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Tuesday, 29 June 2010
The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Leane's Trench, Report of Colonel Johnston, 6 August 1915 Topic: BatzG - Aug 1915
The August Offensive
Gallipoli, August 1915
Leane's Trench, Report of Colonel Johnston, 6 August 1915
To 3rd Inf. Brigade. From Lieut. Col. J.L. Johnston, 11th Infantry Battalion.
Reporting briefly that the enemy made an attack in force on LEANE'S TRENCH this morning. About 0430, they crept up on our right, and made an attack by bombs. The attack was so intense that a large number of the men in that section were either killed or wounded. The enemy then rushed the trench and succeeded in getting possession of it from the extreme right Sap 1a to Sap 2. The bomb attack was maintained right along our front. Capt. Aaron was in command of this section of the de fences. When the enemy obtained a foothold, our men at once blocked up la Sap with sandbags, and then defended the communication trench. The men in the trench kept up an incessant attack on the Turks, by rifle fire and bombs, but could not displace them.
Meanwhile supports had been hurried up from the rear, and a starring party was organized to rush the trench from TASMANIA POST - About 30 under 2nd Lieut. Prockter, were detailed for this duty, and under a withering fire from machine guns and rifles, they rushed that portion of the trench held by the enemy. They had suffered so severely in getting across the open, that the number who got to the trench, were not considered strong enough to turn the enemy out, and hold the position, so another party of 25 under 2nd Lieut. Franklyn, was detailed to follow on. This they did in a gallant manner, and completed the capture of the trench, shooting and bayoneting all the Turks left there.
A party of six Turks had retired into 1a Sap, where for some time they held out, but then were ultimately taken prisoners, and sent back to headquarters under escort unfortunately while passing through the communication trench, three of the six were killed by their own shrapnel fire. The other three were sent on to headquarters.
Meanwhile reinforcements were hurried up to the Turks from the trenches they hold in front of the 2nd L.H. Brigade, also from the left front of LEANE'S TRENCH, and here they were discovered to be so close to our trenches that it was impossible to dislodge them although a large number of bombs were fired at them. Here also they started to dig, probably with the view of under mining our trenches and blowing them up.
I then decided to launch a counter attack from the right of the CORNFIELD, and 2nd Lieut. Hall with 25 men were detailed to carry it out. The result of this was that the enemy retired from this flank.
The general attack continued for about six hours, during which a fierce bombardment by heavy guns took place, as well as incessant rifle and machine gun fire. The trenches and parapets were badly knocked about by shell fire, but with the assistance of the engineer Company, these have been repaired to a great extent and the work is still proceeding. I regret to say the casualties are very heavy, it is difficult to estimate the number killed, as several companies are very mixed up in the firing line - Probably about 50 killed, and about 100 wounded. About 50 dead Turks are to be seen round that portion of the trench they seized.
The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, General Reports, 6 August 1915 Topic: BatzG - Aug 1915
The August Offensive
Gallipoli, August 1915
General Reports, 6 August 1915
0520 & White Valley
Enemy reports attacking LEANE'S TRENCH by means of bomb attack. They entered the extreme right but by 0658 report was received that whole of trench retaken. Three prisoners captured, and result of examination gave indication of troops (TURKISH) confronting the position. General Birdwood sent message 3rd Inf. Brigade, "Well done LEANE'S TRENCH". 900 reinforcements arrived for 2nd Brigade. An aeroplane reconnaissance was arranged of LONE PINE and means of identifying provided.
1630 - 1730
Our Artillery preparations for attack on LONE PINE was commenced, continuing until 1730, when 1st Inf. Brigade advanced and occupied the objective apportioned with very little variation. Over 100 prisoners, and 2 machine guns were captured. Prisoners removed to Anzac.
Summary from 6 a.m. 5th August to 6 a.m. 6th August.
Very quiet day. We drew heavy fire by a ruse, and it was repeated et intervals during the right-Excellent shooting was done by the Navy on HARRIS RIDGE and TWIN TRENCHES. The damage done must be considerable. Early this morning heavy artillery and rifle fire were opened on RYRIE'S POST, which at the time of the report was cc-operating busily with the 3rd Inf. Brigade in holding LEANE'S TRENCH.
Very quiet during the day, a good deal of enemy fire during the night. At 0440 enemy attacked LEANE'S TRENCH At the time of writing morning report a counter attack was being launched (Army Corps since informed that counter attack retook the trench temporarily captured by a Turkish bombing party).
