, 31, and 32, and H.M.D. " Lapwing " and " Lizard." The ships shelled El Jelil and compelled parties of the enemy to retire rapidly northwards from El Haram and Arsuf.

As a result of this successful advance the Turks were driven back five miles and Jaffa became more secure as a landing-place for stores.

• This spot is now marked by an antique column with inscription, t Mulebbis contains the important Hebrew Colony of Petach Tikvah.

To face Plate 29.

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December 23-31.

On the assumption that the general advance into the southern portions of Mount Ephraim would begin on the night of Dec. 24, the 180th and 181st Brigades had been instructed to advance against Kh. Adaseh and a point north of Beit Hannina respectively at dawn on Dec, 23. The 180th Brigade was unable to take its objective before the attack was abandoned owing to the postponement of the general advance on account of weather. The new advance was now fixed for dawn on Dec. 27, but at 2330 on 26th, the enemy launched an attack and drove in the outposts of the 60th Division at Kh. Ras et Tawil and the quarries to the north of it ; at the same time, seven and a half miles to the west, the 24th Welsh Regiment (Pembroke and Glamorgan Yeomanry) stormed Hill 1910, close to Et Tireh, and held it in spite of a strong counter-attack, kilUng seventy Turks and capturing three machine guns.

At dawn on Dec. 27 the Turks made determined attacks on White Hill and Ras ez Zamby, from the former of which our troops were dislodged. The position was recovered after dark as the enemy had been unable to occupy it owing to our artillery fire. A company of the 2/1 0th Middlesex held Deir ibn Obeid all day and night against vigorous attacks, although surrounded and cut off for several hours. At 0130 the whole line was engaged. The enemy made eight assaults before 0800, chiefly in the neighbourhocd of Tel el Ful. In one place he estabhshed himself in part of our line until ejected by the 2/15th Londons who advanced in spite of an artillery and machine-gun enfilade. Between 0230 and 0630 the 2/24th Londons repelled four energetic attacks. After a lull in the fighting the enemy delivered an assault with an unexpectedly large number of men at 1255. The Turks succeeded in. reaching certain sections of the main line but a counter-attack restored our original front.

In spite of the enemy activity on the front of the 53rd and 60th Divisions the general advance began, according to plan, at 0600 on the left where the 29th and 30th Brigades pushed forward in the face of considerable opposition. The 1st Leinsters and 5th Counaught Rangers had a good deal of fighting west of Deir Ibzia but, when this was taken, there was not much trouble in reaching the line r unnin g north-westerly in front of this village through Shabuny to Sheikh Abdullah,, where connexion was made with the Australian Mounted Division. This advance was supported by the 263rd Field Artillery Brigade and the 9th and 10th Moimtain Batteries. The 31st Brigade (10th Division), supported by the 68th Field Artillery Brigade from near Tahta, advanced at 0700 to the Hue running from the right of the 29th and 30th Brigades through Kh. el Hafy to near Kh. Jeriut. The 229th Brigade (74th Division), supported by the 67th (from near Foka and Likia), the 44th and 117th Field Artillery Brigades started at 0750 and reached the west end of the Sheikh Abu ez Zeitun ridge at 0900. From now on the advance was exposed to constant artillery and machine-gun fire, and the whole ridge was only captured after dusk. At 1015 the 24th Royal Welsh Fusiliers (231st Brigade) captured Kh. ed Dreiheraeh and at 1100 assaulted Hill 2450 some 600 yards to the north-east. The result of this advance was apparent by 14C0 when the enemy was observed to be moving his 1st Division westwards from Bireh, thus showing that he found himself forced to conform to oiu" movements and to abandon the initiative.

On Dec. 28 the 158th Brigade captured Anata, but the l/7th Royal Welsh Fusiliers were held up for a long time on Ras Arkub es Suffa, one and three-quarters of a mile to the south-east, and only gained the position after dusk. The 1/lst Herefords also seized Kh. Ahnit, one mile north-east of Anata after dark. The right flank of the fiOth Division was thus covered from an attack from the Jericho road. The 00th Division captured Kh. Adaseh at 1725 with the 180th Brigade, while the 181st was sent forward on the left and occupied El Jib, which had caused so much trouble on Nov. 23, andBirNebala shortly after noon. The 180th pushed on and seized the Er Ram — Rafat line at 1915.

Early m the morning of Dec. 28 the 74th Division completed the capture of Hill 2450. The main advance was resumed at 1330 and by dusk the division had reached the line from the left of the 60th Division at Rafat to the right of the 229th Brigade near Beitunia, which had been captured in face of strong opposition at 1550, when the commander of the garrison, seventy other prisoners, and seven machine guns were taken. Further west Kefr Skiyan was taken by the 31st Brigade at 1740, and the 29th and 30th Brigades had a lot of trouble from enemy machine guns cunningly hidden among the rocks in very broken coimtry before they could take Abu el Ainein (seven furlongs north-east of An Arik) and Kh. Rubin. At 1430 a 6-inch howitzer of the 378th Siege Battery, which had been moved i o Beit Ur el Foka during the morning, began to bombard the enemy withdrawmg from Ram Allah and persevered until midnight.

On Dec. 29 enemy opposition faded away on the extreme right and the 159th Brigade pressed north- wards to cover the flank of the 60th Division. Hizmeh and Jeba were thus occupied without difficulty and 271 enemy dead were buried on the 53rd Division front — the haryest of the last three days. At 0600 the 60th Division resimaed its advance. The 181st Brigade was held up just short of Bireh and Ras et Tahuneh until the 303rd Field Artillery Brigade could get into action by way of the main road, as the Kulundia track was impassable for guns. At 1430 the advance was resumed, and at 1615 the 2/22nd and 2/23rd Londons were in position by the Ram Allah-Bireh road to assault the Tahuneh ridge which was captured, after a stubborn defence, at 1700. Meanwhile, on the right the 2/19th and 2/20th Londons stormed Shab Salah, a precipitous and strongh -held position. This was captured by 1530, and the 2/17th and 2/18th Londons (180th Brigade) pushed forward by 1830 and captured the ridge half a mile north-west of Burkah. At 2100 the 180th and 181st Brigades occupied the line To face Plate 30 \u\j\xSi iiN 1 ij iviuuiM iiiiitAiM AND SHARON PL 30 iikterJiy Tell el Akhdarf(/v./*«'r«', .-•-Ar/w-//? ' aaA

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Beitin-Balua-Kh. el Burj without serious opposition. Ram Allah had been occupied bj the 229th and 230th Brigades at 0917 and, by 2100, the latter was holding a line between the left of the 60th Division and Et Tireh, where the ridge had been occupied by the 10th Division without opposition 60on after 0800.

The Royal Flying Corps by timely information during the course of the day greatly assisted the operations of the XXth Corps and, by bombing the enemy's retreating columns, caused him heavy loss and hindered his withdrawal.

By the morning of Dec. 30 enemy resistance on our right flank had died down and the XXth Corps took up the position shewn in the adjoining map. Throughout these operations the Australian Mounted Division carried out strong reconnaissances and advanced its line to the north of Deir el Kuddis and Khurbetha ibn Harith on Dec. 29. On Dec. 31 this sector as far as a point 500 yards north-west of Deir el Kuddis was taken over by the 29th Brigade and the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade relieved the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade in the Deir el Kuddis-Nalin sector.

During the operations between Dec. 11 and 31, the XXth Corps took 1,301 prisoners, of whom 750 were captured during the three days Dec. 27-29. Twenty-four machine gmis were also taken.

The map opposite shows the extent of territory — all Philistia and almost all Judaea — from which the Turks had been driven as a result of the successive advances of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force up to the end of 1917.

7b face Plate 3i t AREA OCCUPIED AS THE RESULT OF OPERATIONS FROM OCTOBER 2810 DECEMBER31-1917 PLATE 31 "T" r Cilasio to lo «• fto ••If ilea REFERENCE \rva. irt occvLpadbuan. of TVirka. L .• oteo/o/'TiirlM during peHoJ Oc*28«cv5i*-i.9/7 BCIRD HojiaM pr-cvioiu to Odobr* 281917 MEDITERRANEA HmU, SEA •Sai4a J) 2V Dtna.''\ u44 Ei* mmo/ij |DAMA6CU6 SMi-a m»ki Sham DEVELOPMENT OFmTER SUPPLY PRIOR TO OPERATIONS }wr:-REc3ngi7 ¦roducr bythe Survty fifj>pt 0#c /9f8(04SS) Reprinted m En/and //9 February 18.

As a preliminary to the operations for the capture of Jericho the 53rd Division relieved the 60th on the line astride of the Shecheni (Nablus) road in order that the Londoners might take over the eastern front. The 74th Division detailed the 231st Brigade for service with the 60th, and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and 1st Austrahan Light Horse Brigades were also attached. A week before the advance the 60th Division held a line running northward from Kh. Deir ibn Obeid to Ras Arkub es Sulfa, passing about three miles to the east of Jerusalem. Thence it ran north-westerly to Hizmeh and a point three- quarters of a mile south of Burkah. Here the 53rd Division had its extreme right. At dawn on Feb. 14 the 60th Division seized Mukhmas (Michmash) and Tel es Suwan just after the 53rd had captured Kh. el Alia and Deir Diwan. By the night of the 18th the Wellington Mounted Rifles were at Kh. Deir ibn Obeid, and the rest of the New Zealand Moimted Rifles Brigade and the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade with their Divisional Headquarters were concentrated in Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

To face Plate 38.

February 19-21.

On the morning of Feb. 19 the 53rd and 60th Divisions attacked the Turkish positions which were held in some strength along a series of commanding heights. The 2/23rd Londons took Splash Hill, about one mile east of Tel es Suwan, with thirty-two prisoners, at 0600. Rummon was captured by the 2/lOth Middlesex at 0830, and Ras et Tawil was abandoned by the enemy to the 181st Brigade at 0900, owing to our artillery fire. The Turks made a stout resistance across the Arak Ibrahim ridge to the south of the Wadi Farah, where the 2/20th Londons were held up in spite of three assaults. Finally, the position was stormed after artillery had played upon it from 1330 to 1400. While this fighting had been in progress to the north the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division had passed through the wilderness of Jeshimon and concentrated near El Muntar, little more than six miles from the Dead St a. Ey nightfall the line held by the 60th Division ran northward from this point, shewing an average advance of three miles over very bad country during the day. Armoured cars had reconnoitred the Jericho road beyond this line but were held up by a broken bridge three-quarters of a mile further on. The Turks still held a strong position to the south of, and astride, the Jericho road, and during the night the 179th Brigade moved into the Wadi Sidr to deploy for an attack on Jebel Ekteif. The 180th Brigade only reached its positions of deployment in this wadi, at dawn, as the Turks had made three counter-attacks against the sector of front held by the 2/18th Londons.

On the morning of the 20th the advance of the cavalry against Jebel el Kalimim and Tubk el Kunei- trah was necessarily slow owing to the badness of the country. In places progress was only possible in single file along tracks which were under accurate artillery and machine-gun fire from Neby Musa and the two immediate objectives. These two hills were, however, captured by a dismounted attack delivered by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade shortly after noon. Meanwhile, the 180th Brigade had successfully stormed Talaat ed Dumm, above the Good Samaritan's Inn, at 0715, in the face of con- siderable opposition, but the 179th had been seriously delayed in its attack upon Jebel Ekteif on account of the surpassing malignity of the terrain. On one line only was advance possible, and, after a bombard- ment which lasted until 0800, the 2/1.5th Londons stormed the first line trenches. Co-ojrerition between the two brigades now became possible and the 2/18th Londons and a battery gave assistance on the left flank of the 179th Brigade against Turkish positions at Rujm el Kibliyeh, from which an enfilading machine-gun fire was causing annoyance. During this advance two Turkish machine gur.s were captured and turned upon the Turks in the Rujm el Kibliyeh positions with excellent effect. The summit of Jebel Ekteif was captured about noon.

The rest of the 180th and the 181st Brigades were also delayed further to the north by bad country, enemy resistance, and the destruction of the road which impeded the progress of the guns, but by dusk the 181st had moved forward nearly three miles and occupied a line from the ridge above the Wadi Farah, astride the Wadi Rijan up to the ridge to the south of the Wadi el Makuk. After dark two battalions of the 231st Brigade relieved the 181st on the front north of the Ras et Tawil-Kuruntul track which runs down the Wadi Rijan.

Further to the south the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade passed through the gorge of the Wadi Kumran and reached the plain on the north-western shores of the Dead Sea. It took up a position along the Wadi Jofet Zeben at 1800 and, early next morning, started north across the slimy, marl plain and reached Jericho at 0820. At 0600 on the morning of Feb. 21 the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade with the 2/14th Londons and the 10th Mountain Battery had occupied Neby Musa and it now became apparent that the Turks had retired during the night along their whole line. The 60th Division thereupon advanced to Rujm esh Shemaliyeh-Kh. Kakun and Jebel Kuruntul overlooking Jericho, the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade pushed out patrols from Jericho towards the Wadi Aujah in the north and El Ghoraniyeh, where the enemy still held a bridgehead, on the west of the Jordan. To the south the New Zealand Momited Rifles Brigade occupied Rujm el Bahr (Dead Sea Post) with a squadron thus seizing the Turkish base upon the Dead Sea with its workshops. The acquisition of this landing- place was afterwards of great importance in opening communicatioHS with the Northern Operations of the Sherifian Army when in the Kerak area.

During these operations one enemy aeroplane was brought down in front of the 53rd Division.

