"At a mile distant their thousand hooves were stuttering thunder, coming at a rate that frightened a man - they were an awe inspiring sight, galloping through the red haze - knee to knee and horse to horse - the dying sun glinting on bayonet points..." Trooper Ion Idriess
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Thursday, 6 August 2009
The Volunteer Movement in Western Australia, Perth Company of W.A. Rifle Volunteers Topic: Militia - LHW - WA
Western Australian Militia
Perth Company of W.A. Rifle Volunteers
The following is an extract from the book written in 1962 by George F. Wieck called The Volunteer Movement in Western Australia 1861-1903, pp. 32 – 36:
Perth Company of W.A. Rifle Volunteers
An upsurge of international tension in 1872 revived interest in the Volunteer Movement in Western Australia. There was alarm in official circles and steps were taken to raise new corps. Naturally, Perth was to the fore and phoenix-like a new body arose from the ashes of the defunct Perth Volunteer Rifles. The "firebrands", after adequate apologies and promises of better behaviour, rallied around themselves most of personnel of the disbanded corps. Progress was rapid. The Gazette of 17 June 1872 authorized the formation of a corps to be designated the "Perth Company of W.A. Rifle Volunteers" with a strength of 100 all ranks, and to be commanded by Captain E. Birch. The title of Metropolitan Rifle Volunteers had been asked for but was not granted then. However, the approved designation must have proved cumbersome for from 1874 onwards the latter was used, even in official documents. The new corps inherited the accumulated knowledge and experience, as well as the weapons, of its predecessor and was reasonably efficient from the outset.
On 17 June 1872 there were 71 names on the roll. A detachment was formed at Guildford in 1873. By 1875 the strength had increased to 126, plus 12 honorary members and 30 cadets. Strength reached a maximum of 143 in 1881 which led to approval being given to form a second Company. Later for some unknown reason strength declined steadily and by 1895 had fallen to 75.
Plans were completed in 1883 to rearm the corps with new Snider breech-loading rifles of .56 calibre, the old Enfields being handed down to other corps who presumably were armed with still more obsolete weapons.
Corps activities were varied. Combined parades, field days, rifle matches, and guards of honour were numerous. In 1874 the corps became grouped with the Fremantle and Guildford corps for purposes of field and battalion training as the 1st Battalion Volunteers under the direct orders of the Military Commandant, but this in no way affected the former administrative independence of each corps; on parade the Perth corps provided two Companies, Fremantle and Guildford one each. In 1884 the corps attended the 4-day camp of training (the first held in the Colony) at Bullen's Grounds, Albion.
The Band appears to have had an exalted idea of its own importance, for although a component of the corps it claimed the right to absent itself from corps parades when such action suited its own convenience. After a blatant act of defiance in 1877, the Military Commandant suspended the Bandmaster and as a punishment for insubordination reverted all bandsmen to the ranks. Special rules were then issued for the control of all Volunteer Bands. Later, a request by the Band that it be allowed to give a recital in the Supreme Court Gardens, and charge admission thereto, was refused.
The only other recorded act of insubordinate concerned a senior officer who some years after the Band episode was found guilty by a Court-Martial of an offence connected with the wearing of a uniform. Apart from an occasional display of high spirits the corps was sound and reliable, being w trained and the centre of most forms of military activity in the Colony. A Queen's Colour, provide at Government expense, was presented to the corps early in 1895 and consecrated on 24th May. This was the first Queen's Colour to be borne by W.A. Volunteers.
On 1 July 1899 the corps became a component of the 1st Infantry Regiment.
Officers of the Perth Company W.A. Rifle Volunteers
Australian Light Horse, Roles within the Regiment, Instruction of Recruits as Sentries Topic: AIF - Lighthorse
Australian Light Horse
Roles within the Regiment
Instruction of Recruits as Sentries
The following entries dealing with the roles and duties within the hierarchy of a light horse regiment are extracted from a very informative handbook called The Bushman’s Military Guide, 1898. While written in 1898, the information contained in the entries held true for the next twenty years with only minor modifications with the principles remaining as current then as now.
Instruction of Recruits as Sentries
Recruits are to be instructed in their duties as sentries. The instructor will post them in different parts of the barrack yard, giving each of them some particular orders to attend to, and will teach them what is laid down on the subject of Guards, etc.
