The August Offensive

Gallipoli, August 1915

Note on Proposed Attack by 1st Australian Division and Reply by General Birdwood.

Note on Proposed Attack by 1st Australian Division and Reply by General Birdwood.

1. 

The advantage claimed for attacking LOVE PIER prier to making an attack elsewhere, is that it will draw off reserves. Admitting this for the moment, then it must be admitted that, following it to a logical conclusion, the troops allotted to the attack, will therefore run considerable risk of failing to retain the ground gained. If they are "outed" before the movement elsewhere is well advanced, little is seined and much is lost.

REPLY.

I hope it will draw off all reserves ,rear enough to get up to 971 quickly and contain any general reserve, also it may lead to reserves now at ANAFARTA being moved round to KAJADERE to repel an attack from our right front. If an Australian Brigade can once establish itself in the ready made excellent trenches, some of which are only 100 yards off our own, and then allow itself to be outed, I shall be so surprised as to think it might return from ANZAC, but I feel sure it will not allow itself to be outed.

2.

(i) But can it be fairly asserted that a movement such as this will cause the enemy to throw in more than local reserves` sons and will not local reserves be "contained" in any case?

(ii) What it will do, will be to expose attacking troops to a continuous and concentrated bombardment by the enemy's artillery. This will in itself make it difficult for the attacking troops to consolidate trenches gained. Our artillery will therefore have to reply, and they will thus use up ammunition, the want of which next day may be disastrous. Unless we have ample ammunition, no attack can be contemplated.

 

REPLY.

See reply on previous page.

(1) Not necessarily in any way. The Turks might well risk holding a strong work without reserves, who might be sent up to hold 971.

(2) To meet which, all our Artillery will be available: if simultaneous attacks were made only a small proportion will be so. The troops we hope will at once be in trenches, as I trust the attack will be triads, with the idea of covering the open ground in a few seconds after getting into Turk trenches. Enemy has shown no disposition to bombard all night, and did not do so, even the night of our landing.

3.

LONE PINE and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, will throughout the night, be subjected to such enfilade and oblique fire as will, if undisturbed by action elsewhere, make the strengthening of ground gained very difficult.

REPLY.

From what we can see of these trenches, it seems most unlikely that enfilade in oblique fire, can be brought to bear with effect, at least we find that to be the case where we apparently now enfilade and are enfiladed, but bayonet fighting is to be expected in plenty, and at these we must make up our minds to entirely defeat the Turks, but if the Turks are undisturbed by action elsewhere, the object will have been accomplished, i.e. we shall have got 971 unopposed. This I fear is altogether too sanguine.

4.

The enemy will have been given previous warning of determined attack. He probably knows, as we know, that the retention of the plateau is unlikely while the high ground is in his hands ,and he will thus anticipate further attack.

REPLY

Yes, but probably in the same night bombard the JOLLY and GABA TEPE perhaps.

I do not agree. He might well suppose our main object is to join hands with the force near ACHI BABA, and that we do not wish to extend unnecessarily to the north.

5.

If the operation, as an isolated one, failed, it may, and probably will imperil the completeness of the other projected operations. It will certainly tend to disorganize then.

REPLY

It was for the very reason that it would not in any way imperil the main operations, that I am anxious to carry this out. In case of complete failure, all that could happen, would be that the attacking force, would fall back on to its original trenches. The forces detailed to attack LONE PINE and 971, are so entirely separate, that I fail to see how any failure on the part of the force, could in any way disorganize the latter. The continuous fighting, which in any case take place round LONE PINE, must help the attack elsewhere, and I feel convinced that if LONE PINE is attacked with determination as I know it will be, that there will be no failure.

Further Reading:

The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915

Gallipoli Campaign

Battles where Australians fought, 1899-1920

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Sunday, 18 July 2010 7:32 PM EADT

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The August Offensive

Gallipoli, August 1915

Notes on the Attack of Lone Pine

NOTES ON THE ATTACK OF LONE PINE.


A. LONE PINE

1. - This paper deals mainly with problems concerning the attack of LONE PINE. The topographical relation of LONE PINE and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY is such, however, that, strictly speaking, both should in the event of an attack, be dealt with simultaneously.

Reasons forbidding this, however, are:

(1) insufficiency of "numbers;

(2) the fact that the operations in this area are being undertaken to hold the enemy in this locality.