To face i-late 33.

] i *" o.

8 to s « Q March 21.

_ After the advance on the northern front at the beginning of March, by the XXth and XXtst Corps, which pushed the front almost up to the Hne on which it remained imtil September, a raid upon the enemiy's lines of communications in Gilead along which he was feeding his forces engaged against the Sherifian troops in the Hejaz, was decided upon. A special force was formed for this raid, known from the name of its Commander as " Shea's Group." It consisted of :— The Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division.

The 60th (London) Division.

The Imperial Camel Corps Brigade.

10th Heavy Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery.

9th British Mountain Artillery Brigade.

Light Armoured Car Brigade.

Army Bridging Train.

De?ert Mounted Corps Bridging Train.

On March 21, Group Headquarters, the cavalry and the camels were at Talaat ed Dumm (except a brigade at Neby Musa with the armoured cars), the 60th Division was in the Wadi Nueiameh (except a battalion of the 180th Brigade in the Wadi Kelt), the Divisional Artillery was disposed to cover the crossings at Ghoraniyeh and Hajlah, the Moimtain Guns were immediately south of the Wadi Nueiameh, and the Bridging Trains were partly near Jericho and partly in the Wadi Kelt.

Eeconnaissances had shewn that the Jordan at this time of year was unfordable at any available point and that the only practicable places for throwing bridges across were Makhadet, Hajlah, and Ghoraniyeh. It was decided that the cavalry and camels should cross by a steel pontoon bridge at Hajlah, while a standard pontoon bridge, a heavy barrel pier bridge, and an infantry bridge were to be built for the GOth Division at Ghoraniyeh. The 180th Brigade was instructed to force both crossings, with artillery support, and establish bridgeheads to cover the bridge builders. Feints at Aujah, Mandesi, Enkhola, Yehud, and Henu fords were to hold the enemy opposite these places A\hile the I80th Brigade forced the passage in between.

At 1500 on March 21 the enemy reinforced his positions at Ghoraniyeh with 600 infantry and sent two squadrons of cavalry to Hajlah.

At midnight the first attempts to cross the river by swimming were made at Ghoraniyeh, but there was so much flood water in the Jordan that the swimmers of the 2/17th Londons were xmable to make headway against the current. Kepeated attempts were also made to cross in pimts or on rafts but these were, for the same reason, unsuccessful. Our continued activities alarmed the enemy who opened fire and thus further complicated an already difficult operation. Meanwhile the 2/19th Londons and the Australian Engineers of the Desert Mounted Corps Bridging Train had been more fortunate at Hajlah, Their swimmers* had got across unobserved and at 0120 on March 22 the first raft, holding twenty-seven men, was ferried across. Ten minutes later orders were given that the attempt to cross at Ghoraniyeh was to be abandoned for the time. Accordingly the 180th Brigade Headquarters, and the 2/20th Londons moved down to Hajlah leaving the 2/17th Londons, some machine guns, and four guns of the 180th Trench Mortar Battery opposite Ghoraniyeh.

At 0500 the 179th Brigade Group moved into a concealed position west of Hajlah, and the 181st Brigade moved to Tel es Sultan at dawn.

Shortly after dawn an enfilade fire from enemy machine guns was brought to bear on our rafts from a commanding hill some 1,000 yards north-west of the crossing-place at Hajlah. Only eight mm could be sent over at a time and these had to be at the bottom of the raft. One load had seven men liit. Two sections of the 180th Machine Gun Company provided covering fire and, by 0745, the whole of the 2/19th Londons were across the river. The 2/18th Battalion London Regiment, which had reached Hajlah at 0430, then began to cross and by 0810 the first pontoon bridge was finished. By noon the 2/18th Londons were also across and at 1315 efforts were made to enlarge the bridgehead, but owing to enemy machine- gun fire and the density of the jungle on the eastern bank of the river little could be effected.

The efforts of the 181st Brigade to cross at Ghoraniyeh at midnight again failed owing to the swift- ness of the current, and it was not imtil the morning of March 23 that rafting became possible here after the swimmers had got across to the other bank from which the enemy had been driven by our concentrated machine-gun fire.

At 0400 the Auckland Mounted Eifles began to cross at Hajlah in order to clear the enemy out of the coimtry on the east bank as far north as Ghoraniyeh, and later a regiment of the 1st AustraUanLiffbt Horse Brigade was sent to Hajlah to clear the comitry to the east and south-east of the new bridge. The Auckland Mounted Rifles galloped down a number of Turkish detachments and secured the ground covering Ghoraniyeh by noon, capturing sixty-eight prisoners and four machine guns. At 0915 a landing party which had crossed the Dead Sea in motor boats aad landed on the Turkish side of the Jordan joined up with the 180th Brigade at a point about three miles north of the Dead Sea.

The second pontoon bridge at Hajlah, 600 yards upstream from the fijst, was finished at 1330, and the light infantry bridge at Ghoraniyeh was ready by 1630 and was used by the 181st Brigade. The barrel pier bridge and the pontoon bridge at Ghoraniyeh were finished by 2150.

* The names of those Londoners wlio swam the Jordan on the night of March 21-22 are, 2nd Lieut. G. E. Jones, M.C. ; Cpl. E. Margrave, M.M. ; L/Cpl. W. JI. Henderson ; L/Cpl. ¥. Ponliam, Medallh Mililaire ; L/Cpl. W. V. Davis; L/Cpl. H. Silver; Pte. A. C. Hardwick ; Pte. H. Hoxton ; Pte. J. R. Powell; Pte. R. N. Williams. Of the Australians, L/Cpl. 8. Dawson was awarded the Military Medal.

T'o face Plate 34.

i I : CO n o a o 00 March 24-29.

At 0500 on the morning of March 24 the dispositions of Shea's Group were as follows : the 179th Brigade was in the Wadi Nimrin, about two miles up the guUey, the 180th was between the 179th and the Ghoraniy eh bridges, and had guards at these and at the Hajlah bridges. The 181st Brigade was on the right (south) flank of the 179th along the Shunet Nimrin road. The 1st Austrahan Light Horse Brigade was covering the left (north) flank of the 60th Division about one mile north of El Mandasi ford, and the rest of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division was to the east of Hajlah. The 303rd Brigade Royal Field Artillery which had crossed at Ghoraniyeh during the night, and two Mountain Artillery Batteries, supported the 181st Brigade in its attack on Shunet Nimrin at 0830, and one Mountain Artillery Battery supported the 179th Brigade. By 1500 Tel el Musta and El Hand had both been captured. During their attack on the former the 2/22nd Londons had taken three field guns. The presence of the 179th on El Hand enabled the left of the 181st to advance in the valley, and by turning the enemy's right flank compelled him to retire. The 181st pursued the retreating enemy as fast as possible up the Es Salt road with a squadron of Wellington Mounted Rifles in advance. The Australian Imperial Force Airline Section followed the infantry closely and erected an airline to Shunet Nimrin under fire. At midday Group Headquarters moved from the junction of the Jericho and Nebi Musa roads, about one and quarter miles below Talaat ed Dunim, to the west bank of the Jordan at Ghoraniyeh. At 1300 the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade was at Teleil Muslim and began following up tLc Wadi Kef rein, reaching Rujm el Oshir, six miles further on, at 1520. Here its advance was delayed by the bad state of the track, which was fotmd to be impassable for wheels. All wheel transport had to be with- drawn to Shunet Nimrin and the ammunition transferred to camels. In many cass the horses and camels had to be dragged, pushed, and even lifted up the slippery track along which they could only move in single file. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade was moving north-eastwards along the Wadi Jofet el Ghazlaniye, and the head of the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade was about two miles west of Kabr Mujahid. By dusk the 181st Brigade had advanced about four miles up the Es Salt road beyond Shunet Nimrin and was in touch with the enemy who was holdmg positions astride of the road.

March 25 was very wet, and the cavalry and camels found great difficulty in reaching Naaur, seven miles from Rujm el Oshir, by 1030. The 181st Brigade was also much hampered by the mud and did not reach a point within a mile of Es Salt until 1615. Salt itself, which had been evacuated by the enemy, was occupied by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Regiment at 1800 and by the 179th Brigade at midnight. No opposition had been made to their advance by way of the Arseniyat track.

On March 26 the cavalry continued their march from Naaur in heavy rain, and at 0500 the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade joined the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade at the cross-roads one mile east of Es Sir. The 2nd Austrahan Light Horse Brigade then pushed out north of the Amman- Es Salt road capturing 170 prisoners near Sweileh. At 1400 the Mounted Division found it necessary to rest men and horses, but sent a raiding party which blew up the Hejaz railway, seven miles soutli of Amman, during the night.

At 0500 on the morning of March 27 the 181st Brigade (less two battalions), which had handed over the defence of Es Salt to the 179th, advanced towards Amman with three mountain batteries. The advance was, however, interrupted by the incidence of a local feud which happsned to be in yrogress between the Circassians of Sweileh and the Christian Arabs of El Fuheis. Thj column halt3d for the night two miles east of Sweileh. The cavalry started for Amman at 0900, and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade reached Ain Amman at 1030 with the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigide within three miles of Amman Station on the left. The Imperial Camel Corps Brigade at 1100 advanced on Animin village but was held up by enemy fire. At 1500, after much delay in crossing the Wadi Amman the New Zealand Moimted Rifles Brigade reached the railway south of Amman, but the 2nd Austrahan Light Horse Brigade were unable to reach it to the north. Demolition parties were usefully employed in des- troying the line and its culverts in the direction of Libben. During the night the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade succeeded in destroying a two-arch bridge on the railway seven miles north of Amman. At 1100 on March 28 the two battaUons of the 181st Brigade which had been left in Es Salt, started for Amman. During the day the defence of Es Salt was strengthened by the 2/14th and 2/16th Londons, who came up from El Howoij, whither they had proceeded on the 27 th for supply purposes. Thus, by evening, the whole of the 179th Brigade, except the 2/13th Londons (still at El Howeij), the 3rd Australian Light Horse Regiment, and two howitzer batteries, were at Es Salt. During the morning twenty-two Turkish lorries were destroyed by the Armoured Car Brigade on the road between Salt and Swei'c'i. At 1430 an enemy force was observed by the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade advancing along the road from Jisr ed Damieh, and two batteries of Royal Field Artillery moved out in support of the cavalry. Meanwhile the attack on Amman had begun at 1300 when the 2/23rd Londons on the riht, and the 2/21st Londons on the left, advanced parallel to the north of the Sweileh-Amman road against the eastern bank of the Wadi Amman. They were supported by the 9th Moimtain Artillery Brigade, which also shelled Hill 3039 to assist the advance of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade. The advance over absolutely exposed groimd was held up by intense enemy machine-gun and rifle fire about 1,0C0 yards to the north-west of Amman. Further artillery support was difficult owing to lack of observation, and co-operation on the flanks became essential for a continuance of the attack, but the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade on the left and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade on the right had been unable to move, while the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade was held up by machine-gim fire from Hill 3039, which dominated Amnion from the south-east. During the afternoon the 2/17th and 2/18th Londons To /lice Plate 33.

o a o 3 03 were ordered to proceed from Es Sir to support the 181st Brigade. On our left the 2/20th Londons and a battery of armoured cars were sent to support the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.

Owing to the heavy rains the Jordan bridges had been subjected to a very heavy strain by the rush of flood-water. The Jordan had risen nine feet in a very few hours, and only one bridge with its causeway had been kept open at Ghoraniyeh.

At 1730 thirteen enemy aeroplanes bombed Shunet Nimrin causing a number of casualties among the camels.

During the morning of March 29 enemy reinforcements reached Amman Station (two miles distant from Amman village), and the enemy tried to work round the left flank of the 181st Brigade through a gap which existed between it and the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade. There were still hopes, however, that the enemy intended to evacuated Amman, and preparations were made for a night attack and at 1530 a battery of Royal Horse Artillery started for Amman from Shimet Nimrin. At Salt the enemy began to show considerable activity and tried to work round the left flank of the 179th Brigade.

March 30 to April 3.

At 0200 on March 30 the night attack on Amman began, and at 0430 the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade captured part of Hill 3039 with six machine guns, but it was unable to secure the rest of the hill. On their left the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade captured two lines of trenches with twelve prisoners, but the 181st Brigade was unable to reach the Wadi Amman " north of the Citadel " in spite of the capture of 135 prisoners and four machine guns by the 2/22nd Londons. The 2/18th Londons, between the 2/22nd Londons and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade to the south, got within half a mile of the " Citadel," but were held up by the heavy frontal fire. Repeated counter-attacks were directed against the 2/21st Londons on the left of the 181st Brigade. Stubborn hand-to-hand fighting ensued and the enemy was constantly repulsed with satisfactory losses, but no contact could be made with the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade on the extreme left. Troops of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade entered Amman village at 0900 but were fired upon from the houses, and the Imperial Camel Coijrs Brigade was held up by enfilade machine-gun fire from both flanks. At this time the Royal Horse Artillery battery which had left Shunet Nimrin on the previous day, came into action. At 1100 a Turkish counter-attack against Hill 3039 was dispersed by artillery fire, but the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade could make no further progress, while the northern (left flank) of the 181st Brigade was hard pressed by the enemy. At 1500 after an artillery bombardment the 2/18th Londons again stormed the " Citadel " but was checked within 400 yards of its objective by machine-gun fiLre from' the right flank. Meanwhile the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade was being heavily shelled on Hill 3039, and enemy reinforce- ments were arriving from the north.