Battle of Romani, Sinai, August 4 to 5, 1916, Falls Account, The Pursuit on The 5th August Topic: BatzS - Romani
Battle of Romani
Sinai, August 4 to 5, 1916
Falls Account, The Pursuit on The 5th August
The Battle of Romani, 4-6 August 1916
[Click on map for larger version]
[From: Military operations: Egypt and Palestine, Sketch 10 facing p. 178.]
As part of the Official British War History of the Great War, Captain Cyril Falls and Lieutenant General George MacMunn were commissioned to produce a commentary on the Sinai, Palestine and Syrian operations that took place. In 1928, their finished work, Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine - From the outbreak of war with Germany to June 1917, was published in London. Their book included a section specifically related to the battle of Romani and is extracted below.
MacMunn, G. & Falls, C., Military operations: Egypt and Palestine, (London 1930), pp. 190 - 194:
Part 4. The Pursuit on The 5th August.
As soon as he was acquainted with the situation, General Lawrence issued orders for a general advance to take place at 4 a.m. next morning. The A. & N.Z. Mounted Division was to press forward with its right on the Hod el Enna and its left in close touch with the 156th Brigade of the 52nd Division, advancing on Mount Meredith. The 3rd L.H. Brigade was to advance towards Bir en Nuss and attack the Hod el Enna from the south, keeping touch with the A. & N.Z. Mounted Division or the 5th Mounted Brigade, which, under the orders of Major-General Sir W. Douglas, commanding the 42nd Division, was to assist in linking up the right of the A. & N.Z. Mounted Division with the 3rd L.H. Brigade. The 42nd Division' was to advance on the line Canterbury Hill to Mount Royston to the Hod el Enna and drive back any opposition to the advance of the mounted troops, while part of the 52nd Division was to act in a similar manner towards Mount Meredith. The G.O.C. 52nd Division was also instructed to prepare for an advance eastwards towards Abu Hamra, which, however, was not to be undertaken without further orders from Section Headquarters. [Only two brigades were ready for the move, and the 126th Brigade remained in reserve at Pelusium Station.]
As day broke on the 5th August the 8/Scottish Rifles, which had passed the night just short of the crest of Wellington Ridge, advanced in company with the 7th A.L.H, and Wellington M.R. on their right. The attack was covered by the 7/Scottish Rifles on the left, who had during the night brought a total of 16 machine guns and Lewis guns into a position from which they were able to sweep the crest and reverse slopes of the ridge. Well as the Turks had fought hitherto, they knew now that they had been abandoned, and the lines of bayonets in the dim light were too much for their exhausted nerves. A white flag was hoisted and a forest of arms held high. Eight hundred and sixty-four men surrendered to the 8/Scottish Rifles and a great number more to the Light Horse and Wellingtons, who breasted the rise a few minutes later. In all, 1,500 prisoners were taken in the neighbourhood of Wellington Ridge. Other bodies of Turks, pinned to the ground by fire from the works further north, were likewise unable to join in the general retirement, and at 6 a.m. a further 119 surrendered to the infantry in Work 3. Most of the prisoners were in a pitiable state of fatigue and had long been without water.
While this rear guard was being rounded up it had become apparent that the Turks were in full retreat. At 6.30 a.m. General Lawrence ordered General Chauvel to take command of all the mounted troops [That is to say, of the Section Mounted Troops (N.Z.M.R. and 5th Mounted Brigades) and the 3rd L.H. Brigade, but not the Mobile Column, which was under the orders of the G.O.C. No. 2 Section.] and move in pursuit. But, as already stated, the brigades were somewhat scattered, and the troops of the 1st and 2nd L.H. Brigades had to be collected and mounted. The N.Z.M.R. Brigade reached Bir en Nuss at 8.30 a.m., where it found the 3rd L.H. Brigade still watering. The latter brigade; was ordered by General Chauvel to move on Hamisah, beyond which it had been ascertained that the enemy's left flank extended, though his main body had fallen back on Qatiya. Thence, the brigade was to wheel left towards Qatiya, to co-operate in a general attack by the mounted troops. Its advanced guard moved off to fulfil this mission at 9 a.m.
The general mounted advance began at 10.30. By noon the troops under General Chauvel's command were on a line from west of Bir Nagid to south of Katib Gannit ; the 3rd L.H. Brigade on the right, advancing on Hamisah, then the N.Z.M.R. Brigade and the 1st and 2nd L.H. Brigades, with the 5th Mounted Brigade on the left.