2. - We can only conjecture the enemy's strength in the LONE PINE position. Excluding communication trenches, and as far as tie trace of his trenches can be determined, he has space for about 1,000 rifles. The length of front from P.2. to S.3., is about 300 yards, but with double tiers of fire, at least 600 rifles could be brought into action. Cover in rear and adjacent affords cover for unlimited supports and reserves. Our total available strength is:

1st Infantry Brigade.... 2,930

2nd Infantry Brigade.... 2,679

3rd Infantry Brigade.... 3,587

2nd L. H. Brigade.... 1,750

10,946.

This may be increased by reinforcements. With this number we have to hold a front of soma 2,400 yards, and may have to undertake other operations. To hold the front of 2400 yards in the manner indicated hereafter, at least some 7,000 men will be required, thus leaving some 4,000 men free for the operation against LONE PINE. Out of this, a reserve will have to be provided. The 1st Inf. Brigade will therefore have to undertake the operation against LONE PINE, with a strength of some 3,000 men, and a battalion of the 3rd Brigade, will be held in reserve. This of course bearing in mind probable casualties, is a minimum requirement.

3. The nature of the ground separating our and the enemy's trenches, is not altogether favourable. To the north, between our tunnel B.24., and enemy trench P.2., the distance to be traversed is about 70 yards, and the ground is mostly rising slightly. The drawback to movement between our tunnels F.24, and B.8. to the enemy's trenches, is that, while defiladed from fire from the southern faces of LONE PINE, it is enfiladed from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY to a serious extent. A movement straight against the enemy from the vicinity of our tunnel B.5., passes along the crest, and is exposed on both flanks; it is however the shortest route (about 50 yards). Movement from between B.5. and B.3. is defiladed from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, but slightly exposed from PINE RIDGE and SNIPER'S RIDGE From between B.4. and B. 5. movement will be over a distance of 12r yards, and passes through a dip with a steep climb towards the enemy. The frontages from which the attack must be delivered, however, extends from P.2. to about the letters S.1. a total of some 200 yards.

4. The available area far our deployment, therefore extends from B.24 to a point about 10 yards north of B.3. Within this line we have our forward recesses capable of assembling some 230 men. The present firing line can accommodate two lines of 204 and 290 men respectively. These three lines would be able to advance almost simultaneously, and they would give a total of some 700 men. It is improbable that the forward recesses could be filled a second time owing to the difficult of moving through tunnels, and the need for getting to work at once on these tunnels to convert them into communications. Subsequent lines will, therefore, have to move from the present firing line, and will have to be told off in lines, and formed up ready in communication trenches, which should be clearly marked. This is unfortunate as it will mean congestion in a position which is sure to be vigorously shelled. The provision of overhead cover on communication trenches will diminish casualties.

5. The objectives of our attack should be, not the first or second line of the enemy trenches, but the fourth trench back, and the heart of the work. Each battalion should be given a definite line of trenches to aim at, and be told that when once occupied, the tendency should be to open out to the flanks. Enemy lines P2, 010, 011 or P3, and P4, should be converted into works facing North, to give flanks protection, and they should be joined up with the craters about B22 and tunnel B24 to flank OWEN'S GULLY and the ground to the north. The more craters we can make on the line B24, B26, the better. On the south we should endeavour to convert R3, R7 into flank protection.

6. Bomb parties, obstacle parties, and working parties, will need to be told off; and obstacle and working parties should follow, they should include Engineer parties. Bomb parties will have to be provided with means of carrying bombs, and be given a supply of lighting sticks. Parties will also have to be held ready to begin work promptly on our tunnels, and running them into the enemy's forward trenches. B5 will be the main communication trench. The exits to GUN ROAD from B4, B9, B5 should be improved and properly marked.

7. The provision of means of communication with captured works will for some time present some difficulty. The periscope signal apparatus will have to be used for some time, but as early as possible, telephone wires should be laid in tunnels.

B. HOLDING REMAINDER OF LINE

The most effective and economical means of holding the remainder of the line, will be the selection of points d'appui, and the assembly of strength at them, the intervening spaces being held lightly where men are available. The points d'appui, beginning from the south, are suggested thus:-

CHATHAM POST

RYRIE POST

TASMANIA POST

SILT SPUR

TURKEY KNOLL (which should be linked up to B3 and post to be established at B3.)