During the day the situation at Es Salt had become somewhat complicated owing to the arrival of enemy reinforcements in the vicinity of Kefr Huda, on the Jebel Osha, two miles north-west of the town. A battalion of the 180th Brigade was sent up from Nimrin to Howeij and the 2/1 3th Londons were brought back to Salt from the direction of Amman. The enemy attack from the direction of Kefr Huda was defeated at 2255, and the 3rd Australian Light Horse Regiment in a skirmish captured three prisoners, three machine guns, and killed fourteen Turks. During the night the withdrawal from Amman began.

At 0715 on March 31 the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade reached Es Sir, and the evacuation of the woimded from the advanced dressing stations was completed by 1000. The 181st Brigade withdrew from its original positions before the last attack on Amman, by way of Sweileh and Es Sir, in order to avoid the Amman-Fuhais road. The 2nd AustraHan Light Horse Brigade covered this withdrawal. The infantry reached Es Sir just before dusk and continued marching along the track, which was almost impassable for camels, in rain and darkness.

At 1055 the 301st Field Artillery Brigade and "B" 303rd Battery took up positions west of the Jordaa to cover the crossing of divisional troops and two batteries of armoured cars, after dusk.

On April 1 the retirement continued and, during the night, the 179th Brigade withdrew from Es Salt without incident, after blowing up the whole of the captured ammunition.

By 0500 on April 2 the 2/17th and 2/19th Londons rejoined the 180th Brigade and formed a bridge- head until relieved by the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade and one regiment of the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade, next day. The withdrawal of the whole force, with the exception of the bridge- head troops, was completed by the evening of April 2, without interference from the enemy.

In spite of the trouble caused by flood-water in the river, and of the feet that large numbers of civilian refugees from Es Salt, as well as 986 prisoners and 30,000 animals, had to use the bridges in addi- tion to the troops, no delay of any kind was experienced in re-crossing the Jordan.

The medical arrangements of this raid were conducted imder unusual diificulties, and as Jerusalem was the nearest base to which cases could be evacuated, the following stations and relay poste were established : — (1) Talaat ed Dumm.

(2) Main dressing station near Jericho with special operating rmit for serious cases.

(3) Main dressing station Shunet Nimrin.

(4) Advanced dressing station and motor ambulance relay, Es Salt.

(5) Motor ambulance relay, four miles east of Es Salt, on the Amman road.

(6) Advanced dressing station, two miles west of Amman. During the raid, 1,886 sick and wounded were evacuated.

Tu face Plate 3G.

April 29.

Tlie second raid into Gilead, which did so much to persuade the enemy that the ultimate advancvj against Damascus would be made by way of Es Salt and Amman — and thereby compelled him to keep the whole of his IVth Army on the east of Jordan — was primarily intended to harass and, if possible, cut off the large concentration of Turkish troops at Shunet Nimrin, and co-operate with a Sherifian advance at Es Salt. The Desert Mounted Corps was detailed to capture Es Salt and, thereby, cut the the only metalled road serving the Shunet Nimrin position. The secondary Une of commimication down the Wadi es Sir ran through the territory of the Beni Sakhr tribe which had agreed to attack the Turks in co-operation with any British advance before May 4, the date on which the tribe would have to move to fresh grazing grounds. The 180th Brigade {60th Division) on the morning of April 30 attacked the Shunet Nimrin position and captured the advanced works, while the 179th Brigade attacked El Haud. The enemy, however, being in great strength offered so stubborn a resistance that no further progress was possible.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade, having the Hong Kong and Singapore Battery .attached instead of the Notts. Battery, detached for service with the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade, started from Ghoraniyeh for Es Salt by way of the Jisr ed Damie track. The 5th Mounted Brigade moved on the same objective by a more direct route. The 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade was accompanied by 360 camels, artillery, and ambulance transport. The brigade was engaged about two miles north-west of Es Salt and entered the town which was full of enemy troops and transports at 1830. A brisk action in and around the town resulted in the seizure of the junction of the Amman and Shimet Nimrin roads beyond the town, and the capture of numbers of prisoners. The General Headquarters of the IVth Turkish Army only escaped capture by the narrowest margin, given as " one minute " in a captured enemy document signed by the Chief of the General Staff of that army. The 9th Australian Light Horse Regiment then moved out to cover the town from the north-east to the north-west, and at 2200 a detachment of the 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment, with four machine guns, moved eastwards to seize the junction of the Amman- Ain es Sir roads near Ain Hemar. The Turks, however, were astride of the Amman road, 2,000 yards west of Ain Hemar, and the detachment was held up. Next day the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade reached Es Salt and Ain Hemar was occupied, when the detachment rejoined its regiment.

The 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade, having crossed the Jordan at Ghoraniyeh at 1900 on April 29 moved north through thick jungle at 0320, being fired upon by tbe enemy from Red Hill. At 0530 the main body reached the Jisr ed Damie and the 4th Australian Light Horse Regiment advanced up the Nahr ez Zerka. By 0730 the brigade held a line running from the Nahr ez Zerka to a point 500 yards south of the Jisr ed Damie-Es Salt track, about 2,000 yards west of the hills. The 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment failed to capture the Turkish bridgehead at the ford as the position was held in strength. By evening enemy reinforcements began to arrive from the north-west, and the line was shortened by a withdrawal eastwards into the foothills while Red Hill, some two miles to the south, covering the line of retreat to Ghoraniyeh was held by a detachment of the 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment with four machine guns. The 12th Australian Light Horse Regiment held the left of the line ar.:! the 4th the right of the line, with the rest of the 11th in reserve.

May 1.

At 0800 on May 1 the Turks attacked in force, bringing their guns forward. Further Turkish rein- forcements were observed coming up and the " B " Battery, Honourable Artillery Company was with- drawn southwards along the track running parallel with the foothills. During its withdrawal one gun fell over a precipice and had to be abandoned. At 1000 the enemy captured Red Hill, the garrison of which withdrew to the south. At 1030 the Turks again attacked and drove in the right flank, and by ilOU had advanced to within half a mile of the main position. The enemy advance on the left flank was also pressed forward in spite of the reinforcement of the 12th Austrahan Light Horse Regiment by the resarves. At 1130 the Turks were only 200 yards away and afforded an admirable target for our machine guns. The batteries still in the line, the "A" Battery, Honourable Artillery Company and the Notts, continued in action, firing point blank into the massed enemy. As there was no track fit for wheels the eight guns had to be abandoned but the personnel of the batteries was withdrawn with the gun- teams, and fresh guns being issued, the batteries were again in action within forty-eight hours. At the time, however, the brigade was hard put to effect its retreat over country which was full of guUies and gorges so steep that in many cases animals fell down precipices and perished.

By noon the brigade had taken up a hue running from a point immediately north of Southern Pass to a point just south of Red Hill, where a stand was made against repeated enemy attacks. This position covered the Umm esh Shert track from the Jordan to Es Salt which was now the only means of retreat for the cavalry at Es Salt.

Meanwhile, the enemy was bringing up large reinforcements, and the Beni Sakhr tribe failed to tal>e the action which had been expected. This left the Es Sir road open to the Turks and the Shunet Nimrin force, instead of being an isolated body of troops, formed the southern claw of a formidable pair of pin- cers with which the enemy threatened to cut off the cavalry at Es Salt. Without the co-operation alike of the Beni Sakhr and the Desert Mounted Corps it was in vain for the GOth Division to continue a To face Plate 37.

C I- o.

o.

I B frontal attack in hopes of compelling a superior force to surrender. The Desert Mounted Corps was therefore ordered to withdraw from the Es Salt area, as a preliminary to a general retirement to the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead.

After having cleared their line of advance from Jisr ed Damieh towards Es Salt, the Turks made an attack at 2000, on May 2, against the 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment covering the town. In spite of constant repulses the 66th Regiment came on again at 2030, at 0200 on May 3, and at 0400. On the failure of the last attack the Turks were chased down hill with bombs, and retired nearly a mile. The 8th Regiment, attached to the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade, was attacked on the north-east front covering Es Salt, near Kh. el Fokan, at dawn on May 3. The Turks were vigorously counter- attacked at 0630 and lost 319 prisoners. At the same time enemy attacks were delivered on the Kefr Huda ridge, held by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade. A post was driven in and, before any decision as to a reorganization could be put into effect, the withdrawal of the whole force from Es Salt was ordered. The incidence of this enemy activity interfered with the joint attack upon Shunet Nimrin by the cavalry and the 60th Division which took place on May 2. The Turks succeeded in holding the cavalry at Howeij, while the 179th and 180th Brigades were unable to make any substantial progress.

The weather during these operations was excellent, a material factor in favour of the Turks, as the Es Sir road, improved since March, was capable of carrying considerable traffic in dry weather.

The retirement was successfully accomplished under cover of the 181st Brigade which had been brought up to form an extended bridgehead at Ghoraniyeh. By the evening of May 4 all troops of the raiding force had recrossed the Jordan, and the original bridgehead was restored. The raiders had taken in all 942 prisoners and twenty-nine machine guns.

That the operations east of Jordan during April-May finally convinced the enemy that future British operations would be in this area, with the railway junction of Deraa as an objective, is shown by captured enemy documents. It was fully reahzed that the capture and retention of that place by the British would involve the retirement or surrender of any troops remaining to the south, and the direct line to Deraa lay east of Jordan. This belief on the part of the Enemy Command led to the dispersal of forces with a difficult obstacle — the Jordan River and Valley — between the two main groups. These two groups consisted of the Vllth and Vlllth Armies west of the Jordan and IVth Army east of that river.

The respective enemy commanders were incessant in their claims for reinforcements, multiplying their difficulties, and, in the case of the IVth and Vllth Army Commands, tendering their resignation on the grovmds of neglect of their demands, and criticism of their command. The Commander of the IVth Array philosophically commences his reply to an adverse criticism by the German Commander- in-Chief — Liman von Sanders — with the remark, "In this fifth year of the war we are all accustomed to misunderstanding and friction." In this short sentence is gently expressed what had been evident to close observers of the relations between the Turkish and German Staffs and individual officers since the operations leading to the loss of Baghdad. The German's standpoint regarding his mission is well expressed in the following extract from a letter addressed to a German Staff Officer of the IVth Army on May 4, 1918 :— " It is we, as Prussian officers, who are charged with the duty of pushing forward with the greatest energy, satisfying complaints as far as possible, but otherwise insisting with an iron-like resolution on our wishes." and his opinion of the Turkish officer with whom he had to deal : — " The view of the equality of right of the Turks with Europeans, originating in the abolition of the Capitulations, is, of course, just like comparing Lascars to German soldiers, and in many ways, even for enlightened senior Turkish officers it assumes quite grotesque forms." On the part of the Turkish officer, apart from his feeling of resentment at being driven to further other aims than those which would be of advantage to his own country, there was always the — for the time being — repressed feeling against the infidel. The extent of this feeling may be judged from the following extract from a personal letter from Fevzi Pasha, G.O.C. Vllth Army, to Von Falkenhayn : — " My departure for Amman, in order to take over the new command to which I was appointed by Your Excellency, as well as the spiritual and social circumstances of the new post, demand a succession of special measures, neglect of which will entail serious consequences. . . , "Bearing this in mind, and I regard it as very important, it is clear that the employment of officers and men in Gierman uniform in the neighbourhood of the Hojaz Railway, regarded by Moslems as sacred, will favour and strengthen British propaganda, and will increase the already treasonable convictions and fanaticism of the inhabitants.

" For this reason, I shall not be able therefore to take with me to Amman the officers and men in German uniform who have hitherto been on my staff, and I shall also send the German battalion now in the neighbourhood of Kerak to the XXth (Turkish) Army Corps.* " I request you either speedily replace the German flying units and motor lorry columns now in the above-named zone with Turkish officers and men, or else equip them throughout with Turkish uniforms." ? The Turkish XXth Corps was at that time west of Jordau. To face I'latt 38.

u.

2 n o.

I 5 1 "I The Water Supply of Jerusalem and the XXth Corps Area.

The Engineers having completed the first part of their task, namely, the provision of a sufficient supply of water to enable General Allenby's army to march on Jerusalem, next turned their attention to roads. When the capital of Palestine l;al fallen, however, they were again confronted with the pro- blem of providing water, not only for the army and its numerous appurtenances, but for the population of the Holy City itself.

When our troops entered Jerusalem the sources of water supply were : — ¦ (1) Rain-water, stored in cisterns.

(2) Aqueduct-borne water from Solomon's Pools, a quantity of 40,000 gallons per day, (3) The Pool of Siloam, practically Hquid sewage.