There were greater delays before the infantry divisions were on the move. In the case of the 42nd Division this was not of great importance - save that it involved a very trying advance in the heat of the day - because the division's role was only to advance to the Hod el Enna in support of the mounted troops, and it is doubtful whether it could in any event have gone further; actually the Turkish rear guard was routed and largely captured without its assistance being required. But, as a matter of fact, the first message sent to the 127th Brigade, which was to lead the advance, miscarried, and the second, despatched at 2.45 a.m., did not reach it till 5.40 a.m. [Divisional headquarters had just arrived at Pelusium Station, and there appears to have been extraordinary pressure on the single signal station there. But brigade headquarters was only 4 miles away at Mount Royston.] Nor did the brigade's first-line camels arrive till after this, and the troops had then to fill their water-bottles. The brigade marched at 7.30 a.m. and reached the Hod el Enna between 9.30 and 10 a.m., considerably fatigued. The 125th Brigade at Pelusium, delayed by the troops' ignorance of the handling of camels, moved off at 5.15 a.m. and arrived in rear of the 127th Brigade at 11.15, having suffered still more severely in its longer march.
In the case of the 52nd Division, the delay was more serious. Immediately after ordering General Chauvel to take command of the mounted troops and pursue the enemy, General Lawrence, at 6.37 a.m., sent a message to the 52nd Division instructing it to carry out the advance eastwards on Abu Hamra which had been anticipated in his orders of the previous night. On receiving this message General Smith ordered the R.F.C. squadron at Mahamdiyah, which was at his disposal, to reconnoitre while his brigades were completing their preparations. At 10.15 am. General Lawrence urgently repeated his order, but it was some time longer before the 155th and 157th Brigades were able to march. Here again the distribution of water from the camel fanatis [Fantasse, plural fanatis, an Arabic word adopted by the Army. The fantasse was a small metal tank of which each camel carried two. It had a capacity of 12 gallons. The water supply was carried by the 1st-line camels, and each division had also a camel convoy with one day's water.] was the chief cause of delay. There was delay also in distributing food to the men, and it was highly necessary that the troops should have a meal after the night's work, with the prospect of a march and possibly a battle in the sun before them. It was not till noon that the 157th Brigade, followed by the 155th, moved out from the defences, and Abu Hamra was not reached till nightfall.
Meanwhile the 3rd L.H. Brigade had gained a striking success against the enemy on the high ground west of Hamisah. The 9th A.L.H. under Lieut.-Colonel. W. H. Scott, boldly galloped to within a few hundred yards of the Turkish line and then attacked on foot under cover of the fire of the Inverness Battery and machine guns. The enemy hastily abandoned his position, but 425 prisoners and seven machine guns were captured. Unfortunately the brigade then came under fire of the heavy guns behind Qatiya, and withdrew late in the afternoon to Bir Nagid, 21 miles west of Hamisah, before receiving an order from General Chauvel to protect his right.
Between 12 noon and 1 p.m. the four brigadiers of the N.Z.M.R.B. 1st and 2nd L.H. and 5th Mounted, Brigades reconnoitred the enemy's position from a sandy ridge 2 miles west of Qatiya. Many stragglers had been passed in the course of the advance, and it seemed possible that the enemy holding the position was in a demoralized condition and that brusque tactics might result in large captures of men and guns. It was accordingly decided that the three Australian brigades should advance mounted on Qatiya while the 5th Mounted Brigade, also mounted, attacked the enemy's right flank.
The three brigades advanced on Qatiya at 3.30 p.m., the Yeomanry on the far left. Reaching the edge of the white gypsum bed which lay before them, they formed line and, fining bayonets to give at least moral effect to mounted action, advanced at a gallop, cheering loudly. But as the oasis was neared the ground became so swampy that the horses were at once checked. The regiments then dismounted and continued the advance on foot. The 5th Mounted Brigade (which was, unlike the others, armed with the sword) likewise found a mounted advance impossible owing to the intensity of the enemy's fire and was obliged to send back its horses.
Of the expected demoralization in the Turkish ranks there was no sign. Their fire was hot and well directed, while their artillery out-gunned the supporting Ayr and Somerset Batteries. By sunset the advance had ceased, seeing which, from his position 3 miles in rear, General Chauvel ordered a retirement to Romani.
When the 1st and 2nd L.H. Brigades reached camp some of the horses had not been watered for sixty hours. The men of the 2nd and 3rd A.L.H. had been during practically the whole of that period in action or in the saddle. Both sides were almost at their last gasp. While the British mounted troops were moving back to Romani, men sleeping as they rode, the Turks were struggling back to Oghratina under cover of darkness.
