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Wednesday, 26 March 2008
The First Battle of Gaza, Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917, Falls Account Part 11 Topic: BatzP - 1st Gaza
The First Battle of Gaza
Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917
Falls Account Part 11
Falls Account, Sketch Map 15.
The following is an extract of the Falls Account from the the Official British War History volumes on Egypt written by Falls, C.; and, MacMunn, G., Military operations: Egypt and Palestine, (London 1928), pp. 279 - 325 detailing the British role at the First Battle of Gaza, Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917.
Chapter XVII The First Battle of Gaza (Continued).
The First Battle of Gaza.
The Withdrawal to the Wadi Ghazze.
On receipt of this information Desert Column placed the 54th Division under General Dallas's command and warned him to be prepared to withdraw both divisions across the Ghazze if necessary that afternoon. Soon after 11 a.m., General Dallas had a conversation with Br.-General G. P. Dawnay, B.G.G.S. Eastern Force, who asked him whether he considered that the position now held by the two divisions could be maintained for three or four days. He replied that he considered the position a bad one and unsuitable for defence unless Sheikh Abbas also was occupied. He had no fear as to his troops being able to hold their own, but communication by day across the Wadi Ghazze was almost impossible, since all the tracks were under the fire of batteries which the enemy had brought up to Sheikh Abbas. It should be added that the men of the Egyptian Camel Transport Corps had in the course of the morning shown remarkable steadiness and devotion to duty, bringing up food, water, and ammunition along this shell-swept corridor.
General Dobell had now to come to a definitive decision with regard to the action. It appeared to him that General Dallas's view was correct and that the line held by the 53rd and 54th Divisions had little to recommend it while he was preparing for further operations, which he considered would require all the resources at his disposal. As for putting the 52nd Division into the fight to retake Sheikh Abbas, he was strongly averse to that measure. The reorganization of all the troops would have taken considerable time, and to have brought up the necessary supplies and ammunition would have been, in his judgment, virtually impossible. The provision of water would have been the greatest difficulty of all. As he had done on the 26th, he gave Sir A. Murray on the telephone an outline of his situation and stated that in his judgment it was now necessary to break off the fight. The Commander-in-Chief regretfully agreed with this decision.
At 4.30 p.m. General Dobell issued orders by telephone, subsequently confirmed in writing, for the withdrawal of the 53rd and 54th Divisions under the command of General Dallas to the left bank of the Wadi Ghazze. General Dallas accordingly ordered the retirement to begin at 7 p.m., covered by the 158th and 163rd Brigades. The afternoon passed without incident of importance, except for considerable shelling on the fronts of the 53rd Division and the Camel Brigade, until 7 p.m., when an attack upon the 161st Brigade was beaten off without difficulty. In the evening the 22nd Mounted Brigade moved across to the coast and relieved Money's Detachment in the sand-dunes. It was withdrawn at midnight, as part of the general retirement. With these movements there was no interference by the enemy, and the whole of the 53rd and 54th Divisions were across the Wadi Ghazze before 4 a.m. on the 28th March.
The troops who took up a position on the left bank of the wadi were extremely exhausted. The 26th had been reasonably cool, the normal weather of the season, though the mid-day sun was trying. On the 27th a Khamsin had begun to blow, somewhat before its usual season, and the great heat which accompanied it had aggravated the sufferings of men already wearied and short of water.
The British losses were just under four thousand, with a high percentage of lightly wounded,' but also, unfortunately, over five hundred missing, of whom 5 officers and 241 other ranks, wounded and unwounded, fell into the hands of the enemy. These casualties were suffered almost entirely by the 53rd Division and the 161st Brigade, of which the latter had particularly heavy losses.
KILLED
WOUNDED
MISSING
Officers
78
176
13
Other Ranks
415
2,756
499
(The only source from which these figures could be accurately obtained was a return made by the A.A.G. 3rd Echelon on the 15th April. In these circumstances the figures under “Killed" include all who died of wounds between the 27th March and that (late. In a telegram of the 1st April, Sir A. Murray gave an approximate figure for the casualties which was 469 lower than the above).