Our troops perforce drew heavily upon this supply during the winter, and it was necessary, in order to avoid a dangerous shortage, to take steps that would become operative before the rainless summer was upon the city. The scheme proposed by the Engineers and successfully carried out is rich in historic and even romantic associations. It was based on a modification of the Herod-Pontius Pilate system. The ancient engineers of the Roman world had carried the water of the Wadi Arrub springs in rock-cut channels to a reservoir of 4,000,000 gallons capacity, and thence to Jerusalem by a masonry aqueduct via the Pools of Solomon. So now the rock-cut channels leading from the springs were thoroughly cleansed — -they were blocked with an accumulation which can literally be described as " the dust of ages," including the remains of several individuals who may have belonged to almost any period. Next the ancient re3ervoir was repaired, pumps were installed, pumping water to a newly erected reservoir of 300,000 gallons capacity at a point near the springs, whence water flowed by the force of gravity to a reservoir onstructed on a high point west of Jerusalem, so that now it was possible for water-pipes to carry a supply to any point in the town itself. {See Plate 39.) . This water system in Jerusalem was laid down primarily for immediate military necessities, and partly in order to recoup the civilian population for the water stored by them and consumed by the army, but the installation will be of permanent value to the city. The work was bsgun on April 15, 1916, and nine weeks later, on June 18, water was delivered to the inhabitants. Twelve miles of pipe-line had been laid to ensure this result. The daily supply was 280,000 gallons, and during early summer, when supply was plentiful, storage cisterns were filled in Jerusalem for the bigger buildings. Not since the days of the Romans has running water been so plentiful in the Holy City. It is estimated, by the way, that Jerusalem contains rain-water storage cisterns to the capacity of 300,000,000 gallons, or, in other words, barely sufficient for the needs of Greater London for thirty-six hours.

The district north of Jerusalem, both immediately behind the line held by the XXth Corps, and in the reserve area near Ramallah, was extremely short of water. Beyond the cisterns in the villages, used by the local inhabitants but useless for military purposes, there were only a few good springs, and these for the most part in very deep and often almost inaccessible valleys. The positions held and the principal lines of communication, on the other hand, were, generally speaking, on the highest ground, situated 2-3,000 feet above sea-level. To get water, therefore, it was necessary to instal pumping plant in order to raise the product of the springs. In some cases a total Hft of 1,000 feet had to be attained, necessitating relay pumping station and reservoirs.

The principal supplies in the hills were : — (1) Wadi Reiya and Wadi Zerka to El Lubban.

(2) From the Wadi Darah to Umm Suffa.

(8) A gravitation supply to a point north of Ain Sinia on the Nablus Road.

(4) From Durah, Jufna, and Ain Sinia to Tel Asur and Dar Jerir.

(5) From Ain Arik and Ain Jeriut to Beitunia and Bireh.

The total number of pump houses erected was fourteen, and the total height pumped from the eleven pump houses on the above mentioned five supplies was about 3,G00 feet : average height about 330 feet per pump. The total lengtli of pipes laid was over twenty-eight miles. The masonry storage reservoirs erected in the area contained over 250,000 gallons, and the temporary storage exceeded this figure.

On the Jericho road, water was pumped from the springs in Wadi el Fara to a watering area at Talaat ed Dumm (Samaritan's Inn), a rise of 600 feet, necessitating two sets of pumping machinery, one at the bottom and one half-way up, and two additional pumping stations were installed to forward the water for distribution.

In the coastal plain, water was obtained from wells varying from 120 feet to forty feet in depth and over a wide area. Development, therefore, took the ''.orni of the installation of a large number of pumps and engines on the many wells discovered and improved ia the district. Boring sections, too, were most successful in sinking for water.

/',j "ace Plate 3D.

AREA OCCUPIED AS THE RESULT OF OPERATIONS FROM DECEMBER 3P-1917 TO SEPTEMBER 171191 8 plate 39 Mil*>«M * e REFERENCE J Arva in. ocatpotwn of 7\wIm.

• damiofTiirtu during prriod Dec. 31'-! i917-StpT71!ne'' ! 1 „ It » n prfVioUM to Oer!em-brf"3/-79J7 NOTE: Dtnliipmeni ofHmilway from Oetobtr 20 to k DAMASCUS ARAB NOHTHERNARMY S MvniePMENr of vwERSciruf zctobpsfrcnt] "¦.v''S» jn Fnn/jtr,rJ /fi/t The September Advance.

The day before the September advance, the enemy Intelligence Service issued a disposition map, which was captured in the headquarters of the Yilderim Army Group at Nazareth, and is reproduced iu facsimile on the opposite page. The information embodied in this map was quite in accordance with the enemy's air service reports that " no essential changes had taken place in the distribution of the British forces." No change is shown. The move of the 60th Division into the XXIst Corps area, and the concentration of the cavalry on the coast, not to mention the alteration in the front of the 10th and 53rd Divisions, are passed unnoticed. The latter was apparently considered as being in reserve to sector lately occupied by the Desert Mounted Corps. The 6th Poena Division (at the time in Mesopo- tamia) is shown as being within ten miles of the front hne, though to be fair, its exact location is queried.

The position of General Headquarters is not shown, and that of the XXIst Corps Headquarters is placed eleven miles away from where it was actually to be found. The French troops up in the Hne are queried as ItaliariH.

To face Flute 40.

5 - September 18.

On this day the preliminary concentration was complete. The divisions detailed for the main attack, 60th, 7th, 75th, 3rd, 54th, and the French contingent, had actually taken up their positions, the troops previously holding the coastal sector having closed up on to their own fronts of attack to make room for them.

The cavalry were concealed in the orange and olive groves, two divisions immediately north and east of Jaffa, and one (the Australian Mounted Division) near Ludd ; all were within easy reach of the positions of assembly which they were to occupy during the night 18th-19th.

On the right the 10th and 53rd Divisions had closed in their outer flanks, west and east respectively, leaving their centre from Kefr Malik to -Jiljulia covering the main Jerusalem-Nablus road to be occupied by " Watson's Force," a composite detachment formed from the XXth Corps cavalry regiments, two pioneer battalions, and the XXth Corps reinforcement camp. The 53rd Division were in position to launch their preliminary attack on El Mugheir as soon as darkness fell, and thus bring forward the right flank of the corps preparatory to further advance.

The way in which this preliminary concentration was carried out and concealed from the enemy, was one of the most remarkable achievements of the whole operations. A hostile aeroplane reconnais- sance on the 15th reported as follows : " Some regrouping of cavalry units apparently in progress behind the enemy's left flank ; otherwise nothing unusual to report " ; and this at a time when thxee cavalry divisions, five infantry divisions, and the majority of the heavy artillery of the force were concentrated between Ramleh and the front line of the coastal sector, there being no less than 301 guns in place of the normal number of seventy.

On the same date the enemy Intelligence Staff was advised in another aeroplane report that General Allenby's headquarters at Bir Salem was "' infantry camp, two battalions." Prisoners from the coastal plain and the lower foothills of the Judsean range say that they had been told that the British would make a big attack about the 18th, but they had so often been given the same warning that no attention was paid to this one. That the Chief Command were uncertain as to which part of the front would be attacked is indicated by the fact that nowhere were troops grouped in reserve who could make an effective counter-attack. New units arriving on the front were dispersed, and the move, just previous to operations, of two German battalions from the west to east of Jordan was counter-balanced by the move of a strong Turkish regiment — the 191st — from the east to the west of the river.

To face Plate 41, September 19.

The attack was launched at 0445 after only a quarter of an hour's bombardment, and broke clean through the Turkish defences on the coast with hardly a pause. On the right near Rafat the French contingent encountered determined opposition, and probably the hardest fighting of the day took place here and at Et Tireh, where the 75th Division only dislodged the reserves of the Turkish XXIInd Corps (Rafet Bey) after a sharp struggle.

But to take the main attack as a whole, the hackneyed expression that " it went entirely according to plan " is quite inadequate ; the pace at which the infantry broke down the oppostion and the cavalry got through and away, exceeded the most sanguine hopes. By 0730 the 5th Cavalry Division were crossing the Nahr Falik, and by midday they were across the Iskanderuneh ; and the 4th Cavalry Division, though at first delayed by the wire and trenches which they had to cross, were little behind them. By evening the cavalry were in the positions shewn, and the 4th and 5th Divisions had fed and watered and were ready to continue their advance.

There is little more to be said about the infantry beyond what is shewn on the map. The GOth Division, after marching and fighting for eighteen miles, mostly over heavy sand, carried Tul Keram before dark. The 7th Division had reached the foothills about Et Taiyibeh ; while the 3rd (Lahore) Division, after taking its first objective changed direction eastwards, carried the strong works round Kalkilieh, Jiljulieh, and Hableh, and established itself in the footlrills to the east. A pipe-line, 7,000 yards in length, was laid in eight and a quarter hours by the Royal Engineers, while operations were in progress, from the mill-race cm the Nahr el Auja, and conveyed 4,000 gallons per hour to Jiljulieh, where storage was arranged the same day for 70,000 gallons. The 54th Division and the French had secured all their objectives and were sufficiently advanced to support the northern flank of the 10th Division, which had orders to start its advance that night.

The 75th Division having disposed of all Turkish troops round Et Tireh, remained in that area and became Army Reserve.

On the front of the XXth Corps (53rd and 10th Divisions) there was no movement during the day ; the 53rd Division consolidated the line of El Mugheir which it had successfully captured the night before. At 1535 telegraphic orders were sent for both these divisions to start their main advance on the night 19th-20th.

To face Plate 42, September 20.

On this day the 54th Division and French contingent ceased- to be engaged, having suocessfully occupied Bidieh and the high ground north of the Wadi Kadah and so secured the left flank of the 10th Division attack ; they were shortly afterwards withdrawn into reserve near the railway.

The 60th Division advanced up the Tul Keram-Nablus road and though engaged all day with enemy rearguards, had no very severe fighting. By evening they had occupied Anebta village and had secured the railway tunnel at Bir Asur intact, and were pushing forward towards the important railway station of Messudieh which had already been occupied by a squadron of the XXTst Corps cavalry and the 2nd L.A.C. Battery. The 5th Australian laght Horse Brigade, which was attached to the XXIst Corps for the time being, was operating north of Messudieh, and cut the railway near Ajje. The L.A.C. Battery subsequently pushed on towards Nablus.

The 7th Division pushed on all night through very difficult country, following mountain tracks over which no wheels could move ; their greatest hardship was shortage of water, many men having nothing but what they carried in their water-bottles for more than twenty-four hours. Though in touch with scattered parties of the enemy all the time, they had no serious opposition until reaching the com- manding village of Beit Lid, which overlooks the Nablus road, some three miles east of Anebta. Here the en3my had a strong rearguard posted supported by numerous machine guns, and the division was held up for a time, the Seaforth Highlanders suffering particularly heavily. The opposition was, however, overcome, and the division was astride the road and railway north of Messudieh by 0300 on the 2Lst a magnificent exhibition of marching and fighting and worthy of the best traditions of the 7th (late Meerut) Division which has seen as much hard fighting in different theatres of war as any division in the Indian Army.

The 3rd (Lahore) Division advanced steadily all day up the Azzon-Funduk track. This advance was slow in the face of strong enemy rearguards but good progress was made and all opposition overcome. Both the 7th and the 3rd Divisions had to rely for their water-supply during this day's advance on the two specially organized Camel Transport Corps water convoys each of 2,400 camels.

The 10th Division, who launched their attack early on the night of 19-20th, experienced strong opposi- tion both from infantry and artillery, most of the German troops being engaged in this sector. However, the enemy was pressed back as far as Kefr Harris before nightfall. It must be remembered that the 10th Division, also the 53rd Division, were operating in a most difficult country, which it lends itself par- ticularly to the defence; also, on this day they were attacking prepared, and often wired, position.'.

On the right flank the Turks had concentrated comparatively large forces to oppose the 53M Division, and in the course of the morning a counter-attack drove back our most advanced troops. The position was shortly afterwards recaptured by the 160th Infantry Brigade, the 1st Cape Corps Battalion and the l/17th Infantry (Indian) particularly distinguishing themselves, and the advance of the whole division was continued.

While the infantry were breaking down the last organized resistance of the enemy, the action of the cavalry ensured the success of the operations and the destruction or capture of the whole Turkish force east of the Jordan. Pressing on all night in parallel columns, the 4th Cavalry Division on Megiddo (Lejjnn) and the 5th Cavalry Division on Abu Shusheh (a few miles to the north), the Plain of Esdraelon was reached before dawn. Here the first opposition was met with ; as the advanced guard of the 4th Cavalry Division debouched from the defile at Lejjun, a Turkish battaUon with several machine guns was deploying in the plain below them. They were charged without hesitation by the leading reginient, the 2nd Lancers, and in a few minutes the division was able to continue its advance ; less prompt action might have caused fatal delay. The 4th Cavalry Division continued its advance through Al Afule to Beisan which was successfully reached by evening ; the 19th Lancers securing the important bridge over the Jordan at Jisr Mejamie ten miles further north. As showing the rapidity of our advance and the extent to which it surprised the enemy command, the following incident might be mentioned : — Shortly after our cavalry had taken El Afule, a German aeroplane, arriving from the north, landed on the aerodrome, the pilot being quite unconscious of the fact that the place was in the hands of the British.

Meanwhile the 5th Cavalry Division crossed the plain, and soon after dawn the 13th Brigade rode into Nazareth. Here some hard street-fighting occurred, but the Germans and Turks were driven out of the town and only held out in a few houses covering the Tiberias road. They were not dislodged as only one brigade was available for the attack, the remainder being held ready in the plain to suppoit the 4th Division if necessary. Yilderim Army Group Headquarters were captured in Nazareth w.th numbers of valuable documents, and the enemy commander. Marshal Liman Ton Sanders Pasha, himself only just made his escape in time ; some accounts even say that he was actually in the town when the cavalry arrived, but, if so, he cannot have stayed there long.* In the evening the whole of the 5th Division were at and around Afule.

The Australian Mounted Division, which moved forward in close support of the 4th Division, reached " An eyewitness asserts that at tlie first alarm he ran, <;hid only in pyjamas and armed with an electric torch, from his sleeping quarters to near Our Lady's Well shouting for the driver of his "motor car in which he made off. Subsequently the Marshal returned, dressed and superintended the removal of some of his papers.