The infantry brigades were disposed for the night as follows:-The 155th and 157th Brigades at Abu Hamra, the 127th Brigade at Hod el Enna, the 125th Brigade on its left, in touch with the 156th Brigade, which had its left on Work 21. The Mobile Column, which had found Mageibra evacuated, spent the night there.
Battle of Romani, Sinai, August 4 to 5, 157th Infantry Brigade War Diary Account Topic: AIF - DMC - British
Battle of Romani
Sinai, August 4 to 5, 1916
157th Infantry Brigade War Diary Account
War Diary account of the 157th Infantry Brigade.
The only action taken by troops under my command was the movement of the Divisional reserve to a position of readiness west of Hill 88 square M.5(a), this move being completed by 1600 and the opening of fire by my stationary battery between 1200 and 1300 and again at 1900 on the enemy soon to be in Abu Hamra.
At 0945 your G.96 was received, ordering Brigade and attached troops to be ready to move at short notice, and to hand over works and inner defences to men unfit to march. Necessary action was taken.
At 1035 your G.103 received, ordering Brigade with attached troops to move to a position of readiness to attack Abu Hamra, the force to rendezvous north of Work 8 square M.5 (b) at 1115.
On receipt of these Instructions orders were immediately issued to the Officer Commanding the Yeomanry under my command to proceed forthwith to Hill 62 square N.8(a), Hill 79 square N.8(b) and Hill 90 square N.3 (c) to cover the rendezvous and forward movement there from, and report any information obtainable concerning the enemy.
The 6th and 7th Highland Light Infantry previously detailed as Divisional Reserve in accordance with instructions received were in position just west of Hill 88 square M.5(a). These two battalions were fully mobilised and reached the rendezvous approximately at the appointed time. The relief of works 10, 10a and 11, and the detailed arrangements for the occupation of the inner defences Chabrias Camp necessarily took some time as also did the movement of the battery, Field Company and Yeomanry from Romani, but by 1230 the whole force as under was assembled at the rendezvous with the exception of the Field Ambulance which arrived there at 1330.
157th Infantry Brigade.
Detachment Glasgow Yeomanry (Strength about 60)
"A" Battery 263rd Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery 1/2nd Lowlands Field Company, Royal Engineers
Mobile Section Field Ambulance
Divisional Cable Section
To avoid delay, Commanding Officers of various units were interviewed by me as they arrived, and given detailed instructions regarding the movement from the rendezvous to the position of readiness, and probable course of operations. One battalion 155th Infantry Brigade and one battalion 156th Infantry Brigade having been ordered to co-operate from a position just west of Work 5 in the attack on Abu Hamra I selected as my position of readiness the low ground immediately north of the two hills 59 squares N.14 (a) and N.15 (a) and gave this to Unit Commanders in the firing line as their first objective, but with orders not to proceed beyond Hill 62 square No.8 (a) without instructions from me.
Two alternative positions were selected for the battery:
1st Position - Near Work 7.a. from which fire could be brought to bear against Hills 72 and 74 squares N.27 and N.22 and also to cover my left flank,
2nd Position - Square N.7(d).
Immediately on arrival of the Yeomanry from Romani at the rendezvous the Officer Commanding was ordered to send forward 1 Troop to support my original detachment which had already been sent out. His orders were to make good Hill 69 square N.9(b) Hill 72 square N.10(a) and Hill 46 square N.15 (a and b), to use his own initiative as to pushing further forward, and to keep me fully informed. In order to avoid being seen, battalions were ordered to move from the rendezvous round the northern slopes of Hill 100 whence they would turn south east towards their objectives. All four battalions were to move in attack formation 6th raid 7th Highland Light Infantry forming firing line, supports and local reserves, 1/5th Highland Light Infantry and 1/5th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders forming my general reserve. The 1/5th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders as my strongest battalion was echeloned on the left flank to protect this flank. The Field Company, Royal Engineers, moved on the less exposed flank, immediately in rear of the 1/5th Highland Light Infantry. Mobile Section Field Ambulance, and baggage train were ordered to remain in the first instance under cover of Hill 100.
Hearing from my Yeomanry that Hill 90 was occupied by them, the leading battalions were ordered to proceed at once to Hill 62 square N.8(a) where they were to remain under cover pending orders to advance to the two Hills 59 referred to above.
