Australian Light Horse Studies Centre

Citation: The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, General Reports, 6 August 1915

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Sunday, 18 July 2010 10:17 AM EADT

Post Comment | Permalink

Sunday, 27 June 2010

The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Notes on Proposed Operations of 1st Australian Division, 6 August 1915
Topic: BatzG - Aug 1915

The August Offensive

Gallipoli, August 1915

Notes on Proposed Operations of 1st Australian Division, 6 August 1915

Some Notes on Proposed Operations of 1st Australian Division

"LONE PINE"

Action and Record of Events Subsequent to that Action.

Considerations affecting the forward move of the 1st Australian Division.

In drawing up this appreciation, it is understood that, in addition to the New Zealand Division aiming at BABY 700 and beyond, another force will operate still further north, against, or with the object of turning, 971, which dominates the whole of the country to its south. Exclusive of Artillery whose movements will be particularly circumscribed and abnormal, and are therefore dealt with separately, the fighting Units in this Division are:

1st, 2nd and third Infantry Brigades;

2nd Light Horse Brigade;

4th Light Horse Regiment.

2. According to verbal instructions from the Army Corps Commander, one Brigade will join N.Z. & A. Division in the push for BABY 700. Another Brigade is to extend to, and include KABA TEPE, thus leaving one Infantry Brigade, the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, and 4th Light Horse Regiment to:

(a) operate against LONESOME PINE, JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, and GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH; and

(b) hold the keys of our present trenches, cover guns etc.

3. The number of rifles available would be approximately

Infantry Brigade, say .. 2,700

2nd Light Horse Brigade .. 1,470

4th Light Horse Regiment .. 490

Total 4,660

The length of trench at present held is:

1st Infantry Brigade .. .. 950 yards

3rd Infantry Brigade .. .. 975 yards

Total. 1,925 yards

Say 2,000 yards.

The length of the hostile position which includes LONESOME PINE, JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY and GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH, is approximately 1,500 yards.

4. When operating forward to our trench, it is of course not intended that our present trenches should be held in the same strength as now or even continuously. But there are certain portions which must be occupied as points d'appui. Some of which will, in the event of success, become important points on our lines of communications.

5. Numerating them from the left these are:-

(1) the continuation southwards of the head of MONASH VALLEY, from the right of COURTNEY'S POST up to, and inclusive of CLAYTON'S TRENCH, Length of 325 yards.

(2) the head of SHRAPNEL VALLEY, between THOMSON'S POST and some 100 yards southwards along 4th Battalion-trenches (both inclusive) a length of 150 yards.

(3) from: the left of the 3rd Battalion gully sap up to and inclusive of the "PIMPLE", a length of 250 yards.

(4) from head of the "PIMPLE" to cornfield sap inclusive, a length of 225 yards. Total 950 yds.

If these portions of our existing trenches are held adequately when the forward move takes place, we secure our rear against contingencies. Allowing a man per yard as the minimum garrison, it will be seen that we require, say 1,000 rifles in the aggregate to hold these positions. This, deducted from what will be available viz:- 4,660 rifles, leaves for active Operations 3,660 rifles. These might be made up of one complete Infantry Brigade and two Light Horse Regiments. This leaves one Regiment from the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, and the 4th Light Horse Regiment, available to occupy the keys of the trenches mentioned above, plus certain machine gun sections, which would have to be temporarily withdrawn from the attacking force until the latter had taken the trenches. But it is estimated that it will take a Brigade of at least 2,500 rifles, supported by artillery, to take and hold LONESOME PINE, which is the most important objective. It is the key to the right of our present position. It commands all the southern spurs emanating from it, and once securely in our possession could materially help to turn JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY. It must be attacked from the "PIMPLE" and south to ensure success. It is commanded by BABY 700, and beyond again by 971. It has to be decided whether actually the attack should be coincident with the forward movement against BABY 700, or when the attack on the latter is progressing. In the latter case, it would, of course, be necessary to heavy demonstration against LONESOME PINE from the very commencement of the operations against BABY 700, until the moment arrived to push forward. To reduce the distance between our trenches and the forward hostile trenches on LONESOME PINE, underground saps are being pushed forward from the "PIMPLE" and its neighbourhood. It is intended eventually to join these up into a new fire trench in close proximity to the forward hostile trench. This it is proposed to do at the last minute. The open space over which the actual assault will have to be carried out from the neighbourhood of the "PIMPLE", will, it is hoped, not exceed some thirty to forty yards. That portion of the assault from the south of the "PIMPLE", will have further to travel, but will be less exposed to 971 and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY. Adequate artillery support will, have to be rendered (this is dealt with under Artillery). It will most likely be a two or three day’s operation. The other two important positions to operate against, and which must be eventually occupied, are;

(1) JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY;

(2) GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH

Their respective frontages are:

JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY .. yards.

GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH .. yards.

To carry and hold JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, inclusive of the Gully between it and LONESOME PINE, will, it is estimated, require a Brigade of equal strength to that operating against LONESOME PINE, i.e.:- 2,500 rifles. Similarly it will probably be an operation extending over several days. The task should be overtaken concurrently with the attack against LONESOME PINE, the capture of which should facilitate the operation against JOHNSTON'S JOLLY, which, however, like LONESOME PINE, is dominated by 971.

GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH.

Until BABY 700 has been made good, it is to be considered whether an actual attack should be made against GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH, through a vigorous demonstration against it would be necessary. Our occupation of BABY 700, would render the CHESS BOARD more or less untenable by the Turks. Their position in GERMAN OFFICER TRENCH would at the same time be weakened, and it might then be taken, though until JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY is in our hands, the latter can always enfilade us in the GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH. In any case, it is estimated 1,000 rifles mould be required for the operation. Our figures in paragraph 5, show that for all the three operations referred to, we shall have available 3,660 rifles; our estimates show requirements of 6,000.

Further Reading:

Citation: The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Notes on Proposed Operations of 1st Australian Division, 6 August 1915

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Sunday, 18 July 2010 10:35 AM EADT

Post Comment | Permalink

Saturday, 26 June 2010

The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Note on Proposed Attack by 1st Australian Division and Reply by General Birdwood.
Topic: BatzG - Aug 1915

The August Offensive

Gallipoli, August 1915

Note on Proposed Attack by 1st Australian Division and Reply by General Birdwood.

Note on Proposed Attack by 1st Australian Division and Reply by General Birdwood.

1.

The advantage claimed for attacking LOVE PIER prier to making an attack elsewhere, is that it will draw off reserves. Admitting this for the moment, then it must be admitted that, following it to a logical conclusion, the troops allotted to the attack, will therefore run considerable risk of failing to retain the ground gained. If they are "outed" before the movement elsewhere is well advanced, little is seined and much is lost.

REPLY.

I hope it will draw off all reserves ,rear enough to get up to 971 quickly and contain any general reserve, also it may lead to reserves now at ANAFARTA being moved round to KAJADERE to repel an attack from our right front. If an Australian Brigade can once establish itself in the ready made excellent trenches, some of which are only 100 yards off our own, and then allow itself to be outed, I shall be so surprised as to think it might return from ANZAC, but I feel sure it will not allow itself to be outed.

(i) But can it be fairly asserted that a movement such as this will cause the enemy to throw in more than local reserves` sons and will not local reserves be "contained" in any case?

(ii) What it will do, will be to expose attacking troops to a continuous and concentrated bombardment by the enemy's artillery. This will in itself make it difficult for the attacking troops to consolidate trenches gained. Our artillery will therefore have to reply, and they will thus use up ammunition, the want of which next day may be disastrous. Unless we have ample ammunition, no attack can be contemplated.

REPLY.

See reply on previous page.

(1) Not necessarily in any way. The Turks might well risk holding a strong work without reserves, who might be sent up to hold 971.

(2) To meet which, all our Artillery will be available: if simultaneous attacks were made only a small proportion will be so. The troops we hope will at once be in trenches, as I trust the attack will be triads, with the idea of covering the open ground in a few seconds after getting into Turk trenches. Enemy has shown no disposition to bombard all night, and did not do so, even the night of our landing.

LONE PINE and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, will throughout the night, be subjected to such enfilade and oblique fire as will, if undisturbed by action elsewhere, make the strengthening of ground gained very difficult.

REPLY.

From what we can see of these trenches, it seems most unlikely that enfilade in oblique fire, can be brought to bear with effect, at least we find that to be the case where we apparently now enfilade and are enfiladed, but bayonet fighting is to be expected in plenty, and at these we must make up our minds to entirely defeat the Turks, but if the Turks are undisturbed by action elsewhere, the object will have been accomplished, i.e. we shall have got 971 unopposed. This I fear is altogether too sanguine.

The enemy will have been given previous warning of determined attack. He probably knows, as we know, that the retention of the plateau is unlikely while the high ground is in his hands ,and he will thus anticipate further attack.

REPLY

Yes, but probably in the same night bombard the JOLLY and GABA TEPE perhaps.