No. 2 Section, South.
Quiet day and quiet night. Nothing of particular importance to report. The whole of the wire in front of LONE PINE has not been moved by Artillery fire, a considerable portion of the South still remaining. The trenches of this section were taken over by the 2nd Infantry Brigade before 1500 yesterday.
Relief of Southern No .2 Section completed by 1500. COURTNEY'S POST occupied. Nothing of importance occurred during the day. The enemy in this section as in No. 2 southern, exhibited placards saying that WARSAW had fallen. The front trenches in JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY were full of troops during the day.
At 1400 HUGHE'S Battery fired 7 rounds into communication trench along which troops seemed to be moving between GUN RIDGE and PINE RIDGE BASTION; all were effective. At 1045 GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH, pay shelled with 3 effective rounds from the 4th Battery, LOWLAND Brigade. A conference was held at 1200 for the discussion and elucidation of any points arising from the orders regarding the preliminary bombardment mentioned in Operation Order No. 9 issued by G.O.C. 1st Aust. Div.
Casualties. A.D.M.S. has been asked to supply these direct. Ammunition expended. 18 pdr. H.E., 11 rounds, 18 pdr. shrapnel, 224 rounds, 4.7", 2 rounds, 6" how. 8 rounds, 5" how. 104 rounds.
Daily Operations 7 I.M.A. Brigade.
Section in sq 68 B.4. (Capt. C. D. Rawson).
14 P.S. and 3 T.S. at enemy gun in washaway behind Turkish trenches. Range 2000 x 178o 30” Mag. Several rounds appeared effective as did those of 18 pdr, also firing on it. Gun ceased firing.
2 T.B. at aeroplane 2500x and 3500x. Line very good but bursts low.
Section in square 68 B.1. (2nd Lieut. L.B. Tyler) Nothing to report.
Section in square 80 V 5/8.(Capt. G.B.B. Trenchard). Day spent in conflicting a mine emplacement. Ammunition expenditure, 14 P.S. 5 T. 8. Total 19 rounds.
Summary of events from 6 a.m. 5th August to 6 a.m. 6th August 1915
No. 3 Section.
Nothing unusual during the day. A ruse carried out at 9.30 p.m. from QUINN'S and POPE'S drew a certain amount of fire, bat it was not as heavy as the previous day. A defensive mine was exploded near the left of QUINN'S. During the night there were a few bursts of enemy fire. At 4 a.m. today, a second ruse was made, but this did not draw a very heavy fire, cheering was heard in the Turkish trenches in front of QUINN'S POST.
No. 4. Section.
Nothing unusual to report during the day. A considerable amount of the enemy's fire was drawn by a ruse at 9.30 P-7
The preliminary bombardment and registrations were continued yesterday. The 1st Battery fired 101 rounds at the entanglements in front of LONESOME PINE This is was done in two series, the 1st being at 7.30 a.m., and the second later in the morning. The O.C. 1st Brigade reports that all entanglements that could be seen from the North, are demolished. Those over the crest to the South will be engaged at 8.30 a.m. today. One of the 1st Battery guns was put out of action yesterday, by shrapnel bullets on the spring case in the rear of the shield. The damage was repaired yesterday, and the gun has been in action. The 2nd Battery fired 5 rounds in further registering at the head of MONASH GULLY. At 12.30 p.m. the 4th (Howitzer) Battery was timed for a series at LONESOME PINE and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY if trenches, but was unable to bring one gun into action owing to the broken buffer spring reported yesterday. This arrived later on, however, from the CAPE HELLES, and the series began about 2.30 p.m., 80 rounds were fired on the front trenches of JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, and LONESOME PINE, and a large amount of damage was done. A further 5 rounds were expanded in registering trenches beyond the NEK with the gun at PLUGGE'S PLATEAU. An aeroplane flew over the position shortly before 6 a.m. this morning.
Japanese Mortar, number of bombs fired, nil.
Casualties 12 other ranks wounded, 2 officers and 140 other ranks, sick (evacuated).
The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Notes on Proposed Operations of 1st Australian Division, 6 August 1915 Topic: BatzG - Aug 1915
The August Offensive
Gallipoli, August 1915
Notes on Proposed Operations of 1st Australian Division, 6 August 1915
Some Notes on Proposed Operations of 1st Australian Division
Action and Record of Events Subsequent to that Action.