THE PIMPLE (near B3.)

THE B24 POST

THE GULLY POST

MOORE'S POST

THE CRATER POST

THE TAMBOUR

SCOTT'S POST

STEEL'S POST

COURTNEY'S POST

This should so reduce numbers required to hold the present line, that the 3rd Inf. Brigade will be able to hold a battalion in reserve, and be prepared for operations against PINE RIDGE if they became necessary. The 2nd Infantry Brigade similarly should have available some 500 men for any attack on GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH which may be required, and, in addition, sufficient men to resist counter attack from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY or GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH.

C. FURTHER OPERATIONS

It is impossible t o predict what further operations may be required of the division. We are bound however to contemplate:

(1) the seizure of the GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH;

(2) the seizure of PINE RIDGE

(3) an advance to the eastern slopes of LONE PINE plateau

(4) the occupation of the JOLLY.

The first only need be of our own volition - the remainder may be forced upon us. It is necessary, therefore, to determine the most advantageous time for operations against GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH. In the absence of knowledge of the wider plans upon which the action of the division is dependant, the fixing of time is difficult. The object of the attack on LONE PINE is to draw troops down to that locality. In the event of pressure by counter attack, we could therefore use an attack on GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH, to relieve us at any time necessary during the night. This, however, has the disadvantage of indicating our tendency to extend our attack to the left. By midnight, however, this tendency may in any case become evident and there is every advantage in doing the operation at night: the work is subjected to cross fire from the north and from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY in the south. All things considered, it would appear that midnight was a suitable time.

EXTENT OF JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY POSITION.

1. Frontage.

Frontage of enemy's trench is 350 yards approximately.

2. Depth.

To rear of first rise approximately 200 yards. Thence to main valley 300 yards.

Approximate total ... 500 yards.


General.

(1) It is impossible to get a complete view of this feature.

(2) The attached sketch is compiled from the captured Turkish map, and from the results of close personal reconnaissance.

(3) The two "Swells" of which the feature is composed, amount practically to a small plateau descending sharply to the east
to a watercourse. The slope on this side appears to be convex.

(4) The works constructed on the feature appear to extend in depth over both swells.

(5) The feature is higher than the ground held by the enemy immediately to the north (GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH) and slightly higher than LONESOME PINE.

4. Tactical.

(1) GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH could give very little assistance
in defending the JOLLY.

(2) LONESOME PINE could give a good deal of help.

(3) The eastern swell appears to form a point d'apput for the forward position, and for LONESOME PINE, and trenches now connected up.

(4) Possession of the JOLLY would make LONESOME PINE untenable by the enemy and would probably cause the evacuation of GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH.

5. Garrison.

700 yards of trenches require to be held. Under present conditions, a garrison of two battalions would be required.

6. Plans attached.

(1) JOHNSON'S JOLLY, app 12" to 1 mile.

(2) Locality sketch app 3° to 1 mile

EXTANT OF LONESOME PINE POSITION.

1. General Description.

1915-This position runs diagonally to our present front for 600 yards, it then continues along another Spur running a little west of south; or nearly 400 yards. It has a convex slope towards the east.

2. Depth.

From front to rear the depth may be taken as about 600 yards. Owing to the formation of the ground, the defended depth is about 300 yards to 400 yards.

3. Support.

It is supported from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY which appears to command it.

4. Field of fire.

It has a good field of fire generally, but this is somewhat broken up by nullahs, particularly on the southern side.

5. Tactical.

The northern and southern parts are incapable of mutual a, support owing to the nature of the ground.

The northern part and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY are so closely connected for defence, that it would seem that an attempt should be made to capture both at the same time. (3) Owing to the sharpness and convexity of the eastern slopes, would be necessary to go forward a considerable distance if it were decided to hold the place.

6. Garrison.

3. (above) leads to a greatly extended line of from 1000 to 1200 yards. The garrison required would be iron 3 to 4 battalions,

7. Personal.

I have not seen over this ground for some days, and would like to revise this note after a thorough reconnaissance made definitely for the purpose. 

