"At a mile distant their thousand hooves were stuttering thunder, coming at a rate that frightened a man - they were an awe inspiring sight, galloping through the red haze - knee to knee and horse to horse - the dying sun glinting on bayonet points..." Trooper Ion Idriess
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The Battle of Kaukab, Palestine, 30 September 1918, Outline Topic: BatzP - Kaukab
The Battle of Kaukab
Palestine, 30 September 1918
The 4th Australian Light Horse Regiment in cavalry formation moving up to the attack on the enemy's position at Kaukab.
Kaukab, an action fought on 30 September 1918 about sixteen kilometres south-west of Damascus, brought about when a Turkish column attempted to block the advance by leading elements of the Australian Mounted Division (Major-General Henry Hodgson) towards the city. The Turks, numbering several thousand, were themselves falling back north-east on Damascus, but when they sighted the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade (Colonel Murray Bourchier) they moved across its path and took up position along a ridge with the clear intention of making a stand. Hodgson ordered Bourchier's 4th and 12th regiments to prepare to charge with the sword across the two kilometre wide stony valley separating the two forces, while the 5th Light Horse Brigade (Brig. General George Macarthur-Onslow) - ignoring the enemy's line-pushed past the western flank and kept going.
Map of the Damascus region with Kaukab located at the bottom left (south west) side of Damascus.
Although their position was well covered by many machine-guns, the Turks had no guns with which to reply to the fire opened up on them by the British horse artillery in Hodgson's force. As the latter began bombarding the Turkish machine-gun posts over open sights, and with Macarthur-Onslow's brigade (French cavalry on distinctive grey horses being prominent) moving ominously in their rear, the Turks lost all heart for a fight. The Australians were expecting a hot reception by the time Bourchier finally gave the order to advance soon after 11 a.m., but in the event the action was bloodless. The German machine gunners abandoned their weapons without firing a shot at the charging lines of horsemen and joined in the general flight. Twelve machine-guns were thus captured, and 22 prisoners, for no loss to the attackers.
A battery of the Nottinghamshire Brigade (The Notts) in action at Kaukab.
Extracted from the book produced by Chris Coulthard-Clark, Where Australians Fought - The Encyclopaedia of Australia's Battles, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998, pp. 164.
Additional References cited by Chris Coulthard-Clark:
H.S. Gullett (1944) The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, Sydney: Angus & Robertson.
The Battle of St Quentin Canal, France, 29 September - 1 October 1918, Outline Topic: BatzWF - Westn Front
The Battle of St Quentin Canal
France, 29 September - 1 October 1918
The St. Quentin Canal from the air
St Quentin Canal, scene of an attack on 29 September-1 October 1918 by the Australian Corps commanded by Lieut.-General Sir John Monash, aimed at breaking through the main defence system of the Hindenburg Line. The German complex of trenches had been constructed mainly east of the St Quentin Canal (connecting the sources of the Somme and Scheldt rivers) to utilise that waterway as an additional obstacle to an attacker, except where the canal passed into a tunnel for nearly six kilometres through hills between Bellicourt and Venhuille; here it actually bulged west beyond the line followed by the canal underground. Monash was ordered to make his assault along this section of front, since the canal posed no obstacle at this point except that the tunnel possibly provided deep shelter for enemy reserves. The importance of this bridged approach was, however, obvious to the Germans and the defences of the area had been thickened accordingly.
Map of the St. Quentin region.
With the divisions which had taken the Hindenburg Outpost Line (q.v.) now in need of rest, Monash found himself with only two divisions-the 3rd and 5th-in reasonable condition for combat. For the operation contemplated, therefore, the Australian Corps was reinforced by two American divisions-the 27th (New York) and 30th (Tennessee)-which took over the left and right sectors of the corps area. These formations contained as many as three times the number of infantry available in any of the Australian divisions at this time, but the troops were newly trained and lacked battle experience. To overcome this deficiency, the 1st and 4th divisions were each required to provide about 200 experienced officers and men for an advisory 'mission' to assist in preparing the Americans for the coming operation.
Close-up aerial view of the high ground above the St. Quentin Canal.
In the plan which Monash devised-as usual, elaborate but carefully constructed - he decided to utilise the Americans to attack the first objective, the main Hindenburg Line above the tunnel, and also the second line a kilometre or more behind that. lie would then pass through the two Australian divisions to carry on the assault for another four kilometres through the third and final objective, the Beaurevoir Line.
Since concealment of the point of attack was an impossibility, a two-day preliminary bombardment was settled upon. Apart from' smashing up the defences, this would use a consignment of 30,000 mustard-gas shells just arrived from English factories. Tanks would also he used in the attack; 60 supporting the Americans in the first phase, 30 with the Australians in the second.