Considerations affecting the forward move of the 1st Australian Division.
In drawing up this appreciation, it is understood that, in addition to the New Zealand Division aiming at BABY 700 and beyond, another force will operate still further north, against, or with the object of turning, 971, which dominates the whole of the country to its south. Exclusive of Artillery whose movements will be particularly circumscribed and abnormal, and are therefore dealt with separately, the fighting Units in this Division are:
1st, 2nd and third Infantry Brigades;
2nd Light Horse Brigade;
4th Light Horse Regiment.
2. According to verbal instructions from the Army Corps Commander, one Brigade will join N.Z. & A. Division in the push for BABY 700. Another Brigade is to extend to, and include KABA TEPE, thus leaving one Infantry Brigade, the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, and 4th Light Horse Regiment to:
(a) operate against LONESOME PINE, JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, and GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH; and
(b) hold the keys of our present trenches, cover guns etc.
3. The number of rifles available would be approximately
Infantry Brigade, say .. 2,700
2nd Light Horse Brigade .. 1,470
4th Light Horse Regiment .. 490
The length of trench at present held is:
1st Infantry Brigade .. .. 950 yards
3rd Infantry Brigade .. .. 975 yards
Total. 1,925 yards
Say 2,000 yards.
The length of the hostile position which includes LONESOME PINE, JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY and GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH, is approximately 1,500 yards.
4. When operating forward to our trench, it is of course not intended that our present trenches should be held in the same strength as now or even continuously. But there are certain portions which must be occupied as points d'appui. Some of which will, in the event of success, become important points on our lines of communications.
5. Numerating them from the left these are:-
(1) the continuation southwards of the head of MONASH VALLEY, from the right of COURTNEY'S POST up to, and inclusive of CLAYTON'S TRENCH, Length of 325 yards.
(2) the head of SHRAPNEL VALLEY, between THOMSON'S POST and some 100 yards southwards along 4th Battalion-trenches (both inclusive) a length of 150 yards.
(3) from: the left of the 3rd Battalion gully sap up to and inclusive of the "PIMPLE", a length of 250 yards.
(4) from head of the "PIMPLE" to cornfield sap inclusive, a length of 225 yards. Total 950 yds.
If these portions of our existing trenches are held adequately when the forward move takes place, we secure our rear against contingencies. Allowing a man per yard as the minimum garrison, it will be seen that we require, say 1,000 rifles in the aggregate to hold these positions. This, deducted from what will be available viz:- 4,660 rifles, leaves for active Operations 3,660 rifles. These might be made up of one complete Infantry Brigade and two Light Horse Regiments. This leaves one Regiment from the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, and the 4th Light Horse Regiment, available to occupy the keys of the trenches mentioned above, plus certain machine gun sections, which would have to be temporarily withdrawn from the attacking force until the latter had taken the trenches. But it is estimated that it will take a Brigade of at least 2,500 rifles, supported by artillery, to take and hold LONESOME PINE, which is the most important objective. It is the key to the right of our present position. It commands all the southern spurs emanating from it, and once securely in our possession could materially help to turn JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY. It must be attacked from the "PIMPLE" and south to ensure success. It is commanded by BABY 700, and beyond again by 971. It has to be decided whether actually the attack should be coincident with the forward movement against BABY 700, or when the attack on the latter is progressing. In the latter case, it would, of course, be necessary to heavy demonstration against LONESOME PINE from the very commencement of the operations against BABY 700, until the moment arrived to push forward. To reduce the distance between our trenches and the forward hostile trenches on LONESOME PINE, underground saps are being pushed forward from the "PIMPLE" and its neighbourhood. It is intended eventually to join these up into a new fire trench in close proximity to the forward hostile trench. This it is proposed to do at the last minute. The open space over which the actual assault will have to be carried out from the neighbourhood of the "PIMPLE", will, it is hoped, not exceed some thirty to forty yards. That portion of the assault from the south of the "PIMPLE", will have further to travel, but will be less exposed to 971 and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY. Adequate artillery support will, have to be rendered (this is dealt with under Artillery). It will most likely be a two or three day’s operation. The other two important positions to operate against, and which must be eventually occupied, are;
(1) JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY;
(2) GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH
Their respective frontages are:
JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY .. yards.
GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH .. yards.