To faoe Plate 43.

Lejjun about midday and at once detached the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade to occupy Jenin. This was accomplished early in the afternoon, the brigade galloping over an entrenched position and speedily crushing all opposition. The only remaining brigade, the 4th Australian Light Horse (the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade being attached to the XXLst Corps) was fully employed collecting and conveying the prisoners which had been picked up in ever increasing numbers all day.

In a word, a boldly conceived and ambitious cavalry scheme had been carried out to the letter, and all liaes of retreat west of the Jordan denied to the enemy.

To face Plate il.

AREA OCCUPIED AS THE RESULT OF OPERATIONS FROM SEPTEMBER 17-" TO 20-" 1918.

PLATE 44 f fr,.-,' n,r !¦ Tl&7o453) Reprinted in Eng/anc/ /9/S September 21.

The 60th, 7th, and 3rd Divisions had no further fighting on this day, but concentrated and moved into the positions shown covering Samaria, Messudieh, and Tul Keram, and the road and railway between those places.

Tne 10th Division pushed forward with little opposition and occupied positions covering Nablus from the north and east before dark. This division covered over twenty-four miles in as many hours over the roughest country ; a very fine feat of marching.

The 53rd Division experienced considerable opposition during the morning, but this diminished during the day and by evening two brigades had reached the vicinity of Beit Dejan and had closed the toad leading through that place to the Jordan Valley.

Chaytor's Force in the Jordan Valley had so far confined itself to vigorous patrolling to ensure that the enemy could make no move without their knowledge. The role of this composite force was to secure the right flank of the army and the Jordan's crossings, to keep in close touch with the enemy and take advantage of aiy withdrawal on their part but to run no risk of being involved with a more powerful foe too early in the battle. This difficult task was admirably carried out.

On the morning of the 21st, it was found that the enemy resistance was weakening on our northern front in the valley, and the 1st Battalion British West Indians rushed forward and seized two spurs where they were heavily shelled. Mounted patrols occupied Khirbet Fosail still further north. In the evening orders were issued for the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, and parts of the 1st and 2nd battalions British West Indians, to move forward during the night and seize the crossing over the Jordan at Jisr ed Damieh ; while other troops kept up pressure on the rest of the Jordan front. The actual crossing was not secured until the following evening, as it was strongly held by infantry, but the road leading to Nablus was occupied during the night and a large number of prisoners taken, including a Turkish divisional commander. During this day the Cavalry Corps were chiefly engaged in collecting prisoners, who came in in such numbers that their evacuation became a very serious difficulty. The Australian Mounted Division patrolled the country to the east, south, and west of Jenin, and the 14th Cavalry Brigade (of the 5th Division) moved down to Jenin early in the morning to support them.

The 13th Cavalry Brigade reoccupied Nazareth and picquetted all the roads to the west, north, and east. At 0130 on the night 21st-22nd a body of about 1,000 Turks, apparently trying to escape towards Tiberias from Haifa or Acre, attacked the outposts of the brigade and were repulsed after a sharp fight, in which the 18th King George's Own Lancers made a successful charge, killing sixty and taking 100 prisoners.

The 4th Cavalry Division remained at Beisan with posts right across the Jordan Valley, and collected a large number of prisoners, who began to straggle in along the Nablus road early in the day.

To face Plate 4i.

« Sff i jf.' -'->,'' >i - u t:i; r ,(0 \ c 03 1 1 !«r) yQ September 22.

\fter the 21st there was no infantry action of importance. It must not be thought, however, that the trials of the infantry were over ; for some time they were busily engaged in clearing the battlefield, collecting and marching in prisoners, developing water suppUes, makmg roads, and the innumerable other duties which remain to be done after a swift advance.

Chaytor's Force continued to press the enemy vigorously all day. Shortly after midnight the 38th Royal Fusiliers occupied the trenches overlooking the Umm esh Shert Ford and at 0300 in conjunction with two companies of the 39th Royal Fusiliers captured Umm esh Shert. Shortly afterwarde these troops advanced and successfully occupied Mankattat el Mellaha. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade captured El Makhruk and Abd el Kadir with the Commander of the /j-kd Turkish Division and some 500 prisoners, and by evening the important crossing at Jisr ed Damieh had been seized by that brigade in conjunction with the 1st Battalion British West Indies Regiment, though the enemy still held the cros.sing at Mafid Jozele further south against the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade and the 2nd Battalion British West Indians. On the east bank their outposts were driven in, and by evening the 2nd Austrahan Light Horse Brigade was facing the main Turkish position in the foothills at Shunet Nimrin.

Early in the night it became clear that a general retirement of the Turkish Fourth Army had begun, and orders were i.ssued for the force to follow them vigorously, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade by the Jisr ed Damieh crossing supported by the British West Indians, and the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade by the main Shunet Nimrin-Es Salt road with the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade in support. The 5th Cavalry Division concentrated towards Nazareth during the afternoon with a view to a further advance on Haifa and Acre, their place at Afule being taken by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade of the Australian Mounted Division. During the day the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade rejoined its division.

The 4th Cavalry Division remained at Beisan sending one regiment to patrol the east bank of the Jordan ; and numbers of prisoners continued to come in.

At 1330 the 11th and 12th Light Armoiu'ed Car Batteries were sent to reconnoitre and, if possible, to occupy Haifa ; but they met with Ptrong opposition from artillery and machine guns a few miles east of the town and had to fall back.

To. face Plate m.

September 23.

Chaytor's Force pressed forward all day, meeting with little opposition from the enemy but being severely handicapped by the broken nature of the country. As an example of this, the pack wireless set of the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade fell over a cliff, resulting in all touch being lost with this brigade for several hours.

By 1630 the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade occupied Es Salt, and by nightfall all roads lead- ing into the town were covered. The 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions both had sharp fighting. Of the 5th Division, the 13th Cavalry Brigade occupied Acre at 1300 with Httle or no opposition, but the 15th Cavalry Brigade on approaching Haifa were met by a battery of 77 mm. guns on the slopes of Mt. Carmel and at least ten machine guns covering the entrance to the town. The sf a-e between the mountain and the Kishon left little room for cavalry to manoeuvre, but the Jodhpur Lancers made a brilliant charge riding over the machine guns and pursuing the enemy right through the town. A squadron of the Mysore Lancers was sent over Mt. Carmel at the same time to turn the town from the south. They captured two Turkish naval guns mounted on the ridge of Carmel and also made a gallant charge in the face of heavy machine-gun fire. The Turks made a very stubborn defence at Haifa, and, but for the dash of the 15th (Imperial Sei-vice) Cavalry Brigade, might have held out for a considerable time.

In the Jordan Valley at 0800 the 11th Cavalry Brigade of the 4th Division intercepted a large column of the enemy trying to cross the river at Makhadet Abu Naj ford, six miles south-east of Beisan, sup- ported by a large number of guns and machine guns. The ford was not captured until midday after sharp fighting during which the 29th Lancers captured twenty-five machine guns in a single charge on the west bank of the river, while the 35th Jacob's Horse broke up the columns on the east bank.

The hard nature of the fighting is exemplified by the fact that the Hants, battery coming into action in the open had every one of their guns hit.

Over 3,000 prisoners were captured in this action.

September 24.

Chaytor's Force pushed forward all day in touch with enemy rearguards ; the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, supported by the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, moving on the main Es Salt- Amman road and the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade to the south of them through Aid Essir.

By evening the New Zealand Mounted Rifles were east of Suweileh and the 20th Imperial Infantry Brigade had occupied Es Salt.

The 11th Cavalry Brigade of the 4th Division patrolled down both banks of the Jordan to within twelve miles of Jisr ed Damieh, clearing up small parties of the enemy on the way.

The 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade marched at 1 100 for Semakh at the southern end of Lake Tiberias.

Otherwise there was no movement of importance.

September 25.

Chaytor's Force captured Amman at 1510 ; the town and railway station were both held. and hard fighting was necessary before they were captured by the 1st and 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigades and the Canterbury Mounted Rifles.

The railway was seized some miles north of Amman by the Auckland Mounted Rifles and about 600 prisoners in all captured.

Early in the morning the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade took Semakh after some hand to hand fighting at the station, where a considerable number of Germans were killed in the defence of the " laager " which they had constructed of engines and other rolling stock.

'The 5th Cavalry Division moved to Nazareth preparatory for the advance on Damascus, To face Plate 4/1.

PLATE 4; Mr ADVATsrCE THROUGH GILE AD AJNTD GAI.ILE E Milesio .5 10 zoMile Situation at . 1 p m on 25. 9. 1 8 as known at GJi jQ.

EEf: SStk ElSurt iTr,- mediteAr-Aneait Jfrx SEA.

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September 26 and 27.

The interest now began to shift to the crossing places of the Jordan and the country of Gilead and Bashan. In the north, the Australian Mounted Division moved up from the southern end of the Sea of Galilee to march to Damascus by way of Tiberias and Jisr Benat Yakub, followed by the 5th Cavalry Division, which had come up from its capture of Acre and Haifa by way of Nazareth and Tiberias. The two divisions were intended to capture Damascus, if possible before the Turkish IVth Army could get there. The 4th Cavalry Division left Beisan and the Jordan Valley with the intention of falling upon the left flank of the Turks, which was hurrying north along the Hejaz Kailway in order to avoid the attacks of Chaytor's Force in the south. On the right flank of the retreating IVth Army, the advanced troops of the Hejaz northern operations were already active and had done much to delay the retreat by the destruction of railway and bridges. Away in the south, as far as Maan inclusive, where desultory operations had for some time past been in progress between a flying column from the Ilnd Corps and the Ai-abs who were watching the town from the Semna hills, the Turks were hurrying north in a vain hope of reaching Damascus before Chaytor's Force could effectively bar their retreat. Of the presence of Sherifian troops to the noi-th of it, the Ilnd Corps was still ignorant, but it was fully alive to the danger which it ran from the energetic hostility of the country through which it was retreating and the insistent attacks of the troops of the Hejaz southern operations which prej'ed upon its flanks and rear. It was an interesting race and it is possible that the bulk of the IVth Army might have got through to Damascus in time to organize some sort of a defence against the cavalry, had it not been delayed for several precious hours by the destructive activities of Lieut. -Col. T. E. Lawrence, C.B., and his Arab Camel Corps and armoured cars. The part played by the Eoyal Air Force was also important in causing that delay in the Turkish retreat which enabled the Australian Mounted Division and the 5th Cavalry Division to get so good a start in the race.

In hopes of delaying this northern force, the enemy had blown one arch of the Jisr Benat Yakub (now generally known as ' ' Jordan Bridge ' '), and had formed a laager of lorries with artillery and machine guns. Thus the Australians, at the end of their eighteen miles' advance from Mejdel on the Sea of Galilee (during which the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade had reconnoitred up to Safed) found them- selves faced with strong opposition on attempting to cross the Jordan. The 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade, however, swam the river at FjI Min. a mile below the broken bridge, while the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade was strongly engaged in the swampy country between Jisr Benat Yakub and Lake Hule. The 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade imperilled the communications of the enemy and cap- tured much transpoi-t, while the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade kept the enemy busy at the bridge. At dusk the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade forced a passage to the uorthof the bridge and. pressing on througli the night, captured Deir es Saras just before dawn with prisoners and guns. This operation delayed the Australian Mounted Division for some time, so that it was overtaken by the 5th Cavalry Division which had come thirty-two miles from Kefr Kenna to a point near Jisr Benat Yakub.

Meanwhile, the 4th Cavalry Division had crossed the Jordan at Jisr Mujamie. south of the Sea of Galilee and was advancing upon Deraa. The 10th Cavalry Brigade got into visual connection with the Sherifian troops on the far side of the retreating Turks at 11.30 on the morning of Sept. "26, but actual contact had still to be established. The enemy made considerable resistance west of Irbid and that town was only occupied at nightfall. The same brigade was again engaged near Er Eemte, when the 1/lst Dorset Y'eomanryexecuted a highly successful charge, which resulted in satisfactory enemycasual- ties as well as the capture of 200 prisoners and twenty machine guns. After this. Y.v Bemte was taken and advanced patrols pushed on through the night towards Deraa. This the Sherifian troops occupied shortly before midnight, after an exciting race, in which Colonel Lawrence's fast camels beat the Sherif Feisal's horsemen by a neck along a course from the headquarters of the Hejaz northern operations. Troopers of the Central India Horse established contact with the Sherifian Arabs just after dawn on Sept. 28 west of Deraa, and only desisted from arresting one of the British officers serving with the Arabs under the impression that he was a German seiTing with the Turks, onrecognisingthe well-knownEnglish expletive that was drawn from him by their proposal.

With Chaytor's Force, the period covered by Sept. 26 and 27, forms a gap in the operations, owing to the fact that the main body of the Turkish Ilnd Corps had not yet come within range to be struck at and the rest of the Turkish Fourth Army had moved away from the Amman area into the inhospitable Hauran (Bashan). The force was actively ertgaged in finding fresh enemies to conquer, and the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade was fortunate in finding some Turks in the Wadi el Ilammam, who fought before surrendering to the number of 105 with one gun. Other Turks were seen moving south, stragglers probably from the main body of the Fourth Army, trying to join the advancing Ilnd Corps for safety, in view of the hostility of the local population. The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade located the advancing troops of this corps near Kastal and, on the morning of Sept. 27, there was a further engagement in the Wadi el Hammam. in which the 3rd Australian Light Horse Regiment, with aeroplane assistance, captured 300 prisoners and two machine guns. Later in the day. the .\ustralian and New Zealand Mounted Division was disposed between the water at Wadi el Hammam and Kalaat ez Zerka. and the Turks moving north., while the New Zealand Mounted Rifles had a detachment across the Darb el Haj and the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade held the water at Leban Station.