The Turkish loss in prisoners was 837, including 4 Austrian officers and 37 other ranks and the divisional commander and staff of the 53rd Division. The guns captured by the N.Z.M.R. Brigade were brought in. The total Turkish casualties were estimated by Sir A. Murray to be considerably in excess of his own, but it is now known that they were about five-eighths of that figure.
The First Battle of Gaza, Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917, Falls Account Part 12 Topic: BatzP - 1st Gaza
The First Battle of Gaza
Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917
Falls Account Part 12
Falls Account, Sketch Map 15.
The following is an extract of the Falls Account from the the Official British War History volumes on Egypt written by Falls, C.; and, MacMunn, G., Military operations: Egypt and Palestine, (London 1928), pp. 279 - 325 detailing the British role at the First Battle of Gaza, Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917.
Chapter XVII The First Battle of Gaza (Continued).
The First Battle of Gaza.
The Causes of Failure and the Reports to the War Office.
Few actions of the late war have been the subject of greater differences of opinion than the First Battle of Gaza. The problem is complicated, since it is not merely whether or not the withdrawal of the mounted troops was necessary, but whether the attack of the 53rd Division could not have been launched earlier. The latter question, again, depends to a great extent upon how far the fog delayed operations. Then there is the third question, whether, notwithstanding the delay, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the mounted troops, there was any possibility on the afternoon of the 27th of acceding to General Dallas's request to retake Sheikh Abbas, and subsequently of renewing the attack on Gaza.
It will be attempted here, not to find an answer to these questions, but merely to point out all considerations which appear to have importance. With regard to the mounted troops, the situation must be judged as it appeared to General Chetwode and as he represented it to General Dobell on the afternoon of the 26th: not as it appears in the light of later knowledge. Nor in any case has the fact that the Turkish relieving columns were halted during the night much bearing on the subject. They might have been more active, but they could hardly have exercised strong pressure during the hours of darkness. Their pressure would have been strong enough as soon as dawn appeared. On the other hand, it is clear that Gaza was, in fact, virtually captured by nightfall, and it certainly seems probable that General Dobell's actions would have been different had he received earlier the despairing messages of Major Tiller messages which he ought to have received in no case later than an hour after their despatch.
Turning to the 53rd Division, it has been shown that the fog delayed the infantry in its progress to Mansura and Esh Sheluf less seriously than has commonly been supposed. The two leading brigades had reached these positions by 8.30 a.m.; it is a reasonable calculation that they would have been there an hour earlier if unhindered by the fog, but probably not more. The 159th Brigade was across the wadi by 6.40 a.m., and could presumably have been at Mansura by 9.30. A much more important effect of the fog seems to have been its delay of the necessary reconnaissance. Even as it was, it would appear that, had the brigadiers accompanied General Dallas to Mansura, while their brigades were being led to their positions, the conference could have been held an hour earlier than 10.15 a.m., the time at which it actually began. The two field artillery brigades had five batteries out of six in position at 10.20 a.m. Granting that it might not have been possible to communicate to them the plan and arrange for their co-operation without some further delay, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the attack might have been launched an hour sooner if the conference had assembled that much earlier. Whether it would have been taking undue risk for the infantry to have advanced, covered by strong patrols, towards its objectives, without waiting for the artillery's support, is another and more difficult question. It must be remembered that the successful progress of the mounted troops does not furnish a complete analogy; they were advancing into open country, the infantry against an enemy force in position. The delay in the arrival of the 161st Brigade Group, owing to misunderstanding, was also an important factor, though less as regards its infantry than its attached artillery brigade, the support of which at an earlier hour might have led to the speedier capture of the position.
