Topic: BatzG - Aug 1915
The August Offensive
Gallipoli, August 1915
Notes on the Proposed Operation of Including Kaba Tepe and Intervening Ridges in Our Defensive Links
NOTES ON THE PROPOSED OPERATION OF INCLUDING KABA TEPE AND INTERVENING RIDGES IN OUR DEFENSIVE LINKS
The object would be three-fold:(1) the removal of a flank menace;
(2) the provision of an exit for future forward movement;
(3) to create a diversion on this flank.
Factors affecting attainment of object.
To hold KABA TEPE, the intervening ground must be held. This comprises a low ridge (A) running off the right of our position at an angle of about 60 degrees, and extending for some 900 yards. Beyond this it is joined by a col to a twin ridge (B) some 600 yards further on, the southern slopes of which practically fall into the creek. The creek has steep banks but would afford good cover for attacking the low wooded ridge which protects the entrance to KABA TEPE.
The number of troops which the enemy would bring against A, and B., if captured is probably small, although it is difficult to say, what the two valleys east of the ridges hold. The ridges to the east would certainly bring fire to bear on A. and B., and gun fire both from these ridges and south of KABA TEPE would have to be guarded against. If troops were brought by the enemy against A. and B., either by the valleys or across the ridges, to the east, a good target would be presented to the right of our present main line. In KABA TEPE itself there are certainly troops but the numbers are unknown. It is improbable, however, that they are in any strength, but likely that they have a number of machine guns.
The new line may be put down roughly at 2,200 yards. The strength required to hold it is therefore not less than a brigade whose strength is not less then 3,000 men. The great drawback to the position, is, that it has no depth and in consequence the disposition of supports and reserves, and the service of maintenance will be difficult.
(4)The position will undoubtedly form another salient in our line.
(5)To take the line two operations will be necessary.(a) the occupation of the ridges A, and B.;
(b) the occupation of KABA TEPE.
To take the ridges A. and B. it will be necessary to make a flank movement along the beach and narrow strip of intervening ground. Covering fire from the right of our present ridge, will probably simplify this. Once taken, the ridge will be enfiladed from KABA TEPE and by gun fire, from further south. The effect of this could be minimised by "T" heading the trenches on TWIN POINTS and traversing elsewhere. From the cover of TWIN POINTS the force to attack KABA TEPE would have to deploy. To get there, it would be necessary to move along the beach and this would be exposed to the view of KABA TEPE if done in daylight.
(6) General Points.The effect of the operation on others must be considered. The utilization of an extra brigade in a defensive line means a brigade less for offensive operations. A certain amount of ship's gun fire will shays be necessary to maintain the brigade. The new line can easily be fired at by guns from KILID BAHR. Later on the whole attention of those guns will be taken up with the southern force, and the question arises in consequence, if the operation should not be delayed. The new line would undoubtedly form a good jumping off place for the capture of the ridge culminating in a point 971. It is a question therefore, whether it should not be an immediate preliminary to any contemplated operation against 971. Its value for a forward turning movement from this flank, is by the lack of depth in the position. It would almost appear that the assault of LONESOME PINE and the occupation of the ridge running south of it, and overlooking the valley, should be made a concurrent operation to make our gain appreciable.