To carry and hold JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, inclusive of the Gully between it and LONESOME PINE, will, it is estimated, require a Brigade of equal strength to that operating against LONESOME PINE, i.e.:- 2,500 rifles. Similarly it will probably be an operation extending over several days. The task should be overtaken concurrently with the attack against LONESOME PINE, the capture of which should facilitate the operation against JOHNSTON'S JOLLY, which, however, like LONESOME PINE, is dominated by 971.
GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH.
Until BABY 700 has been made good, it is to be considered whether an actual attack should be made against GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH, through a vigorous demonstration against it would be necessary. Our occupation of BABY 700, would render the CHESS BOARD more or less untenable by the Turks. Their position in GERMAN OFFICER TRENCH would at the same time be weakened, and it might then be taken, though until JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY is in our hands, the latter can always enfilade us in the GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH. In any case, it is estimated 1,000 rifles mould be required for the operation. Our figures in paragraph 5, show that for all the three operations referred to, we shall have available 3,660 rifles; our estimates show requirements of 6,000.
The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Note on Proposed Attack by 1st Australian Division and Reply by General Birdwood. Topic: BatzG - Aug 1915
The August Offensive
Gallipoli, August 1915
Note on Proposed Attack by 1st Australian Division and Reply by General Birdwood.
Note on Proposed Attack by 1st Australian Division and Reply by General Birdwood.
The advantage claimed for attacking LOVE PIER prier to making an attack elsewhere, is that it will draw off reserves. Admitting this for the moment, then it must be admitted that, following it to a logical conclusion, the troops allotted to the attack, will therefore run considerable risk of failing to retain the ground gained. If they are "outed" before the movement elsewhere is well advanced, little is seined and much is lost.
I hope it will draw off all reserves ,rear enough to get up to 971 quickly and contain any general reserve, also it may lead to reserves now at ANAFARTA being moved round to KAJADERE to repel an attack from our right front. If an Australian Brigade can once establish itself in the ready made excellent trenches, some of which are only 100 yards off our own, and then allow itself to be outed, I shall be so surprised as to think it might return from ANZAC, but I feel sure it will not allow itself to be outed.
(i) But can it be fairly asserted that a movement such as this will cause the enemy to throw in more than local reserves` sons and will not local reserves be "contained" in any case?
(ii) What it will do, will be to expose attacking troops to a continuous and concentrated bombardment by the enemy's artillery. This will in itself make it difficult for the attacking troops to consolidate trenches gained. Our artillery will therefore have to reply, and they will thus use up ammunition, the want of which next day may be disastrous. Unless we have ample ammunition, no attack can be contemplated.
See reply on previous page.
(1) Not necessarily in any way. The Turks might well risk holding a strong work without reserves, who might be sent up to hold 971.
(2) To meet which, all our Artillery will be available: if simultaneous attacks were made only a small proportion will be so. The troops we hope will at once be in trenches, as I trust the attack will be triads, with the idea of covering the open ground in a few seconds after getting into Turk trenches. Enemy has shown no disposition to bombard all night, and did not do so, even the night of our landing.
LONE PINE and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, will throughout the night, be subjected to such enfilade and oblique fire as will, if undisturbed by action elsewhere, make the strengthening of ground gained very difficult.
From what we can see of these trenches, it seems most unlikely that enfilade in oblique fire, can be brought to bear with effect, at least we find that to be the case where we apparently now enfilade and are enfiladed, but bayonet fighting is to be expected in plenty, and at these we must make up our minds to entirely defeat the Turks, but if the Turks are undisturbed by action elsewhere, the object will have been accomplished, i.e. we shall have got 971 unopposed. This I fear is altogether too sanguine.
The enemy will have been given previous warning of determined attack. He probably knows, as we know, that the retention of the plateau is unlikely while the high ground is in his hands ,and he will thus anticipate further attack.
Yes, but probably in the same night bombard the JOLLY and GABA TEPE perhaps.
I do not agree. He might well suppose our main object is to join hands with the force near ACHI BABA, and that we do not wish to extend unnecessarily to the north.
If the operation, as an isolated one, failed, it may, and probably will imperil the completeness of the other projected operations. It will certainly tend to disorganize then.
It was for the very reason that it would not in any way imperil the main operations, that I am anxious to carry this out. In case of complete failure, all that could happen, would be that the attacking force, would fall back on to its original trenches. The forces detailed to attack LONE PINE and 971, are so entirely separate, that I fail to see how any failure on the part of the force, could in any way disorganize the latter. The continuous fighting, which in any case take place round LONE PINE, must help the attack elsewhere, and I feel convinced that if LONE PINE is attacked with determination as I know it will be, that there will be no failure.