The second serious misunderstanding occurred after the order for the withdrawal of the mounted troops had been given, when General Dallas was not informed that the 54th Division was closing in to north of Mansura. This misunderstanding has been dealt with in detail, but though it accounts for the abandonment of the position gained, it does not alter the fact that the holding of the advanced line on Ali Muntar, with the Turkish artillery on Sheikh Abbas, would have been an exceedingly difficult matter, unless Gaza could be immediately taken. If the 54th Division, which had two brigades only available, withdrew to the Burjabye Ridge, it had inevitably to abandon Sheikh Abbas. The abandonment of Sheikh Abbas allowed the Turks to occupy it, to bring up their guns and (it was eventually proved) to render the new position practically untenable. Sheikh Abbas could hardly have been retained unless the mounted troops had been kept out. It could not have been retaken on the 27th unless they had been again employed, together with the two brigades of the 52nd Division then available. On the second of these cases Sir A. Murray writes in his Despatches:
"If it had now been practicable for the General Officer Commanding Eastern Force to advance with his three infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions, I have no doubt that Gaza could have been taken and the Turks forced to retire; but the reorganization of the force for a deliberate attack would have taken a considerable time, the horses of the cavalry were very fatigued, and the distance of our railhead from the front line put the immediate maintenance of such a force with supplies, water and ammunition entirely out of the question. The only alternative, therefore, was to retire the infantry."
On the 28th March Sir A. Murray reported to the War Office that he had advanced to the Wadi Ghazze, that he had been heavily engaged east of Gaza on the 26th and 27th, that he estimated the Turkish causalities at between 6,000 and 7,000 men in addition to 900 prisoners, and that his troops had behaved splendidly. The C.I.G.S. replied on the 30th that as a result of his recent success and of British progress in Mesopotamia the situation had altered since he received his last instructions. His immediate objective should now be the defeat of the Turks south of Jerusalem and the occupation of that city. Sir A. Murray answered next day (the 31st) that he was most anxious to advance on Jerusalem, but added a warning that his difficulties must be realized and that no rapid advance could be expected. He again called attention to his former estimate of the strength required for the operations, and stated that, though he could beat the Turks in the open, it had been proved that they were exceedingly good defensive fighters. They would probably take up a series of defensive positions between the Beersheba-Gaza and Jaffa-Jerusalem lines, out of which he could not hope to turn them without considerable losses, requiring immediate replacement. In any case his progress would be measured by that of his railway, and the best he could hope for was 20 miles a month, if no great engineering difficulties were met with. He concluded by stating that he might have to ask for material to double the line from Qantara to Gaza.
Sir W. Robertson replied briefly on the 1st April, but on the 2nd, after the War Cabinet had considered Sir A. Murray's message of the 31st March, despatched a long telegram embodying its views. He had been asked to point out the great importance of the operations in Palestine. Everyone was now feeling seriously the strain of war, and the moral effect of success was extremely valuable. The War Cabinet therefore desired that Sir A. Murray's operations should be pushed on energetically. He added that there was internal unrest in Turkey, and that she was undoubtedly more exhausted than any other of Great Britain's enemies. With the reinforcements detailed for Egypt, he did not see why Sir A. Murray should not be completely successful. (The reference is to troops required to bring up to strength the 74th Division and also to proposals to form another division from Territorial battalions then in India. As will appear, a mixed division of Territorial and Indian battalions (the 75th) was eventually formed instead.) On the 4th April Sir A. Murray telegraphed that he hoped the War Cabinet would be assured that he fully appreciated the importance of operations in Palestine. He did not believe that a single day of the past fifteen months had been wasted, or that greater energy could be displayed. Preparations were in progress for a renewed attack on Gaza, but he was anxious not to hurry over this operation, as he felt that a methodically prepared attack had chances of winning a considerable success. After taking Gaza he intended to continue the invasion of Palestine, though he had at the moment only enough rails to reach Deir el Balah. He then enumerated his reasons for proposing to continue his advance along the coast instead of the Turkish Beersheba railway, and stated his requirements in mechanical transport, Army Service Corps drivers, artillery for his new divisions, signal units and material, Royal Engineers (Army Troops), and modern aeroplanes.