Further Reading:

The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915

Gallipoli Campaign

Battles where Australians fought, 1899-1920

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Monday, 19 July 2010 4:46 PM EADT

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The August Offensive

Gallipoli, August 1915

Notes on the Proposed Operation of Including Kaba Tepe and Intervening Ridges in Our Defensive Links

NOTES ON THE PROPOSED OPERATION OF INCLUDING KABA TEPE AND INTERVENING RIDGES IN OUR DEFENSIVE LINKS

Object.


1.

The object would be three-fold:

(1) the removal of a flank menace;

(2) the provision of an exit for future forward movement;

(3) to create a diversion on this flank.

2.

Factors affecting attainment of object.

(1)

To hold KABA TEPE, the intervening ground must be held. This comprises a low ridge (A) running off the right of our position at an angle of about 60 degrees, and extending for some 900 yards. Beyond this it is joined by a col to a twin ridge (B) some 600 yards further on, the southern slopes of which practically fall into the creek. The creek has steep banks but would afford good cover for attacking the low wooded ridge which protects the entrance to KABA TEPE.

(2)

The number of troops which the enemy would bring against A, and B., if captured is probably small, although it is difficult to say, what the two valleys east of the ridges hold. The ridges to the east would certainly bring fire to bear on A. and B., and gun fire both from these ridges and south of KABA TEPE would have to be guarded against. If troops were brought by the enemy against A. and B., either by the valleys or across the ridges, to the east, a good target would be presented to the right of our present main line. In KABA TEPE itself there are certainly troops but the numbers are unknown. It is improbable, however, that they are in any strength, but likely that they have a number of machine guns.

(3)

The new line may be put down roughly at 2,200 yards. The strength required to hold it is therefore not less than a brigade whose strength is not less then 3,000 men. The great drawback to the position, is, that it has no depth and in consequence the disposition of supports and reserves, and the service of maintenance will be difficult.

(4)

The position will undoubtedly form another salient in our line.

 

(5)

To take the line two operations will be necessary.

(a) the occupation of the ridges A, and B.;

(b) the occupation of KABA TEPE.

To take the ridges A. and B. it will be necessary to make a flank movement along the beach and narrow strip of intervening ground. Covering fire  from the right of our present ridge, will probably simplify this. Once taken, the ridge will be enfiladed from KABA TEPE and by gun fire, from further south. The effect of this could be minimised by "T" heading the trenches on TWIN POINTS and traversing elsewhere. From the cover of TWIN POINTS the force to attack KABA TEPE would have to deploy. To get there, it would be necessary to move along the beach and this would be exposed to the view of KABA TEPE if done in daylight.

(6) General Points.

The effect of the operation on others must be considered. The utilization of an extra brigade in a defensive line means a brigade less for offensive operations. A certain amount of ship's gun fire will shays be necessary to maintain the brigade. The new line can easily be fired at by guns from KILID BAHR. Later on the whole attention of those guns will be taken up with the southern force, and the question arises in consequence, if the operation should not be delayed. The new line would undoubtedly form a good jumping off place for the capture of the ridge culminating in a point 971. It is a question therefore, whether it should not be an immediate preliminary to any contemplated operation against 971. Its value for a forward turning movement from this flank, is by the lack of depth in the position. It would almost appear that the assault of LONESOME PINE and the occupation of the ridge running south of it, and overlooking the valley, should be made a concurrent operation to make our gain appreciable.

Further Reading:

The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915

Gallipoli Campaign

Battles where Australians fought, 1899-1920

Citation: The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Notes on the Proposed Operation of Including Kaba Tepe and Intervening Ridges in Our Defensive Links

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Monday, 19 July 2010 4:50 PM EADT

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The August Offensive

Gallipoli, August 1915

Table "A", Order of Battle

ARMY CORPS ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR 6TH AND 7TH AUGUST.

(1) A number of units are to disembark at ANZAC during the next few days, bringing the total up to that shown on the attached table "A", which is to be treated as secret.

(2) In consequence, and in view of possible operations, there will be a redistribution of the garrisons of Sections and of troops within the position, as shown on the attached Table "B". Only officers, whose duties require it, are to be furnished with the Table, or with extracts from it.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Troops at Anzac.

Australian Division (Commanding) Brig-General H.B. Walker, D.S.O.