I do not agree. He might well suppose our main object is to join hands with the force near ACHI BABA, and that we do not wish to extend unnecessarily to the north.

If the operation, as an isolated one, failed, it may, and probably will imperil the completeness of the other projected operations. It will certainly tend to disorganize then.

REPLY

It was for the very reason that it would not in any way imperil the main operations, that I am anxious to carry this out. In case of complete failure, all that could happen, would be that the attacking force, would fall back on to its original trenches. The forces detailed to attack LONE PINE and 971, are so entirely separate, that I fail to see how any failure on the part of the force, could in any way disorganize the latter. The continuous fighting, which in any case take place round LONE PINE, must help the attack elsewhere, and I feel convinced that if LONE PINE is attacked with determination as I know it will be, that there will be no failure.

Further Reading:

Citation: The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Note on Proposed Attack by 1st Australian Division and Reply by General Birdwood.

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Sunday, 18 July 2010 7:32 PM EADT

Post Comment | Permalink

Friday, 25 June 2010

The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Notes on the Attack of Lone Pine
Topic: BatzG - Aug 1915

The August Offensive

Gallipoli, August 1915

Notes on the Attack of Lone Pine

NOTES ON THE ATTACK OF LONE PINE.

A. LONE PINE

1. - This paper deals mainly with problems concerning the attack of LONE PINE. The topographical relation of LONE PINE and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY is such, however, that, strictly speaking, both should in the event of an attack, be dealt with simultaneously.

Reasons forbidding this, however, are:

(1) insufficiency of "numbers;

(2) the fact that the operations in this area are being undertaken to hold the enemy in this locality.

2. - We can only conjecture the enemy's strength in the LONE PINE position. Excluding communication trenches, and as far as tie trace of his trenches can be determined, he has space for about 1,000 rifles. The length of front from P.2. to S.3., is about 300 yards, but with double tiers of fire, at least 600 rifles could be brought into action. Cover in rear and adjacent affords cover for unlimited supports and reserves. Our total available strength is:

1st Infantry Brigade.... 2,930
2nd Infantry Brigade.... 2,679
3rd Infantry Brigade.... 3,587
2nd L. H. Brigade.... 1,750
10,946.

This may be increased by reinforcements. With this number we have to hold a front of soma 2,400 yards, and may have to undertake other operations. To hold the front of 2400 yards in the manner indicated hereafter, at least some 7,000 men will be required, thus leaving some 4,000 men free for the operation against LONE PINE. Out of this, a reserve will have to be provided. The 1st Inf. Brigade will therefore have to undertake the operation against LONE PINE, with a strength of some 3,000 men, and a battalion of the 3rd Brigade, will be held in reserve. This of course bearing in mind probable casualties, is a minimum requirement.

3. The nature of the ground separating our and the enemy's trenches, is not altogether favourable. To the north, between our tunnel B.24., and enemy trench P.2., the distance to be traversed is about 70 yards, and the ground is mostly rising slightly. The drawback to movement between our tunnels F.24, and B.8. to the enemy's trenches, is that, while defiladed from fire from the southern faces of LONE PINE, it is enfiladed from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY to a serious extent. A movement straight against the enemy from the vicinity of our tunnel B.5., passes along the crest, and is exposed on both flanks; it is however the shortest route (about 50 yards). Movement from between B.5. and B.3. is defiladed from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, but slightly exposed from PINE RIDGE and SNIPER'S RIDGE From between B.4. and B. 5. movement will be over a distance of 12r yards, and passes through a dip with a steep climb towards the enemy. The frontages from which the attack must be delivered, however, extends from P.2. to about the letters S.1. a total of some 200 yards.

4. The available area far our deployment, therefore extends from B.24 to a point about 10 yards north of B.3. Within this line we have our forward recesses capable of assembling some 230 men. The present firing line can accommodate two lines of 204 and 290 men respectively. These three lines would be able to advance almost simultaneously, and they would give a total of some 700 men. It is improbable that the forward recesses could be filled a second time owing to the difficult of moving through tunnels, and the need for getting to work at once on these tunnels to convert them into communications. Subsequent lines will, therefore, have to move from the present firing line, and will have to be told off in lines, and formed up ready in communication trenches, which should be clearly marked. This is unfortunate as it will mean congestion in a position which is sure to be vigorously shelled. The provision of overhead cover on communication trenches will diminish casualties.