The August Offensive, Gallipoli, August 1915, Notes on the Attack of Lone Pine Topic: BatzG - Aug 1915
The August Offensive
Gallipoli, August 1915
Notes on the Attack of Lone Pine
NOTES ON THE ATTACK OF LONE PINE.
A. LONE PINE
1. - This paper deals mainly with problems concerning the attack of LONE PINE. The topographical relation of LONE PINE and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY is such, however, that, strictly speaking, both should in the event of an attack, be dealt with simultaneously.
Reasons forbidding this, however, are:
(1) insufficiency of "numbers;
(2) the fact that the operations in this area are being undertaken to hold the enemy in this locality.
2. - We can only conjecture the enemy's strength in the LONE PINE position. Excluding communication trenches, and as far as tie trace of his trenches can be determined, he has space for about 1,000 rifles. The length of front from P.2. to S.3., is about 300 yards, but with double tiers of fire, at least 600 rifles could be brought into action. Cover in rear and adjacent affords cover for unlimited supports and reserves. Our total available strength is:
1st Infantry Brigade.... 2,930
2nd Infantry Brigade.... 2,679
3rd Infantry Brigade.... 3,587
2nd L. H. Brigade.... 1,750
This may be increased by reinforcements. With this number we have to hold a front of soma 2,400 yards, and may have to undertake other operations. To hold the front of 2400 yards in the manner indicated hereafter, at least some 7,000 men will be required, thus leaving some 4,000 men free for the operation against LONE PINE. Out of this, a reserve will have to be provided. The 1st Inf. Brigade will therefore have to undertake the operation against LONE PINE, with a strength of some 3,000 men, and a battalion of the 3rd Brigade, will be held in reserve. This of course bearing in mind probable casualties, is a minimum requirement.
3. The nature of the ground separating our and the enemy's trenches, is not altogether favourable. To the north, between our tunnel B.24., and enemy trench P.2., the distance to be traversed is about 70 yards, and the ground is mostly rising slightly. The drawback to movement between our tunnels F.24, and B.8. to the enemy's trenches, is that, while defiladed from fire from the southern faces of LONE PINE, it is enfiladed from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY to a serious extent. A movement straight against the enemy from the vicinity of our tunnel B.5., passes along the crest, and is exposed on both flanks; it is however the shortest route (about 50 yards). Movement from between B.5. and B.3. is defiladed from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, but slightly exposed from PINE RIDGE and SNIPER'S RIDGE From between B.4. and B. 5. movement will be over a distance of 12r yards, and passes through a dip with a steep climb towards the enemy. The frontages from which the attack must be delivered, however, extends from P.2. to about the letters S.1. a total of some 200 yards.
4. The available area far our deployment, therefore extends from B.24 to a point about 10 yards north of B.3. Within this line we have our forward recesses capable of assembling some 230 men. The present firing line can accommodate two lines of 204 and 290 men respectively. These three lines would be able to advance almost simultaneously, and they would give a total of some 700 men. It is improbable that the forward recesses could be filled a second time owing to the difficult of moving through tunnels, and the need for getting to work at once on these tunnels to convert them into communications. Subsequent lines will, therefore, have to move from the present firing line, and will have to be told off in lines, and formed up ready in communication trenches, which should be clearly marked. This is unfortunate as it will mean congestion in a position which is sure to be vigorously shelled. The provision of overhead cover on communication trenches will diminish casualties.
5. The objectives of our attack should be, not the first or second line of the enemy trenches, but the fourth trench back, and the heart of the work. Each battalion should be given a definite line of trenches to aim at, and be told that when once occupied, the tendency should be to open out to the flanks. Enemy lines P2, 010, 011 or P3, and P4, should be converted into works facing North, to give flanks protection, and they should be joined up with the craters about B22 and tunnel B24 to flank OWEN'S GULLY and the ground to the north. The more craters we can make on the line B24, B26, the better. On the south we should endeavour to convert R3, R7 into flank protection.
6. Bomb parties, obstacle parties, and working parties, will need to be told off; and obstacle and working parties should follow, they should include Engineer parties. Bomb parties will have to be provided with means of carrying bombs, and be given a supply of lighting sticks. Parties will also have to be held ready to begin work promptly on our tunnels, and running them into the enemy's forward trenches. B5 will be the main communication trench. The exits to GUN ROAD from B4, B9, B5 should be improved and properly marked.