1st Infantry Brigade (Colonel NM Smythe, VC)

1st Infantry Battalion

2nd Infantry Battalion

3rd Infantry Battalion

4th Infantry Battalion

 

2nd Infantry Brigade (Colonel JK Forsyth)

5th Infantry Battalion

6th Infantry Battalion

7th Infantry Battalion

8th Infantry Battalion

3rd Infantry Brigade (Brig-General Sinclair Maclagan D.S.O.)

9th Infantry Battalion

10th Infantry Battalion

11th Infantry Battalion

12th Infantry Battalion

Divisional Artillery

2nd Field Artillery Brigade (less 6th Battery) (Brig-General Hobbs)

3rd Field Artillery Brigade CAPE HELLES

Attached 1/4 Lowland (How.) Brigade & Field Artillery (Territorial Force)

Heavy Battery (Two 6" Howitzers, One 4.7" Naval gun)

Light Horse

2nd Light Horse Brigade (Brig-General Ryrie)

5th Light Horse Regiment

6th Light Horse Regiment

7th Light Horse Regiment

4th Light Horse Regiment (attached to 2nd Light Horse Brigade)

Divisional Engineers

No. 1 Field Company Engineers

No. 2 Field Company Engineers

No. 3 Field Company Engineers

Signal Company

2nd Light Horse Brigade Train - less details detached.

Field Ambulance

1st Field Ambulance

2nd Field Ambulance

3rd Field Ambulance

4th Field Ambulance

New Zealand and Australian Division Commanding Major General Sir AJ Godley, KCMG CB.

New Zealand Infantry Brigade (Brig-General F.E.Johnson)

Auckland Battalion

Canterbury Battalion

Otago Battalion

Wellington Battalion

Maori Contingent

N.Z. Mounted Rifles Brigade. (Brig-General Russell)

Auckland M.R.

Canterbury M. R.

Wellington M.R.

Otago M. R.

4th Australian Infantry Brigade. (Brig-General J. Monash)

13th Infantry Battalion

14th Infantry Battalion

15th Infantry Battalion

16th Infantry Battalion

 

Light Horse

1st Light Horse Brigade. (Lieut-Colonel Rowell)

1st Light Horse Regiment

2nd Light Horse Regiment

3rd Light Horse Regiment

3rd Light Horse Brigade. (Brig-General Hughes)

8th Light Horse Regiment

9th Light Horse Regiment

10th Light Horse Regiment

Divisional Artillery

N.Z. Field Artillery (Lieut Colonel Johnson)

N.Z. Field Artillery Brigade less one battery at CAPE HELLES

Howitzer Battery

Divisional Engineers

N.Z. Engineers

No. 1 Field Company Engineers

2nd Field Company Engineers

NZ Divisional Signal Company

Field Troop

Divisional Train less details detached.

 

Field Ambulance

N.Z Field Ambulance

4th Field Ambulance

N.Z. Mounted Rifles Field Ambulance

1st Light Horse Field Ambulance

3rd Light Horse Field Ambulance

13th Division (Commanding) Major General FC Shaw, CB.

38th Infantry Brigade

6th Battalion R. Lan R.

6th Battalion E. Lan R

6th Battalion S. Lan R.

6th Battalion N. Lan R.

 

39th Infantry Brigade

9th Battalion R. War. R.

7th Battalion Glouc. R.

9th Battalion Worc R.

7th Battalion N. Staff. R.

 

40th Infantry Brigade

4th Battalion S. Wales Bond.

8th Battalion R.W. Fus

8th Battalion Ches. R.

5th Battalion Wilts. R.

 

8th Battalion Welsh R, (Pioneers)

69th (How) Brigade RFA (A. B. C. D. Batteries)

HQ Divisional RE.

71st Field Company

72nd Field Company

88th Field Company

13th Divisional Signal Company

13th Divisional Train (personnel only)

10th Division

29th Infantry Brigade

10th Battalion Hamps. R.

6th Battalion R. Ir. Rifles.

5th Battalion Conn. Rang.

6th Battalion Lein. R.

 

29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade (Commanding) Brig-General HV Cox O.B., C.S.I.

14th K.G.O. Sikhs

1st Battalion 5th Gurkha Rifles.

1st Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles

1st Battalion 10th Gurkha Rifles.

CORPS TROOPS (Lieut-Col Parker)

21st Kohat Mountain Battery

26th Jacobs Mountain Battery

137th Combined Indian Field Ambulance

ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS SIGNAL CO.