5. The objectives of our attack should be, not the first or second line of the enemy trenches, but the fourth trench back, and the heart of the work. Each battalion should be given a definite line of trenches to aim at, and be told that when once occupied, the tendency should be to open out to the flanks. Enemy lines P2, 010, 011 or P3, and P4, should be converted into works facing North, to give flanks protection, and they should be joined up with the craters about B22 and tunnel B24 to flank OWEN'S GULLY and the ground to the north. The more craters we can make on the line B24, B26, the better. On the south we should endeavour to convert R3, R7 into flank protection.

6. Bomb parties, obstacle parties, and working parties, will need to be told off; and obstacle and working parties should follow, they should include Engineer parties. Bomb parties will have to be provided with means of carrying bombs, and be given a supply of lighting sticks. Parties will also have to be held ready to begin work promptly on our tunnels, and running them into the enemy's forward trenches. B5 will be the main communication trench. The exits to GUN ROAD from B4, B9, B5 should be improved and properly marked.

7. The provision of means of communication with captured works will for some time present some difficulty. The periscope signal apparatus will have to be used for some time, but as early as possible, telephone wires should be laid in tunnels.

B. HOLDING REMAINDER OF LINE

The most effective and economical means of holding the remainder of the line, will be the selection of points d'appui, and the assembly of strength at them, the intervening spaces being held lightly where men are available. The points d'appui, beginning from the south, are suggested thus:-

CHATHAM POST
RYRIE POST
TASMANIA POST
SILT SPUR
TURKEY KNOLL (which should be linked up to B3 and post to be established at B3.)
THE PIMPLE (near B3.)
THE B24 POST
THE GULLY POST
MOORE'S POST
THE CRATER POST
THE TAMBOUR
SCOTT'S POST
STEEL'S POST
COURTNEY'S POST

This should so reduce numbers required to hold the present line, that the 3rd Inf. Brigade will be able to hold a battalion in reserve, and be prepared for operations against PINE RIDGE if they became necessary. The 2nd Infantry Brigade similarly should have available some 500 men for any attack on GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH which may be required, and, in addition, sufficient men to resist counter attack from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY or GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH.

C. FURTHER OPERATIONS

It is impossible t o predict what further operations may be required of the division. We are bound however to contemplate:

(1) the seizure of the GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH;

(2) the seizure of PINE RIDGE

(3) an advance to the eastern slopes of LONE PINE plateau

(4) the occupation of the JOLLY.

The first only need be of our own volition - the remainder may be forced upon us. It is necessary, therefore, to determine the most advantageous time for operations against GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH. In the absence of knowledge of the wider plans upon which the action of the division is dependant, the fixing of time is difficult. The object of the attack on LONE PINE is to draw troops down to that locality. In the event of pressure by counter attack, we could therefore use an attack on GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH, to relieve us at any time necessary during the night. This, however, has the disadvantage of indicating our tendency to extend our attack to the left. By midnight, however, this tendency may in any case become evident and there is every advantage in doing the operation at night: the work is subjected to cross fire from the north and from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY in the south. All things considered, it would appear that midnight was a suitable time.

EXTENT OF JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY POSITION.

1. Frontage.
Frontage of enemy's trench is 350 yards approximately.

2. Depth.
To rear of first rise approximately 200 yards. Thence to main valley 300 yards.

Approximate total ... 500 yards.

General.
(1) It is impossible to get a complete view of this feature.

(2) The attached sketch is compiled from the captured Turkish map, and from the results of close personal reconnaissance.

(3) The two "Swells" of which the feature is composed, amount practically to a small plateau descending sharply to the east
to a watercourse. The slope on this side appears to be convex.

(4) The works constructed on the feature appear to extend in depth over both swells.

(5) The feature is higher than the ground held by the enemy immediately to the north (GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH) and slightly higher than LONESOME PINE.

4. Tactical.

(1) GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH could give very little assistance
in defending the JOLLY.

(2) LONESOME PINE could give a good deal of help.

(3) The eastern swell appears to form a point d'apput for the forward position, and for LONESOME PINE, and trenches now connected up.

(4) Possession of the JOLLY would make LONESOME PINE untenable by the enemy and would probably cause the evacuation of GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH.

5. Garrison.

700 yards of trenches require to be held. Under present conditions, a garrison of two battalions would be required.

6. Plans attached.

(1) JOHNSON'S JOLLY, app 12" to 1 mile.

(2) Locality sketch app 3° to 1 mile

EXTANT OF LONESOME PINE POSITION.

1. General Description.
1915-This position runs diagonally to our present front for 600 yards, it then continues along another Spur running a little west of south; or nearly 400 yards. It has a convex slope towards the east.

2. Depth.
From front to rear the depth may be taken as about 600 yards. Owing to the formation of the ground, the defended depth is about 300 yards to 400 yards.