7. The provision of means of communication with captured works will for some time present some difficulty. The periscope signal apparatus will have to be used for some time, but as early as possible, telephone wires should be laid in tunnels.
B. HOLDING REMAINDER OF LINE
The most effective and economical means of holding the remainder of the line, will be the selection of points d'appui, and the assembly of strength at them, the intervening spaces being held lightly where men are available. The points d'appui, beginning from the south, are suggested thus:-
TURKEY KNOLL (which should be linked up to B3 and post to be established at B3.)
THE PIMPLE (near B3.)
THE B24 POST
THE GULLY POST
THE CRATER POST
This should so reduce numbers required to hold the present line, that the 3rd Inf. Brigade will be able to hold a battalion in reserve, and be prepared for operations against PINE RIDGE if they became necessary. The 2nd Infantry Brigade similarly should have available some 500 men for any attack on GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH which may be required, and, in addition, sufficient men to resist counter attack from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY or GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH.
C. FURTHER OPERATIONS
It is impossible t o predict what further operations may be required of the division. We are bound however to contemplate:
(1) the seizure of the GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH;
(2) the seizure of PINE RIDGE
(3) an advance to the eastern slopes of LONE PINE plateau
(4) the occupation of the JOLLY.
The first only need be of our own volition - the remainder may be forced upon us. It is necessary, therefore, to determine the most advantageous time for operations against GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH. In the absence of knowledge of the wider plans upon which the action of the division is dependant, the fixing of time is difficult. The object of the attack on LONE PINE is to draw troops down to that locality. In the event of pressure by counter attack, we could therefore use an attack on GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH, to relieve us at any time necessary during the night. This, however, has the disadvantage of indicating our tendency to extend our attack to the left. By midnight, however, this tendency may in any case become evident and there is every advantage in doing the operation at night: the work is subjected to cross fire from the north and from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY in the south. All things considered, it would appear that midnight was a suitable time.
EXTENT OF JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY POSITION.
Frontage of enemy's trench is 350 yards approximately.
To rear of first rise approximately 200 yards. Thence to main valley 300 yards.
Approximate total ... 500 yards.
(1) It is impossible to get a complete view of this feature.
(2) The attached sketch is compiled from the captured Turkish map, and from the results of close personal reconnaissance.
(3) The two "Swells" of which the feature is composed, amount practically to a small plateau descending sharply to the east to a watercourse. The slope on this side appears to be convex.
(4) The works constructed on the feature appear to extend in depth over both swells.
(5) The feature is higher than the ground held by the enemy immediately to the north (GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH) and slightly higher than LONESOME PINE.
(1) GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH could give very little assistance in defending the JOLLY.
(2) LONESOME PINE could give a good deal of help.
(3) The eastern swell appears to form a point d'apput for the forward position, and for LONESOME PINE, and trenches now connected up.
(4) Possession of the JOLLY would make LONESOME PINE untenable by the enemy and would probably cause the evacuation of GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH.
700 yards of trenches require to be held. Under present conditions, a garrison of two battalions would be required.
6. Plans attached.
(1) JOHNSON'S JOLLY, app 12" to 1 mile.
(2) Locality sketch app 3° to 1 mile
EXTANT OF LONESOME PINE POSITION.
1. General Description.
1915-This position runs diagonally to our present front for 600 yards, it then continues along another Spur running a little west of south; or nearly 400 yards. It has a convex slope towards the east.
From front to rear the depth may be taken as about 600 yards. Owing to the formation of the ground, the defended depth is about 300 yards to 400 yards.
It is supported from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY which appears to command it.
4. Field of fire.
It has a good field of fire generally, but this is somewhat broken up by nullahs, particularly on the southern side.
The northern and southern parts are incapable of mutual a, support owing to the nature of the ground.
The northern part and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY are so closely connected for defence, that it would seem that an attempt should be made to capture both at the same time. (3) Owing to the sharpness and convexity of the eastern slopes, would be necessary to go forward a considerable distance if it were decided to hold the place.
3. (above) leads to a greatly extended line of from 1000 to 1200 yards. The garrison required would be iron 3 to 4 battalions,
I have not seen over this ground for some days, and would like to revise this note after a thorough reconnaissance made definitely for the purpose.
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