Meanwhile the Government had asked for a fuller report on the operations, all that had yet been received being the short telegram on the 28th March.2 In a very long telegram of the 1st April Sir A. Murray recounted his objects (which have been given in Chapter XVI) and the conditions, and gave a sketch of the operations, estimating the Turkish casualties at 8,000. He concluded:-
"The operation was most successful, and owing to the fog and waterless nature of the country round Gaza just fell short of a complete disaster to the enemy. Our troops are exceedingly proud of themselves, particularly 53rd Division, who have not been in action since Suvla, and I am delighted with their enterprise, endurance, skill (,and leading. None of our troops were at any time harassed or hard pressed. It is proved conclusively that in the open the enemy have no chance of success against our troops, but they are very tenacious in prepared positions. In the open our mounted troops simply do what they like with them. "
It will be seen from Sir W. Robertson's messages that the policy of the Government had completely changed. No longer were serious operations to be postponed until the autumn; Sir A. Murray was now urged to advance and capture Jerusalem as soon as possible. To some extent this revision of estimates and plans was accounted for by the British success in Mesopotamia, but it was governed to a greater extent by the interpretation placed by the C.I.G.S. and the War Cabinet upon Sir A. Murray's reports. There is no doubt that these reports, the first of which resulted in congratulatory messages from H.M. The King, the Imperial War Cabinet, Lord Derby, General Nivelle, with personal telegrams from Sir W. Robertson and Sir John Cowans, created in their minds the impression that the result of the battle had been more favourable, and that the enemy had been harder hit, than was actually the case. This appears to have been one of those occasions in which a commander in the field, hoping immediately to improve his situation after what has appeared to him to be only a temporary set-back, has unconsciously understated the extent of that set-back in his reports to those in ultimate authority. He may by such action avoid creating needless despondency, but he may also give rise to exaggerated hopes, deprive himself of support which a fuller representation of the case would have ensured, and finally be forced to demand it after a further check to his plans.
At the same time, even had Sir A. Murray's messages been framed in less sanguine tones, neither the C.I.G.S. nor the War Cabinet would have been likely to admit that his offensive power had vanished as a result of one indecisive action-an action which, judged by the standards of the Western Front, was small and far from costly. The War Office was fully aware of the Turkish strength in the theatre and the limits of possible reinforcement, and with some minor differences its estimate corresponded with that of G.H.Q. in Egypt. Though the renewed British offensive, preparations for which were known to be in train, might have been less confidently urged, it does not seem probable that it would in any case have been cancelled.
The First Battle of Gaza, Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917, 22nd Mounted Brigade War Diary Account Topic: AIF - DMC - British
The First Battle of Gaza
Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917
22nd Mounted Brigade War Diary Account
22nd Mounted Brigade War Diary Account.
The following is a transcription of the Account from the War Diary of the 22nd Mounted Brigade detailing their role at the First Battle of Gaza, Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917.
25 March 1917 Deir el Belah
The Brigade left Bir Eshsha at 0230. Arrived Deir el Belah at 0630. Watered horses and then took up a position covering Wadi el Ghuzze. The Brigade withdrew at 1800.
26 March 1917 Gaza
The Brigade marched with the Division at 0230, crossed the Wadi Ghuzze and marched as far as Beit Durdis. We were shelled from Gaza and shot at by German aeroplanes. The attack on Gaza was carried out by 53rd Division and commenced at 1030. At 1500 The Anzac Division was ordered to attack from the north. The attack was carried out by the 22nd Mounted Brigade (1/1st Lincolnshire Yeomanry and 1/1st East Riding Yeomanry) on the left the New Zealand Mounted Riflles Brigade in the centre and the 2nd Light Horse Regiment on the right. The attack reached its objective but Turks withdrew to dand hills. As it was getting dark, the Division was ordered to withdraw and concentrate. The Brigade reached Deir el Belah at 0500.
27 March 1917 Deir el Belah
At 0830 Brigade ordered to relieve on regiment Imperial Mounted Division on sand hills north east of mouth of Wadi Ghuzze. 1/1st Lincolnshire Yeomanry and 1/1st Staffordshire Yeomanry in outpost line. At 1900 received order to withdraw outposts at 2400 and new line occupied by 0300.
War Diaries
All War Diaries cited on this site should be read in conjunction with the Australian Light Horse Studies Centre, AIF War Diaries of the Great War, Site Transcription Policy which may be accessed at:
The First Battle of Gaza, Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917, Eastern Force Order No 33 Topic: AIF - DMC - British
The First Battle of Gaza
Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917
Eastern Force Order No 33
Eastern Force Order No 33.