At about 1500 the Yeomanry Officer who had been ordered to report to me in person came in and informed so that rifle and Machine Gun fire had been opened by the enemy from the ridges about Hills 72 and 74.
At about 1520 your G.108 was received informing me that a Yeomanry patrol and armoured train hard been unable to find Turks in Abu Hamra and directing me to send patrols immediately to verify this. (I had already done so), it Turks found, to attack at once unless I considered them too strong, in which case 2½ battalions would be sent to co-operate with me from Work 5.
If I ascertained that Abu Hamra was all clear, I was to bivouac for the night, suggested by the General Officer Commanding near Hill 100, or if preferred, within the outpost line.
At 1530, I received a report from my Officer Commanding Yeomanry that his Officers Patrol was held up while crossing Abu Hamra at point Kilo 46, enemy holding Hill 74 and ridges east and west, apparently about 40 or 50 men on ridges and 60 or 70 were seen in small groups behind Hill 74. Patrol forced to retire. A few enemy also seen its trees at Bir abu Hamra. Having fully satisfied myself that the enemy was in some strength on the ridges south east of Abu Hamra, I ordered my battery to open fire on Hills 72 and 74, my Yeomanry to again press forward under cover of this fire, and my leading battalions to search to the two hills 59 preparatory to the attack.
It was now clear to me that to fulfil my original object namely the attack on Abu Hamra, I must, instead of attacking that place attack Hills 42 and 74, and the ridge between them, the capture of which would automatically mean the capture of Abu Hamra, whereas the capture at Abu Hamra would merely have placed me under the command of the enemy on the above Hills and ridges. I at once called up the General Officer Commanding Division on the telephone, informed him of the situation, telling him I was preparing to attack Hills 72 sad 74 but that if I did so, I must bivouac there for the night and not where suggested by him. At approximately the same time I received reports regarding our own cavalry moving in the direct urn of KATIA and being shelled by the enemy.
Shortly after this I received a report that our cavalry were being driven back. At this time I personally observed the enemy shelling Abu Hamra and the country to the south east of Hills 72 and 74 they were lengthening their range, which tended to prove the report just previously received that our cavalry were being driven back. This shelling, without being excessive was fairly severe. It was very difficult to ascertain what really was happening as I could obtain no connection with the 5th Mounted Brigade or Anzacs. I was then informed on the telephone that our own mounted troops complained that they wore being shelled by our own guns. I replied that they were not being shelled by me, and that enemy were undoubtedly on Hills 72 and 74 and I asked the General Officer Commanding if he could give me any information as to what was happening to our own cavalry. He instructed me to wait a few minutes before launching the attack, while he communicated with No.3 Section.
At 1710 I received a message cancelling move of 1½ battalions 156th Infantry Brigade and 7th Royal Scots to position of readiness just west of work 5 (9 111) to co-operate with me. Ten minutes later I received a message that above 2½ battalions would move at 1800 to a position of readiness west of Work 5 (9 114).
At about 1700, I received in confirmation of telephone conversation GB 302 instructing me to advance to the attack and to endeavour to get in touch with the 5th Mounted Brigade. I immediately advanced to the attack and during the advance received a message from my Yeomanry saying that the enemy had apparently evacuated Hills 72 and 74, and that they had been seen retiring from these Hills.
I may mention here that the shooting of my battery on Hills 72 and 74 was very good indeed, and this I think undoubtedly accounted for the retirement of the Turks.
The advance was continued towards the ridges south east of Abu Hamra. By this time it was dark, and night formation was adopted. The ridges about Hills 72 and 74 were occupied without opposition, and an outpost line was taken up with three battalions on these ridges, and one battalion north of the railway protecting my left flank, and the men set to work to dig themselves in.
Having satisfied myself regarding the outposts, I established my Brigade Headquarters at 0200 between Kilo 46 and Kilo 47 and the moment communication was complete reported the situation to the General Officer Commanding delay is obtaining communication was caused by shortage of cable.
At 0330 I received a message G.127 ordering me to move with troops attached at 0415 and occupy the line from ruins of Katia exclusive to Er Rabah. About the same time a warning message handed in at Division Headquarters 2535 was received by my signal office warning me to be ready to move at 0400. Previous to receipt of this, I had sent a message to my battery to proceed to their second position or to a more favourable position as agreed between me and Officer Commanding Battery. (To be in position by 0430). The Officer Commanding Battery reported to me that this order was perfectly clear and definite, but I believe he received contrary instructions from some other source.