Ceylon Planters Rifle Corps

 

Further Reading:

The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915

Gallipoli Campaign

Battles where Australians fought, 1899-1920

Citation: The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Table "A", Order of Battle

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Tuesday, 27 July 2010 12:01 PM EADT

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The August Offensive

Gallipoli, August 1915

Army Corps Order No. 16.

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS

No.G.a.74.

From General Staff, A.& N.Z. Army Corps. To Aust. Div.

MEMORANDUM.

With reference to Organization Orders forwarded with my Ga-37 of 3rd inst, for the troops in Anzac, under Para 1. - DRESS AND EQUIPMENT F. S. Equipment, please note that coats will be worn and orders should be amended accordingly.

ARMY CORPS ORDER NO. 16.

Reference Gallipoli Maps 1/20,000, and map of area occupied by Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

1. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps ,with attached troops Anzac, has ordered to take part in a combined operation, which has for its object, securing a position astride of the Gallipoli Peninsula from the neighbourhood of GABA TEPE to the straits north of Maidos. The main features of the immediate operations for the attainment of this object, are given below, for the information of Divisional Commanders and Staff, and of Brigade Commanders, only. Fuller and non-secret details are given in the instructions prepared for the commanders of the various operations to be undertaken by us.

(a) On August 6/7th the forces in the south of the Peninsula, are to attack with the object of drawing part of the enemy's forces in that direction.

(b) A force is to be landed North of the Anzac position with tie object of securing Suvla Bay as a base: an operation which includes the seizure of the "W” and "CHOCOLATE HILLS” and the enemy guns there.

(c) Action by the Australians and New Zealand Army Corps as detailed in the following paragraphs.

2. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps with attached troops, to advance and occupy a line extending from the neighbourhood of GABA TEPE, along the main spur marked approximately by the track 82 - 87 - 165 - CHUNUK BAIR, and thence along the CHUNUK BAIR RIDGE to, and including, Hill 305.


3. With this object:

(a) Australian Division will assault the Turkish positions on Plateau 400 commencing at 5.30 P.M., August 6th. A subsidiary operation against GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH will also be undertaken, to assist No. 4. Section against Baby 700.

(b) New Zealand and Australian Division-,13th Division less one Brigade (except a battalion), and less Artillery; 9th Indian Inf. Brigade; and IMA Bde less one section, under command of Major General Sir A.J. Godley, KCMG, CB:-

1. Will carry the line. CHUNUCK BAIR - Hill 350, during the night of the 6/7th August, the operation to commence at 9 p.m. 1.m.

2. Will hold No. 3. Section less COURTNEY'S POST, and assist in "3".

3. Will hold WALKER'S RIDGE and RUSSELL'S TOP, and provide columns to assault BABY 700.

4. The General Reserve (29th Brigade, and 40th Brigade, less 1 Battalion) will be located in Rest and Reserve Gullies from 4 a.m, on 7th till, called up to move.

5. Arrangements for Naval support are included in the detailed instructions given to each commander, but consist generally of:

A Southern squadron of five vessels, stationed off GABA TEPE, and firing on targets east of Plateau 400 - Hill 180 - CHUNUK BAIR RIDGE.

A Northern squadron of two monitors and two torpedo. boat destroyers firing on targets on the Northern and Western slopes of the Sarl Bair.

SUPPLEMENT TO ARMY CORPS ORDER NO. 16.

The countersign for the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps and attached troops for the night of 6/7th, and 7/8th, will be:-

For troops of the 1st Aust. Div. and attached units.

Password: WALKER. Countersign. SUCCESS.

For troops of the N.Z. & A. Division

13th Division.

29th Brigade.

29th (Indian) Brigade

I.M.A. Brigade, less the section renaming with 1st Australian Div.

Casualty Clearing Stations.

Passwords: GODLEY. Countersign: SUCCESS.

Correction to Army Corps Order No. 16 - dated 3rd August 1915. In para 3. (a) - line 2 - for 5.0 p.m. read 5.30 p.m.

Further Reading:

The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915

Gallipoli Campaign

Battles where Australians fought, 1899-1920

Citation: The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Army Corps Order No. 16.

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Tuesday, 27 July 2010 12:01 PM EADT

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