To face Plate 4S PLATE 4S ADVANCE THROUGH G ILE AD AND GALILE E I Milesio S' 10 20 Miles =1 |SHiiationat)Qprn.on27-9;!8aslmownatGJijQ..E.EF jaa!- 35 MEDITEAR-ANEAjST SEA ISlK ) Odmmd on r*Ki" )i.>/<: VoJifto 2r¥:, /;• Khya, /n Ij.tl Abayl _«- .s- — NTT — - / >jL »»nV** **;"; 389 Ayvn*lt(uH WA-SiSl ¦%'**"' lyi< :«Wt

_.!£ •f / l/«tea9« V/ Otfr»ijf» f;; I 'Wj\ TBO»PS rXr as: •'¦7«--S ajmsale... ,_„ At 2IZA STAfmVg'dtCVIierf*'. "18000 and 10.000 TutHS-' Surrenderee on 28-9-18- .>-"-" Sherifian Co-operation in September.

On Aug. 31 a detachment of the regular forces of King Husein started north from near Akaba in order to co-operate in the then forthcoming operations against the Turks. The direct route from Akaba to Damascus runs by way of Maan, Amman, and Deraa, and was, at that time, still for the most part in the occupation of the enemy. It was, therefore, necessary for a wide outflanking movement to be undertaken. That this was successfully carried through was most creditable to the troops engaged in the operation, as on one occasion they made a four days' march from water to water, followed imme- diately after that by a two days' march to the next supply. Nor was this water supply of the most inviting description. Leaches abounded and many of those who drank hastily found afterwards that these unpleasant creatures had got into their mouths and fastened themselves in the nasal tubes. Abu Lissa, near Maan, was reached on Sept. 2, then by way of Jafar and Bair the force reached Kasr el Azrak and continued through Umm el Jemal and Umtaiye which was reached on the afternoon of the 15th. This was made the base for the operations in the immediate future. A raid was made upon the railway between Deraa and Damascus. A point near Tel Arar was the place selected, and a bridge and 1,200 rails were blown up and destroyed during the morning of the 17th. A daylight occupation of a point only four miles from a German aerodrome invited the intervention of the enemy, and the force was attacked and bombarded by nine aeroplanes from Deraa. The work was, however, success- fully carried through, and part of the force proceeded during the day to the railway station at Mezerib, which was captured in the evening of the same day. This important point on the enemy lines of com- munication was carefully burned, two trains were destroyed, the water tanks blown up, and a quantity of rails bent and displaced. A good day's work being thus creditably brought to a close, the Arab force passed the night peacefully astride the enemy's only railway between his front in Palestine and Gilead and his base. Next day the force retreated southwards on Umtaiye passing near Remte and reaching Nasib station on the Hejaz Railway, south of Deraa, in time to blow up a large bridge and damage a quantity of rails before bed-time. On the morning of the 19th the Arab regulars accompanied by a numerous following from the local tribes and country-side in general, arrived at Umtaiye where they were attacked by their previous acquaintances, the German aeroplanes, who were in search of vengeance. The garrison of Deraa must have felt particularly vindictive, as the Arab regulars had, in the course of forty-eight hours, completely cut their communications with Amman, the Palestine front, and Damascus alike. . Bombs were freely dropped. The tribesmen and local peasantry vanished into the surrounding country, but the regular troops of the Arab Army barracked their camels, dismounted, and sat immovable, each man by the side of his beast, until the storm was passed. The Germans returned to Deraa for more bombs, whereupon the Camel Corps withdrew into a wadi and sat still among the blocks of lava which were to be found therein. By making no movement at all they concealed their presence from the questing planes, and the Germans returned disappointed, doubtless to report that the entire force had been destroyed. The picture of the Hejaz Camel Corps passing itself off as black stones recalls the story of Sherherazad in the " Arabian Nights," and, as in that story, the black stones came to life again and busily harassed the enemy. They remained among the lava until Sept. 24, issuing on one occasion by night to catch and kill a passing train, and on another occasion by day to blow up a bridge and destroy a great length of rails. On Sept. 24 the Turkish 4th Army began to surge northwards in its vain endeavour to escape disaster which had overtaken the troops to the west of Jordan. The Arab Camel Corps being immensely outnumbered by this force, which still retained a certain amount of organization, was unable to stop this retreat, and was obliged to content itself during two days with vigorous minor operations for incommoding its passage. These took the shape of a succession of raids upon selected units. A flurry of rifle fire would be followed by a charge and a swift withdrawal, leaving twenty or thirty dead Turks on the ground, and a dozen or so prisoners in the hands of the Arabs. In this way, two officers, 300 men, and twenty-five guns were captured. On Sept. 26, the Camel Corps having hurried north through the night, was able to blow up the railway and capture Ezra and Ghazale stations. Through Sheikh Miskin the force went to Sheikh Saad on one of the roads north from Mezsrib to Damascus. Here thirty officers and 500 men were captured, many of the former being Germans and Aastrians. The state of demoralization into which the enemy had fallen is exemplified in this force. Although provided with fifteen machine guns, as well as rifles and adequate ammimition, no resistance was made to the attacks of tribesmen and peasants, who reduced them to such a con- dition that only one pathetic figure had retained sufficient of his property to be able to wave portion? of a white handkerchief, saying : " I am a major, we surrender." During Sept. 27, the last Turkish formations evacuated Deraa and the Es Salt force moved north by way of Mezerib and Tafas. This force was so imbued with the doctrine of f rightfulness that it thought in its madness that an example of terrorism might overawe the Hauran which was bubbling in open rebellion all round it. Consequently it was decided " to make an example of " the unhappy villages of Tafas and Turaa. Eighty women and children were butchered with every revolting circumstance of atrocity, but the last hour of Turkish rule, east of Jordan, had already s-iruck. The Arabs, so far from being overawed and terrorised into a dutiful submission to their former tyrants, were justly incensed by this thoroughly Turkish outrage. The force which was responsible for it was visited by immediate and well-earned retribution, and the units which had moved out of Deraa and Mezerib never readied Damascus. Sheikh Tallal, a fighting man of high repute and a notable of the Hauran, was with the Arab Army. On finding what atrocities To face Plate 40.

AREA OCCUPIED AS THE RESULT OF OPERATIONS FROM SEPTEMBER 21«- TO 271918 PLATE 49 had been committed in his villafje he charsjed single-handed upon a Turkish column and furiously exacted blood for blood until he was riddled with bullets. At dawn on the 27th, the Arab Camel Corps rode into Deraa, so long a Turkish place of strength, and shortly afterwards at a point a little to the west of the lailway junction, made their first contact with sowars of the 38th Central India Horse.

September 28, 29, and 30.

The 5th Cavalry Division was somewhat delayed in crossing the Jordan — a lorry broke down the temporary bridge across the arch destroyed by the enemy — and finally made use of fords. By 1800 all fighting troops and fighting wheels were across, but further delay was caused to the latter by the dis- tressing nature of the road leading up to the plateau on the east of the river. It was not until 2030 that the division reached Kuneitra, which the Australian Mounted Division had occupied at 1300, and its rear wheels only arrived at 0600 on Sept. 29. Tired horses had been left in the Jordan Valley. The Australian Mounted Division led in the advance from Kuneitra in the evening of Sept. 29, and the 3rd- Australian Light Horse Brigade was engaged with the Tm-ks on the high ground south of Sasa at 2000. The brigade was hampered in its attack by the masses of lava deposits which made it difficult for men to move across country in the dark. The enemy's flank was protected by an impassable morass, and no attack could be made before 0300 on Sept. 30, when the enemy was disposed of by the 9th and 10th Austalian Light Horse Regiments and lost twenty-five prisoners, two guns and seven machine guns. The advance continued without check until some 2,500 Turks with machine guns were found to be holding Kaukab and the ridge east of it. A successful mounted attack was made by the 12th and 4tb Australian Light Horse Regiments, supported by the Notts Battery of Royal Horse Artillery and " A " Battery Honourable Aitillery Company, and the ridge was taken at the gallop. Many of the Turks fled into the woods near Daraya. Meanwhile, at 0845, an aeroplane report was received by the 5th Cavalry Division to the effect that some 2,000 Turks were retiring on Damascus by the Deraa road. The 14th Cavalry Brigade was ordered to intercept this force and then march on Damascus. This brigade cut the Turkish column in half, capturing the bulk of the leading portion including all that was left of the 3rd Turkish Cavalry Division with the Divisional Commander and his stafi. The 13th and 15th Cavalry Brigades concentrated just north of Sasa in Corps reserve. At noon, after some opposition, the 13th Cavalry Brigade seized the Jebel el Aswad astride the Kiswe-Daniascus road and cut off large numbers of Turks trying to withdraw to Kiswe, who tried to break away to the left and right of the brigade and up the Wadi Zabirani. Others, greatly disorganized, were streaming up the hills to the north-east and along the main road to Damascus. The former were shelled by the Essex Battery and the latter were headed off towards the 4th Cavalry Division, with the loss of about 1,000 prisoners. At 1300 the brigade advanced to Kaukab and then co-operated with the 14th and 15th Brigades (the latter being on the right, astride of the Wadi Zabirani) against the Turks who were trying to break out from Kiswe. At 1700 the 13th Brigade captured Kiswe with 675 prisoners and four guns. In the evening the 5th Mounted Division had its headquarters at Kaukab with the 13th Mounted Brigade, the 14th was astride the Kiswe-Damascus road north of the Jebel el Aswad with patrols at Kadem Station, and the 15th was round Khan esh Sheha, which had been occupied at 1000. Two troops of the 1/lst Royal Gloucester Hussars Yeomanry fl3th Cavalry Brigade) had been sent forward in hopes of capturing the enemy wireless station at Kadem. This was however blown up on their approach at 1630. The yeomanry charged the destruction party, killing fifteen with the sword, but had to retire in face of con- siderable German reinforcements, and afterwards joined the Australian Mounted Division.

The 4th Mounted Division coming up from the south with the Sherifian forces on its right, entered Deraa unopposed on Sept. 28, and next day got into touch with the retreating Turks in the Dilli area. For two days the enemy was pressed and harassed, his columns were fired upon and broken up, and on Sept. 30 the division got into touch with the other divisions of the Desert Mounted Corps, and reached Zerakiye late at night. By dusk the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade and the French Cavalry under Commandant Lebon, attached to the Australian Mounted Division, had worked across the Damascus- Beirut road immediately north-west of Damascus and on the hills sanormding it. Here the enemy was trapped — the defile was swept with rifle and machine-gun fire tiaius were wrecked, and every form of transport destroyed. In this action the Turks lost 4,000 prisoners and very many killed.

In Gilead Chaytor's Force located the southern portion of the Turkish Fourth Army at Kastal, with three trains in the station. At 1515 the Commander was summoned to surrender by 0845 next day, in a message dropped from an aeroplane, but no reply was received. At 1145, however, on Sept. 29, the Turks opened negotiations with the 5th Australian Light Horse Regiment, on the railway south of Leban. The situation was difficult as large numbers of the local inhabitants, intent upon looting, were surround- ing the Turkish position. Any sign of a white flag was likely to precipitate matters, so the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade advanced to Kastal and formed a cordon behind which the Turks were able to surrender. The Turkish Commander, Ali Bey Wahabi, was taken by car to Divisional Headquarters. The other prisoners to the number of over 4,000 marched into Amman luider the protection of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, while some 500 sick had to be left for a time at Kastal. The surrender also included twelve guns and thirty-five machine guns, and brought the list of captures by Chaytor's Force during its operations as a separate entity to over 10,000 prisoners, fifty-seven guns, and 132 machine guns. Large quantities of railway rolling stock, ammunition, and other material were also taken.

Itiface Plate 50, CAPTURE OF DAMASCUS PLATE 50 ~ Zebdajii t TCLTALtAJAT ' IBN HALLAWI 36JI5' Vo' \q 5905 / , III I JtBCL RAHWM / r I I "Ruins Vvins HORCIRI Jn 2* JBaVncn Ifn -'z ASffrSemat ;*y 9- 5d> SVJauraj o _ y o lA" AUS.M.O.

lACAV." t2ArL.H jeb/l, iXSWAO JEBEL TX42S 11 TChifyit aejo' Remnants oT PTarmy ihuvt V*""/" ARA jnA#i/0K TUt-UL »HAAI» Il \,7 I JO IV »MA Printed by the Survey of Egypt. De. 1918 (04 53) TeUJuMUuxb' 4fCAV.t/\W Katgat on Nuhas c/lbmff ¦ eaSnahir \ \ u.iuiu ((.'153: Miles 5 -t 3 2 i o 5 lo] Situationat I? a-.miL 30-9-18aslaiowiat G.H.O-E.E.F.

October 1.