Immediately on receipt of G.127 I ordered the Yeomanry to proceed at once in the direction of the advance, and I rode to battalions with my Brigade Major and ordered them to get ready to move immediately. With the very short notice given, it was quite impossible to get them off to time, and as it was they had to start without any tea or breakfast.
The advance on the new objective was carried out with two battalions in the front line, and two in reserve as before, and the objective was reached without opposition, and a line of local protection taken up in accordance with instructions received from Divisional Headquarters. The Brigade remained on outpost duty until relieved by the 155th Brigade about 2000.
Roll of Honour
N MATHESON, 1st/6th Battalion, Highland Light Infantry, Killed in Action 4 August 1916.
Battle of Romani, Sinai, August 4 to 5, New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, War Diary Account Topic: AIF - NZMRB
Battle of Romani
Sinai, August 4 to 5, 1916
NZMR Bde, War Diary Account
War Diary account of the NZMR Bde.
0200 - Received information that the enemy was pushing forward their left flank in a north east direction towards high ground west of Bir Et Maler and further that the outposts of Anzac Mounted Division at Hod el Enna had been heavily engaged throughout the night and were withdrawing on Bir Et Maler.
0700 - The Brigade moved out with orders to proceed to Dueidar. When 1¼ miles from Dueidar Brigade was directed to Canterbury Hill with orders to collect the two absent regiments at once and operate against the enemy's left flank reported in vicinity of Canterbury Hill
1100 - Brigade (strength was increased by six Troops, Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment) arrived at high ground 1½ miles south east of Canterbury Hill. Turks seen (about 2,000) busily entrenching on Mount Royston and hills to the north.
1130 - Touch was gained with Anzac Mounted Division on the left and 5th Mounted Brigade (from Gilgan) on the right.
Enemy's advanced posts were then attacked and driven in supported by Royal Horse Artillery Battery. Further advances however then checked.
1450 - General Officer Commanding 2nd Light Horse Brigade arrived with message from general Officer Commanding Anzac Mounted Division stating that the two Brigades at Bir Et Maler could not move out until Mount Royston had been cleared. General assault arranged with 5th Mounted Brigade and ordered for 1645.
1645 - General Assault, supported by Royal Horse Artillery Battery.
1700 - Mount Royston rushed and 250 Turks surrendered.
1715 - The 127th Infantry Brigade was now approaching from the direction of Pelusium and came in eventually on the left of the Brigade as support.
1745 - Enemy continued to surrender on ridges north of Mount Royston, being heavily enfiladed.
1830 - Hills finally cleared and handed over to Infantry.
1915 - The Brigade moved to Pelusium to bivouac.
0530 - The Brigade left Pelusium in a south easterly direction to Bir en Nuss the guns and limbers going by a more southerly route (via Dueidar) where one Section of the Battery was left, the other proceeding with double teams.
0830 - Brigade arrived at Bir en Nuss where the 3rd Light Horse Brigade and 5th Light Horse Regiment were found watering also one Squadron Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment. The Brigade having watered proceeded towards Qatia along the telegraph wire, the guns not having as yet rejoined the Brigade.
The 3rd Light Horse Brigade moved forward on our right via Nagid and Hamisah.
1215 - The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade reached the high ground two miles west of Qatia.
A conference of Brigadiers was held and the attack on Qatia oasis ordered, where the enemy was reported in force.
1415 - General attack by 5 Brigades as per plan and the south west and western end of the oasis occupied.
1715 - 3rd Light Horse Brigade withdrew exposing the right flank of New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.
1730 - Enemy reinforced his left flank and our right was very heavily pressed. (Canterbury Mounted Rifles Regiment.)
1900 - Brigade withdrew and moved to bivouac at Katib Gannit.
0300 - Arrived Katib Gannit, special guide having lost his way.
Note: On arrival water very scarce.
The Royal Horse Artillery Section joined the Brigade; on arrival at bivouac having been all day coming up owing to the very heavy going between Dueidar and Qatia.
0400 - Four Officers' Patrols left to reconnoitred for the Infantry Divisions attacking Qatia.
0600 - The brigade, less Canterbury Mounted Rifles Regiment who followed after watering, moved forward to Qatia which was found unoccupied.
1030 - The Brigade again moved east to join touch with the enemy who was found entrenched across the telegraph line 1½ miles east of Hod umm Ugba. Heavy artillery fire was opened on us and kept up till dark.
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