Captured German machine gun positions on the bank of the St Quentin Canal.
Monash's plan did not envisage flanking corps trying to cross the sections of canal on either flank, since he considered this likely to be too costly, but in the event Rawlinson directed that the British 9th Corps would make such an attempt at the Bellicourt end of the tunnel in the south. A major problem which quickly emerged was, however, the fact that the chosen start-line for the attack had not yet been secured, and would entail a separate preliminary operation to wrest control of the required ground from the enemy. This attack, launched at 5.30 a.m. on 27 September by a regiment of the 27th Division, failed-largely due to the Americans not heeding advice about clearing trenches and dugouts properly, and thus leaving significant pockets of Germans who emerged behind the attackers with machine guns.
The consequence of this botched attempt was that capture of the start-line became the first requirement of the main attack launched at 5.55 a.m. two days later. In the confusion of this advance, carried out amid thick mist made worse by smoke, the Americans were reported to be on their objective when they were not. The men of the 3rd Australian Division, going forward at 9 a.m. to begin the second phase, thus found themselves engaged in securing even the first phase objective. With all the tanks knocked out by mines and enemy fire, and use of artillery disallowed because of uncertainty concerning the positions actually reached and held by the Americans, the situation in the centre and left degenerated into a desperate struggle by small parties to overcome enemy strong points with Lewis guns and hand grenades. This fighting raged for the next three days on this part of the battlefront.
To the south matters had gone somewhat better. The 30th Division made good progress, thanks to the accuracy of the bombardment, and enabled the 5th Australian Division to pass through and capture Bellicourt village at the mouth of the canal. The situation to the north now placed this gain in peril, since German fire from this flank stopped any further movement forward. The battle might have lapsed into stalemate at this point, but for the astonishing achievement of the flanking British 9th Corps in getting across the canal and striking out halfway towards the Beaurevoir Line. This success threatened the Germans with being outflanked and forced their gradual withdrawal. The whole operation up to 2 October had cost the two Australian divisions involved 2,577 casualties, but the main Hindenburg Line had been breached.
The steep, wooded banks of the St Quentin Canal, in the Hindenburg Main Line, looking towards Bellenglise from near Riqueval.
Extracted from the book produced by Chris Coulthard-Clark, Where Australians Fought - The Encyclopaedia of Australia's Battles, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998, pp. 162-164.
Additional References cited by Chris Coulthard-Clark:
C.E.W. Bean (1937) The Australian Imperial Force in France during the Main German Offensive, 1918, Sydney: Angus & Robertson.
The Battle of Ramadi, Mesopotamia, 28 September 1918, Outline Topic: BatzM - Ramadi
The Battle of Ramadi
Mesopotamia, 28 September 1917
Signallers at Ramadi resting before tragedy - within five minutes half the animals will be dead with shrapnel wounds.
Ramadi, an action fought in Mesopotamia on 28 September 1917, on the Euphrates River about 110 kilometres west of Baghdad. Realising that a Turko-German offensive was in preparation aimed at retaking Baghdad (q.v.), which had fallen to the British in March, Lieut.-General Sir Stanley Maude was determined to deliver the first stroke as part of a strategy of active defence. Ire accordingly moved against Ar Ramadi, where the Turks held a strong position, delivering a feint against the enemy's left flank between Lake Habbaniyah and the Euphrates while sending a column of cavalry supported by part of the infantry across desert to attack the opposite flank. When Maude commenced his attack on 28 September, the cavalry-having successfully passed around the enemy's line - cut across and by 4 p.m. were digging in and shelling the Turkish rear. This ensured that enemy attempts at escape were futile and the entire garrison of 8,545 men was taken captive, at a cost of only 995 British casualties (many of whom were only slightly wounded by high-bursting enemy shrapnel).
Mesopotamian operations. Ramadi is to the left of Baghdad.
Throughout the action the British cavalry's progress was reported (often under shrapnel fire) by a transmitting station of the 1st Australian Wireless Signal Squadron, which was formerly an 'Anzac' unit but had become wholly Australian following the withdrawal of the New Zealanders earlier that year; another station from the same unit was with the infantry. A few members of a second signal squadron newly arrived from Australia for service with the Indian Cavalry Division were also attached to the attacking force, purely to obtain experience.
1st Australian Wireless Signal Squadron operating at Ramadi.
Extracted from the book produced by Chris Coulthard-Clark, Where Australians Fought - The Encyclopaedia of Australia's Battles, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998, p. 131-132.
Additional References cited by Chris Coulthard-Clark:
C.E.W. Bean, (1937), The Australian Imperial Force in France during the Main German Offensive, 1918, Sydney: Angus & Robertson.
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