The following is a transcription of Eastern Force Order No 33 from the War Diary of the Eastern Force detailing the battle plan for the First Battle of Gaza, Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917.
Eastern Force Order No 33
Lieutenant General Sir Charles Dobell, KCB, CMG, DSO
Commanding Eastern Force
Headquarters Eastern Force, 24th March 1917.
1. The enemy's main body is Tel en Nejile - Huj area, south of the Wadi el Hesi, covered by detachments about GAZA, Tel el Sheria, Abu Hareira and Beersheba. He appears to dispose of two weak divisions and fragments of two other divisions - the equivalent in all of between 2½ and 3 divisions. One of these divisions appears not to number more than 6,000 rifles.
2. The General Officer Commanding intends to drive the enemy out of Gaza and hopes to destroy his advanced detachment at that place.
3. The Desert Column will move forward in the early hours of the morning of 26th March against the enemy at Gaza. The General Officer Commanding Desert Column will dispose his mounted troops so as to block the enemy's lines of retreat from Gaza, and to watch for any movement of his main body towards Gaza from the Tel en Nejile - Huj area, or of the Tel esh Sheria - Abu Hareira detachment along the main road or roads to the north of it.
He will than attack the enemy's force occupying Gaza.
4.
(a) In order to pass the mounted troops round the enemy's position, it will be necessary for General Officer Commanding Desert Column to move then through, the outpost position of the 54th Division soon after dawn an the 26th March.
The 54th Division will be ready to move at 0830 on the 26th. As soon as the mounted troops of the Desert Column are clear and over the Wadi Ghuzze, the Division (less one Infantry Brigade, one Field Artillery Brigade and one Field Ambulance) will move from In Sereit to a Position of readiness in the neighbourhood of Sheikh Abbas to be selected by the Divisional Commander. General Officer Commanding 54th Division will not disperse his troops at Sheikh Abbas more then is avoidable, but will select a position suitable for defence against an attack from the east and south east, and will make arrangements so as to enable it to be occupied and rapidly strengthened if necessary. He will also reconnoitre his lines of advance against a hostile force moving on Gaza from the Tel esh Sheria - Abu Hareira direction.
General Officer Commanding 54th Division will also make every effort to develop a supply of water in the Wadi el Ghuzze, between Abu um Teibig and the bend in the wadi wast of El Breij, both inclusive.
(b) The Brigade group, 54th Division, left at In Seirat, in accordance with the foregoing order, will for the time being be directly at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding Eastern Force.
5. The 53rd Division will await orders at Khan Yunis, for the protection of which place General Officer Commanding 52nd Division will be responsible. The division will be ready to move at the shortest notice, with two complete "mobile rations" on the man, and the Divisional Commander will make every endeavour to arrange that, by leaving behind non-essentials carried in his 1st line transport, by loading additional forage on artillery vehicles, etc, he may be able to carry one day's marching ration for animals in the 1st line transport, in case it is necessary to move forward.
6. When the enemy's force at Gaza is disposed of, and if the General Officer Commanding Desert Column finds an opportunity for the use of his mounted troops in pursuit, the 1st Imperial Camel Brigade will revert to the direct command of the General Officer Commanding East Force. General Officer Commanding Desert Column will report the exact position of this brigade as soon as possible after the dispositions of the mounted troops preliminary to the main attack on Gaza is completed.
7. The following is the disposition of the Royal flying Corps.
A permanent contact patrol of one aeroplane will be maintained with the Desert Column, reporting direct to battle headquarters, Desert Column. General Officer Commanding Desert Column will be responsible for transmitting information received from this contact patrol to Eastern Force Headquarters, or battle headquarters, as the case may be. Five aeroplanes will be detailed for general reconnaissance, reporting to battle headquarters, Eastern Force; all information gained by these aeroplanes of movements of the enemy main body (at present in the Tel el Nejile - Huj area) o9r of his central detachment (at present in the El esh Sheria - Abu Hareira area), or of the approach of enemy troops from the Lydda - Ramle area will be dropped at battle headquarters, Desert Column, as well as at battle headquarters, Eastern Force.