3. Support.
It is supported from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY which appears to command it.

4. Field of fire.
It has a good field of fire generally, but this is somewhat broken up by nullahs, particularly on the southern side.

5. Tactical.
The northern and southern parts are incapable of mutual a, support owing to the nature of the ground.

The northern part and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY are so closely connected for defence, that it would seem that an attempt should be made to capture both at the same time. (3) Owing to the sharpness and convexity of the eastern slopes, would be necessary to go forward a considerable distance if it were decided to hold the place.

6. Garrison.
3. (above) leads to a greatly extended line of from 1000 to 1200 yards. The garrison required would be iron 3 to 4 battalions,

7. Personal.
I have not seen over this ground for some days, and would like to revise this note after a thorough reconnaissance made definitely for the purpose.

Further Reading:

Citation: The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Notes on the Attack of Lone Pine

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Monday, 19 July 2010 4:46 PM EADT

Post Comment | Permalink

Thursday, 24 June 2010

The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Notes on the Proposed Operation of Including Kaba Tepe and Intervening Ridges in Our Defensive Links
Topic: BatzG - Aug 1915

The August Offensive

Gallipoli, August 1915

Notes on the Proposed Operation of Including Kaba Tepe and Intervening Ridges in Our Defensive Links

NOTES ON THE PROPOSED OPERATION OF INCLUDING KABA TEPE AND INTERVENING RIDGES IN OUR DEFENSIVE LINKS

Object.

1.

The object would be three-fold:
(1) the removal of a flank menace;

(2) the provision of an exit for future forward movement;

(3) to create a diversion on this flank.

Factors affecting attainment of object.

(1)
To hold KABA TEPE, the intervening ground must be held. This comprises a low ridge (A) running off the right of our position at an angle of about 60 degrees, and extending for some 900 yards. Beyond this it is joined by a col to a twin ridge (B) some 600 yards further on, the southern slopes of which practically fall into the creek. The creek has steep banks but would afford good cover for attacking the low wooded ridge which protects the entrance to KABA TEPE.

(2)
The number of troops which the enemy would bring against A, and B., if captured is probably small, although it is difficult to say, what the two valleys east of the ridges hold. The ridges to the east would certainly bring fire to bear on A. and B., and gun fire both from these ridges and south of KABA TEPE would have to be guarded against. If troops were brought by the enemy against A. and B., either by the valleys or across the ridges, to the east, a good target would be presented to the right of our present main line. In KABA TEPE itself there are certainly troops but the numbers are unknown. It is improbable, however, that they are in any strength, but likely that they have a number of machine guns.

(3)
The new line may be put down roughly at 2,200 yards. The strength required to hold it is therefore not less than a brigade whose strength is not less then 3,000 men. The great drawback to the position, is, that it has no depth and in consequence the disposition of supports and reserves, and the service of maintenance will be difficult.

(4)
The position will undoubtedly form another salient in our line.

(5)
To take the line two operations will be necessary.
(a) the occupation of the ridges A, and B.;

(b) the occupation of KABA TEPE.

To take the ridges A. and B. it will be necessary to make a flank movement along the beach and narrow strip of intervening ground. Covering fire from the right of our present ridge, will probably simplify this. Once taken, the ridge will be enfiladed from KABA TEPE and by gun fire, from further south. The effect of this could be minimised by "T" heading the trenches on TWIN POINTS and traversing elsewhere. From the cover of TWIN POINTS the force to attack KABA TEPE would have to deploy. To get there, it would be necessary to move along the beach and this would be exposed to the view of KABA TEPE if done in daylight.

(6) General Points.
The effect of the operation on others must be considered. The utilization of an extra brigade in a defensive line means a brigade less for offensive operations. A certain amount of ship's gun fire will shays be necessary to maintain the brigade. The new line can easily be fired at by guns from KILID BAHR. Later on the whole attention of those guns will be taken up with the southern force, and the question arises in consequence, if the operation should not be delayed. The new line would undoubtedly form a good jumping off place for the capture of the ridge culminating in a point 971. It is a question therefore, whether it should not be an immediate preliminary to any contemplated operation against 971. Its value for a forward turning movement from this flank, is by the lack of depth in the position. It would almost appear that the assault of LONESOME PINE and the occupation of the ridge running south of it, and overlooking the valley, should be made a concurrent operation to make our gain appreciable.

Further Reading:

Citation: The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Notes on the Proposed Operation of Including Kaba Tepe and Intervening Ridges in Our Defensive Links

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Monday, 19 July 2010 4:50 PM EADT