No precise moment can be fixed for the fall of Damascus. Politically its independence from Turkish domination was proclaimed about 1400 on Sept. 30 while Jemal Pasha, Commander of the Fourth Army and numbers of armed Turks and Germans were still in the city. Yet, so reduced was the moral of these troops, that they wearily trailed out of Damascus along the north bank of the Barada and gazed apathetically at the Sherifian flags which proclaimed the jubilation of the Damascenes at their defeat and emphasized the collapse of four centuries of empire. No forraal surrender took place as the municipal authorities welcomed the troops alike of the Desert Mounted Corps and of the Sherifian Army as liberators and allies, and no enemy administration survived in such a form as to be able to take upon itself the task of arranging a capitulation. The last days of Turkish rule in the famous city had indeed been full of humiliation for the defeated side. People refused to sell pro- visions to Turks, even for gold. It was impossible to obtain supplies for the hospitals, and the Germans forcibly seized all available transport for their own especial benefit. During the morning of the SOtli the Damascenes were delighted to witness a brisk fight between Turks and Germans, provoked by the rapacity of the latter over the distribution of vehicles. Satisfactory numbers on both sides lost their lives in this encounter, which was, apparently, the most formidable of many similar skirmishes between the Turks and their Prussian patrons, evidence of which had been forthcoming in the shape of numerous German corpses all along the line of retreat. In the hospitals the Tiu-kish sanitary department entirely collapsed during the last five days, so much so that one of the first tasks to be undertaken after the ficcupation of the town, was the very nec?ssary burial of bodies which had been left three, four, and even five days, on the floor where they had died. Food was obtained for the survivmg patients, and the hospital staff was forcibly induced to resume its duties. The 14th Cavalry Brigade and Sherifian troops had entered Damascus on Oct. 1, but in so large a city it is not surprising that both detachments were ignorant of the arrival of the other, and that both thought that they were first in. In point of actual time a detachment of the 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment under Major Olden reached the Scrail at 0630 on Oct. 1, while Colonel Lawrence and the Sherifian Camel Corps were a little later, but it was not until 0830 that General Chauvel motored into Damascus to confer with the Civil Authorities. During the early hours of the morning of Oct. 1, the 14th Cavalry Brigade intercepted numbers of Turks who were still trying to reach Damascus, in ignorance of the fact that the city was no longer a refuge for them. The rest of the 5th Cavalry Division concentrated at Deir Khabiye at 0600 and moved up the Kiswe-Damascus road to join the 14th Brigade. The 4th Cavalry Division which had left Zerakiye at 0300 followed. At 1030 the 14th Cavalry Brigade was sent through the town to Jobar to co-operate with the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade in closing the Duma road to those Turks who were trying to escape that way.

Meanwhile, the Australian Mounted Division, which had been astride the Beirut road all night, at 0500 pushed forward the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade through the town and blocked the Ale\ po road. On the way this brigade captured a train, with 483 prisoners, eight guns, and thirty machine guns, and engaged an enemy column at Duma. The 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment charged the rear of this column, killed numbers of the enemy and captured 600 prisoners and thirty-seven machine guns. The pursuit was continued and in the evening some Germans and machine guns were taken at Khan Kusseir. The brigade remained at Duma for the night. At 0825 next - morning the brigade galloped for nearly six miles across country and charged an enemy column with sword. The Turks were broken and lost many dead, in addition to a captured Divisional Commander, 1,500 other prisoners, three guns, and twenty-six machine guns. This brought the operations roimd Damascus to a close.

Story of the Arab Movement.

A Sherif (Arabic plural Ashraj) in the Moslem world is one who claims descent in the male line from the Khalif Ali (656-661 a.d.) by his marriage with Fatima, daughter of the Prophet Mohammed (died 632). There are many of these Ashraf in Arabia, Morocco and the Sudan, but among those generally accepted as such, only the Ashraf inscribed in the Register of Mecca., which has been strictly kept for many centuries past — if not from the days of the Prophet himself, are of absolutely unquestioned authenticity. They are divided into a number of clans, living mostly in the Hejaz, and form an accepted aristocracy with peculiar privileges under a law of their own.

For the first four centuries after the death of the Propliet, the Ashraf were not very numerous and had not as yet estabhshed their position as a poUtical power. Towards the end of the tenth century. however, one of the Ashraf of Mecca got possession of his native town and inaugurated in the Hejaz a tradition of Sherifian temporal power, the holder of which was regarded as the Emir and head of the Ashraf, or, as he has for centuries been known in Europe — " The Grand Sherif of Mecca." In course of time a fighting Sherif of the Juheinah clan, by name Qatada, became Emir and a Prince of his dynasty during the sixteenth century, established the undoubted predominance of the Emirate of Mecca over the Hejaz, and sccaired for his own family an exclusive right to the throne. The reigning representative of the senior line of the dynasty founded by the Emir Qatada succeeded to the throne of Mecca as the Emir Husein in 1908, and so long as it was possible to reconcile his position as a vassal of the Sultan of Turkey with his dignity as an Arab Prince and head of the Ashraf, he remained a loyal subject of the Ottoman Empire, but at the beginning of the war the Turkish atrocities in Syria which came on the top of the violent attempts of the Constantinople Government forcibly to Ottomanize all nationalities under its authority, made a revolt of the Arab nation against its oppressors inevitable.

To face Plate hi.

Cj\l jl Kjixr ur ujjvlajm_u:!> PLATE 51 fPrinfdby the Surveyof Egypt. Drc 1918(0453) Reprinted in Eir/and 19/9.

Miles S 4 3 2 1 o I C . I 1 — 1= m Miles In May, 1916, the position of the Emir of Mecca "was threatened by the arrival of a picked force of ¦ 3,000 Turkish troops in Medina. Their plan of campaign was to march through the Hejaz consoHdating the waning Ottoman authority in that principality, and then to proceed to the Yemen in order to reinforce the -Turkish army operating against Aden. The foresighted policy of the Emir in preventing the pro- longation of the Hejaz railway from Medina to Mecca, caused a much needed delay in the progress of the Turks, and the Emir decided that the privileged position of the Hejaz and possibly his own authority would be menaced by the arrival of so large a Turkish force. He placed himself at the head of the national cause and drew his sword in the defence of the Arab as against the Turk.

The Arab revolt began on June 5, 1916, with the formation of a thin Bedouin cordon round Medina, where Ali and Feisal, two sons of the Sherif Husein, were in command. The Hejaz railway was broken at several points between Medina and Abu Naam ; but the Arabs, inexpert in demolition, did not effect enough before being driven off by relief parties with machine guns, to interrupt seriously the com- munication of Medina with the north, and the besic'ing force, short of arms and supplies, and with no guns worth mentioning, could do little but watch the city from afar. Jiddah, however, which was attacked on June 9, held out barely a week. Cut off from Mecca by the loss of the blockhouses on the road, and exposed to naval guns and 'planes, the Turkish garrison, in a weak position north of the town, yielded to the instance of the civilian population and surrendered at discreticm. Mecca had passed in the mean- time into the Emir's hands, with the exception of the forts and entrenched barracks, held by small garrisons, the bulk of the Turkish force being absent in summer quarters at Taif with the Governor-General. These garrisons, who had had some Inkling of what was coming, opened fire on the town, putting a shell or two even into or near the Great Mosque, to the infinite scandal of all pious Moslems ; and they were not reduced imtil artillery was brought up from Jiddah. They had all surrendered bv July 16. Taif where over 2,000 men, the bulk of the Turkish force, were entrenched, with Ghalib Pasha, the G.O.C. and Governor-General, held out much longer — till Sept. 23 — and then capitulated from hopelessness rather than from scarcity or fear of its assailants. It had been blockaded very effectively for three and a half months by Sherif Abdullah, the Emir's second son, with a mixed force of Ateibah Bedouins and Meccan townsfolk, but though regularly bombarded it had never been really assaulted.

Smaller places, like Lith and Yambo, surrendered as soon as they were seriously attacked, and the greater part of the Hejaz was now clear of the Turks. So far the task of the Arabs had been com- paratively easy. Isolated bodies of troops, divided from all possible relief by 300 miles of hostile, ill- watered country and barred from the sea, were bound to capitulate sooner or later, however superior in fighting quahty and equipment to their foes. But the Medina garrison was in a different case. It had been rein- forced, re-armed, re-victualled, and reassured by successful sorties during these four months, and, late in September it was able to issue forth, driving the Arabs before it, and make Medina secure by establishing a cordon of fortified posts, thirty to forty miles out along the Mecca roads. This done, the Turks pushed farther still, realizing that their best defence was an offensive and at one time they threatened to occupy both Yambo and Kabugh, the important half-way house to Mecca. But only some 14,000 strong, they had not the forces necessary to hold such distant objectives together with the lines of communication. Considerable Arab armies moved up from south and south-west, and the Turks withdrew again behind the fortified outposts of Medina at the end of the year.

It had beconae clear that owing to their inexperience in modern siege warfare the Arabs could not expect to reduce Medina. The only operation likely to be fruitful would be systematic attack on the 800 miles of the single track of the Hejaz railway which connects Medina with Damascus. For such raiding however, and for ultimate extension of the revolt to Syria, more northerly bases than Jiddah, Rabugh, or even Yambo, were required. Therefore at the of Jan., 1917. Sherif Feisal, with the Northern Arab Army, installed himself at Wejh, already occupied by landing parties, and extended his hold farther north to Dhaba and Moweilah on the Midian coast. His brother, Abdullah, had arrived at Wadi Ais, north-west of Medina, leaving only his eldest brother. Ah, in the former theatre of operations.

The raiding carried out during the following six months, with British and French help, lowered the strength and spirit of the Turkish forces in Medina, provided scope for adventure which attracted many fresh .Arab elements, and offered a demonstration of activity which induced many more to engage them- selves on the Sherifian side in view of a move still farther "north. But it did not cut off Medina. The permanent way proved harder to wreck irretrievably, and the enemy better prepared to make inter- ruptions good, than had been expected. The alternative scheme, that of blowing up trains, was evolved, and under the direction of Lieut. -Colonel T. E. Lawrence, this form of military activity began to rank almost as a national sport. Numerous instances occurred of small parties of Arabs under Allied leader- ship, blowing up the engine of a train while in motion. Sometimes the disaster merely resulted in the delay and discomfiture of the enemy — sometimes the Arabs were able to inflict serious losses and capture valuable material as the result of one of these episodes. In any case such destruction invariably impaired the railway track, reduced the number of engines and the amount of rolling stock available, caused delay and laid a heavy burden upon the Turkish lines of communication.

Meanwhile, early in July, 1917, Akaba had been captured from the Turks, and Sherif Feisal moved up. Operations and propaganda could now be extended much farther northwards. Previously there had been no raiding of the railway above Tebuk. Now it was attacked, not only south of Maan but north, while Arab forces threatened both Maan itself and also the forest district on the north-west, whence tJie railway locomotives were drawing their fuel supply. The effect on Medina was soon evident, and had the Turks been in a position to evacuate by the railway without almost certain disaster, they would Til face Plate 52, AREA OCCUPIED AS THE RESULT OF OPERATIONS FROM SEPTEMBER 28 TO OCTOBER 1:1918 piate 52 «• »o ••vile* REFERENCE tiJLiArta. in, oentpafiim of TtwitM S - olMindcfTxau during ptriixiSrpt2S'-''foOct.ll0le preyuHlM toSUinhn- 28*6 70J6 HOTE: D»vmhpm*ni of Railway from SepttmbT 20* to Oct l*~* I9IB .Shown thut I • — -?- — Dmemuvillm i ¦ MEDITERRAJEA SEA *f«,r.M.roJ EGYPTIAN LABOUR CORPS ISSEPTlHie ONWARDS ~- m— *• ¦ ? *9 V* K. h. C. Campm C Military LaJxtuf Utwa-u MEDITERRANEAN SEA PEN I fftfAHw/uM/ h tkm Aijfx. nffatt Ok /9/A /VMAS) Dirl- /« fUr* /.Q/Q probably have done so early in the current year. But, for lack of sufficient rolling stock and troops to keep tho line during withdrawal, they evidently decided to hold on, as the lesser evil ; for, in any case, they were secure for some months of being able to repel direct Arab attack, all reduced and scurvy-ridden though their troops had become, both at headquarters and on the line of communication. ' There they remained until their surrender became necessary as the result of the Armistice which the Turks were compelled to accept at the end of October. Lines of communication troops who had hoped to make good their escape northwards, when disaster overtook the Turkish armies west of the Jordan were beset by hostile tribesmen and finally surrendered to Chaytor's force at Ziza.

Having secured the adhesion or neutrality of all Arabs as far up as Maan, and made provisional arrangements with others to northward, Feisal could now contemplate an advance into the trans-Jordan country. He had collected, from one source or another, some thousands of partly-trained troops, beside contingents from Bedouin tribes of higher fighting quality than the Hejazis. Also he was much better equipped with guns, small arms, and auxiliary services than any Arab army had been heretofore. The Turks in Maan and the Hishe Forest made attempts to dislodge him from the Petra region in Oct. and Nov., 1917, but proved to weak to press home any advantage they gained. The cold of the highlands in winter, and lack of transport, militated against strong counter-offensives by the Arabs, but in Jan.. 1918, they were able to begin an advance towards the eastern Dead Sea lands. There were, but few Turks to oppose them, and the local inhabitants, though jealous and suspicious of a strange force in their midst, did not obstruct. Shobak and the Hishe Forest were occupied, and towards the end of January, the Arabs had taken and passed Tafilah, raided up to Mezra on the Dead Sea, and began to threaten the Turks in Kerak and on the railway north of Jurf el Derwish.

To stay an advance, which, if not checked would bring all their Hejaz forces into an inextricable situation, the Turks renewed, in February, their efforts at offensive, from Kerak and from the railway. The first attempt by an infantry force, about 700 strong, to reach Tafilah ended in signal disaster, barely fifty men getting back to Kerak, with the loss of all guns and material. A second attempt, made from the railway early in March, with two comparatively strong columns, stiffened by German units, effected its purpose with little difficult}', the Arabs retiring from Tafilah to Shobak ; but its effect was demonstrative only, the Turks being unable to remain at Tafilah in view of the probability of an advance by the British across the Jordan. The Arabs re-occupied Tafilah on March 18, and, on the Turks withdrawing from Kerak a few days later, a detachment of Fcisal's irregular troops entered this place also. They did not, however, stay long. The past month of April was marked by a great increase of Arab activity, and as a result of the capture of all the stations on the line between Maan and Mudowara and destruction of track and bridges for ovsr seventy miles, Medina was finally isolated. Maan was vigorously attacked and the Sherifian forces, although unable at the first attempt to hold the railway station which they had entered, took up a strong position dominating both the station and the town. Further north much damage was done to stations, tracks and bridges, and the Beni Sakhr tribe gave assurances of future co-operation, which were, at the time, believed to be satisfactory. The history of the Es Salt raid (April and May, 1918) showed that this confidence had been misplaced, and the operation did not result in the wholesale destruc- tion of Turkish troops owing to the Beni Sakhr tribe remaining quiescent at the critical moment.

The strong position taken up by the Turkish Fourth Army in the Belka during the summer made it impossible for the Arab Army to attempt an offensive owing to its lack of the resources and heavy artillery necessary for such an operation. The September advance made by General Allenby in Palestine caused the Fourth Army to retire upon Damascus and gave the Sherif Feisal the opportunity for which he had so long been waiting.

From the fall of Damascus to the Armistice.

The result of the September operations left the Turks depressed in moral, and so greatly reduced in numbers as to be almost entirely deprived of power to resist the northward sweep of the cavalry, except in the neighbourhood of Aleppo. The obstacles which still impeded the advance were chiefly those offered by long distances, by bad roads, and by disease. The troops which had passed through the Beisan area suffered severely from malaria after the period of incubation had elapsed, by which time they had advanced into the Damascus area. The widely prevalent influenza also produced many casualties.

In spite of these difficulties there were some examples of rapid advance on the part both of cavalry and infantry. The 5th Cavalry Division, which was engaged in the fighting round Damascus on the last day of September, was fighting Turks fifteen miles north of Aleppo on the last day of October. The 7th Indian Division, at Haifa on Oct. 1, marched to Beirut in a week, and occupied Tripolis on Oct. 18, after halting on the historic shores of St. George's Bay for five days. In the course of the advance to Beirut, this division foimd time to construct a road, over which guns were taken, across the Ladder of Tyre, a natural obstacle of imposing and picturesque magnitude. Full details of the advances of these two divisions will be found in their respective records.

During the advance of the 5th Cavalry Division on the afternoon of Oct. 22, the Armoured Car Column engaged a number of the enemy's armed lorries near Khan Sebil (thirty-five miles south of Aleppo). An enemy armoured car was captured, and the lorries, which kept up fire from machine guns, were chased for fifteen miles. One lorry was run to a standstill but some of its orew escaped in the darkness, leaving twenty-five casualties and five prisoners. Another lorry with five prisoners was captured next day but the Turkish Commander in Aleppo itself declined to surrender to the Armoured Car Column Tu fuce Piute 03.

ADVANCE THROUGH NORTHERN SYRIA PLATE S3 I O cU23t ' DISPOSITION OF TROOPS FROM OCT IV-ZO"!" ¦CL QMUl -tji**i~ifatti*miMut Reprinted in En/and /9/9.

Ml In a oMilcs LINES OF COMMUNICATION, 1918.

British.

Early in the spring of 1918, railhead having been established at Ludd, and active operations on a large scale having ceased, preparations began to be made for the next stage of the advance.

These preparations included the doubling of the railway track from El Arish to Rafa, the relaying of the Turkish railway from Ludd to Jerusalem with a track of standard gauge {see Plate 40), the for- mation of large hospital centres at Gaza and Deir el Belah, and the development of Jerusalem and Ludd as advanced bases ; to these base camps, medical imits and reserves of supplies and stores were trans- ferred from the bases from which the November advance had been made. An immense amount of labour was expended on roads, which were rapidly put into a condition to bear the heaviest traffic ; water supplies were developed ; and a widespread and thorough campaign was carried on through the summer against malaria in — and immediately in rear of — the Corps areas.

The pressure of work on the Lines of Communication was greatly increased by the withdrawal of the 52nd arid 74th Divisions for service in France ; by the arrival of the 3rd and 7th Indian Divisions to take their places ; and by the reorganization of the remaining British Divisions (except the 54th) on the Indian scale.

On July 1 the Lines of Communication were extended to include the area west of the Suez Canal known as the Suez Canal Zone, thus taking in the Canal ports of Suez and Ismailia ; and on the same date the defence of Tor and Abu Zenima, together with their garrisons, came under the Lines of Communication.

In the latter part of August, advice was received that active operations would start in the near future, and on a large scale, thus involving a certain amount of preparation being made on the Lines of Communication ; e.g. hospital accommodation was increased and medical units pushed forward close on the rear of the fighting line ; arrangements were made for receiving prisoners-of-war in large numbers and for their accommodation on the journey from the front line to the base ; and reinforcement camps were established from the railliead to the front line in order that reinforcements could be hurried forward during the advance. Owing to the necessity for secrecy, the final arrangements could not be made until immediately before the advance started : consequently, the night of Sept. 18 was a very busy period on the lines of communication.

The great success and rapidity of the advance involved great activity on the lines of communication, in order to keep up as far as possible with the advancing army. Reinforcement camps were pushed forward, prisoners-of-war cages were taken over, and, on Sept. 26, the area of the lines of communication was extended northwards along the whole front from the sea to the Jordan. On Oct. 4 it was again extended northwards to include Nablus and Tul Keram ; on Nov. 1, Haifa, Damascus, and the railway line between these two places were taken over ; and on Nov. 16, Nazareth and Tiberias were included.

Summing up, the lines of communication have grown from what they were on the arrival of General A lien by, the bases of Port Said and Kantara, with a single railway track to Deir el Belah — a distance of 220 kilometres {see Plate 2) — to what they are now, with a railway line from Kantara to Damascus — approximately 650 kilometres — and branch railheads at Beersheba and Jerusalem. {See Plate 54.) The troops employed on the lines of communication at its start were entirely British, but later battahons of the Egyptian Army were substituted, who have done valuable work, including the holding of the inner cordon on the west bank of the Suez Canal, and duties with balloon sections in the rear of the front hue. Battalions of the British West Indies Regiment and Jewish battalions of the Royal Fusiliers took over duties on the further extension of the line, but these were eventually withdrawn and transferred to fighting formations.

It is impossible to go fully into statistics in so small a space, but the following two points may be of interest : — (1) The rations strength of Kantara when taken over by Palestine Lines of Commimication in May, 1917, was less than 10,000, while on the day of the Armistice it reached 100,000.

(2) Up till May, 1917, no ocean-going ship had ever been berthed at Kantara, whereas, in Oct., 1918, the daily average of ocean-going ships loading and discharging in the Port of Kantara was five.

These figures alone will give some idea as to the amount of organization which was required to bring the lines of communication up to their present dimensions.

Turkish.

In the spring of 1918, Germans were substituted for the majority of the Turkish officials, and matters improved somewhat. A " Navy " was formed on the Dead Sea, and wheat from Kerak was transported up the Dead Sea by motor boats and barges. (-See Plate 2.) The weak spot of the enemy lines of communication was Deraa ; and the destruction of the line to the north, south, and west, by the Arab Northern Army on Sept. 17 and 18, completely cut off their supplies. During the retreat in Sept., 1918, an attempt was made to use their boats on the Sea of Tiberias, and to transport stores from the northern shore to Damascus by camels ; also the motor-lorry columns, which had been extensively used from Damascus southwards, were able to remove a small portion of the stores from their advanced bases.

It was not until Oct. 9, 1918, that the first broad gauge train ran through the Taurus tunnel, and the first train to run direct from Constantinople to Aleppo arrived only a few days before the city was occupied by our troops.

7'u face Plat* 64.

PLATE 5 The Military Administration of tiie Territory released fronn the Turlts.- As the Egyptian Expeditionary Force advanced and more and more territory was released from Tnrkish rule the Commander-in-Chief gradually became responsible for the administration of a large area and a considerable population. The former had suffered from centuries of neglect and the passage of contesting armies, while the latter were impoverished and ill-nourished as the result of exhaustive Turkish requisitions and the blockade to which the country, while under Turkish rule, had been subjected by the Allies. The peculiar religious status of Jerusalem and the presence of numerous privileged eccles- iastical corporations also gave rise to complicated questions of a nature seldom presented to the military administration of occupied enemy territory. General Allenby at first entrusted the administration of .Southern Palestine to his Chief Political Officer, Brigadier-General G. F. Clayton, C.B., C.M.G., who built up such measures of governtnent of the civilian populations as is provided for in "The Laws and Usages of War," laid down by the international agreements embodied in the Hague Convention. This administration, of what was techQi(;

The arrival of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was fortunately so timed as to prevent the who'.c- sale deportation of Hebrew colonists and residents which had actually been ordered by the Turks, and the.se careful agriculturists were able to restore to a great extent the properties in the Kaza of Jaffa which they had been able to preserve in part from the spoliation of the enemy. Not only did the colon- ists benefit from the market afforded by the presence of the army, but were able to co-operate in the efforts made on behalf of the whole Hebrew community by the energetic Dr. Chaim Weiszmann and the Zionist Commission, which culminated in the ceremonial foundation of the University of Jerusalem as a symbol alike of their confidence in the future and of their recognition of the necessity of imparting higher education in their own language.

As the tide of victory rolled north and east it became necessary very largely to extend the activities of the Military Administration, and in course of time the Commander-in-Chief found it desirable to divide occupied enemy territory into three sectors, south, north, and east. The respective areas were admiuistered under the control of the Commander-in-Chief by General Money from Jerusalem, bj Colonel P. de Piepape, C.B., from Beirut, and by Ali Riza Pasha el Rikabi from Damascus. The opposite map shews the extent of these three areas and indicates the position of the kazas actually allotted to Occupied Enemy Territory Administration North but temporarily dependent, for the sake of adminis- trative convenience, upon Occupied Enemy Territory Administration East. Throughout the whole of these extensive territories efforts are being made to enable the population to recover from the effects of four centuries of Turkish domination and to restore the ordinary amenities of civilization and commerce.

To face Plate 55.

Summary of the Terms of the Turkish Armistice (as published) which came into force on Oct. 31, 1918.

Art. 1. — Opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and access to the Black Sea. The Allied occu- pation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.

Art. 2. — The position of all minefields, torpedo tubes, and other obstructions in Turkish waters to be indicated and assistance to be given to sweep or remove them as may be required.

Art. 3. — All available information regarding the mines in the Black Sea is to be communicated. Art. 4. — All Allied prisoners and Armenians interned to be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.

Art. 5. — The immediate demobilization of the army except troops required for the surveillance of the frontier and maintenance of internal order, their number and disposal to be determined later by the Allies after consultation with the Turkish Government.

Art. 6. — The surrender of all war vessels in the Turkish waters or the waters occupied by Turkey. These ships are to be interned at such Turkish port or ports, as may be directed, except such small vessels as required for the police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.

Art. 7. — The Allies are to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising, which threatens the security of the Alhes.

Art. 8. — The free use by Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation, and the denial of their use to the enemy. Similar conditions are to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters for the purposes of trade and the demobilization of the army. Art. 9. — The use of all ship repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals. Art. 10. — Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

Art. 11. — Withdrawal of Turkish troops from north-western Persia. Part of Trans-Caucasia has already been ordered to be evacuated ; the remainder to be evacuated if the Allies require after they study the situation there.

Art. 12.— Wireless and cable stations to be under Allied control ; Turkish Government messages are excepted.

Art. 13. — Prohibition of the destruction of any naval, military, or commercial material by the Turks.

Art. 14. — Facilities are to be given for the purchase of coal, oil-fuel, and naval material from Turkish sources, after the requirements of the country have been met. None of the above material is to be exported.

Art. 15. — Allied control of all railways and Allied occupation of Batoum. Turkey not to object to the Allied occupation of Baku.

Art. 16. — The surrender of the garrisons of the Hejaz, Assir, Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia, and the withdrawal of troops from Cilicia, except those maintaining order as determined under clause 5. The surrender of all ports there.

Art. 17. — The surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the nearest Italian garrison. Turkey guarantees to stop supplies to and communication with these officers if they do not obey the order of surrender.

Art. 18. — The surrender of all ports occupied in TripoUtania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.

Art. 19. — All Germans and Austrians, naval, military, and civilian, to quit Turkey within a month. Those who are in remote districts to do so as soon as possible thereafter.

Art. 20. — Compliance with the Allies' orders as regards the disposal of arms and the transport of the demobilized under clause 5.

Art. 21. — An Allied representative to be attached to the Turkish Ministry of Supplies 1o safeguard Allied interests.

Art. 22. — Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allies. The release of Turkish civilian prisoners and prisoners over military age to be considered.

Art. 23. — Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.

Art. 24. — In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Alhes reserve the right to occupy any of them.

 

 

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Further Reading:

Desert Mounted Corps

The Desert Mounted Corps, Roll of Honour

Battles where Australians fought, 1899-1920

 


Citation: Desert Mounted Corps (DMC), General Allenby's Despatches, Part 4

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