Six aeroplanes will be detailed for cooperation with the artillery. A wireless receiving station is allotted to the heavy artillery, three to each division and two to each mounted division.
Six aeroplanes will be detailed for patrol duties.
8. Special Communications. A Shore Signal Station, for inter communication between the Navy and the Army will be established at 0600 on March 26th at a point 200 yards north of the well at Sheikh Shabashi. This station will be connected by wire with battle headquarters, Eastern Force.
Communication with the Navy can also be obtained by wireless from battle headquarters, Eastern Force. As soon as Gaza is occupied, General Officer Commanding Desert Column will make arrangements for opening a Signal Station at some convenient place on the beach. The Sheikh Shabashi signal Station will close down as soon as the new station is opened. In the event of battle headquarters, Eastern Force, moving before the Gaza Shore Signal Station is opened, arrangements will be made for the Sheikh Shabashi station to be connected to the nearest signal office.
9. A note regarding the supply of ammunition is issued as an annexure to this order.
10. Medical Arrangements. A Casualty Clearing Station will be established at Khan Yunis to which patients will be evacuated from the front. This Casualty Clearing Station will be laid out on the 25th ready to be set up, but no tents will be pitched on that day. General Officer Commanding 52nd Division will arrange to pitch the tents on the morning of the 26th.
The 54th Division will form a dressing station if required near In Seirat, on the Gaza - Rafa Road as near as possible to Deir el Belah.
The 52nd Division will form a dressing station at Khan Yunis if required.
Evacuation will take place from the dressing stations to the Casualty Clearing Stations at Khan Yunis by motor ambulance convoy.
The Deputy Director Medical Services Desert Column has at his disposal 21 Ford motor ambulances for use as an ambulance convoy. In the event of motor ambulances not being available for evacuation purposes, the Assistant Directors Medical Services 54th and 52nd Divisions will use their own transport.
11. To General Officers Commanding
Desert Column,
52nd Division,
54th Division,
74th Division and
Commandant, Khan Yunis,
Special Instructions are issued with this order regarding supply arrangements.
12. Battle Headquarters, Eastern Force, will be established by 0600 on the 26th March about Point 310 north east of In Seirat.
The Officer in charge of Signals, Eastern Force, will arrange to connect the battle headquarters of Eastern Force and Desert Column by wire as early as possible on the 26th.
Signed GP Dawnay, Brigadier General General Staff, Eastern Force
War Diaries
All War Diaries cited on this site should be read in conjunction with the Australian Light Horse Studies Centre, AIF War Diaries of the Great War, Site Transcription Policy which may be accessed at:
The First Battle of Gaza, Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917, Egyptian Expeditionary Force Lynden-Bell Letter 21 March 1917 Topic: AIF - DMC - British
The First Battle of Gaza
Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917
Egyptian Expeditionary Force Lynden-Bell Letter 21 March 1917
Lynden-Bell Letter 21 March 1917.
The following is a transcription of the Lynden-Bell Letter of 21 March 1917 from the War Diary of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force detailing the discussion formulating the battle plan for the First Battle of Gaza, Palestine, 26 to 27 March 1917.
GS 388
General Headquarters Egyptian Expeditionary Force 21st March 1917
General Officer Commanding Desert Column
There are now sufficient Hotchkiss Guns and pack saddlery available to complete the rearmament of the units of the Australian and New Zealand and Imperial Mounted Divisions, from which the Lewis Guns and equipment, at present, on charge, will be withdrawn.
Would you kindly say when it will be convenient to begin this rearmament and the order in which yet wish the units to be re-armed.
Since, its addition to the above, there will be sufficient pack saddlery to replace that at present with the 22nd Mounted Brigade it is considered that this exchange should be carried out.
It is desirable to carry out this out this rearmament as early as possible to enable a reserve of Lewis Guns to be built up.
Signed A Lynden-Bell, Major General Chief of the General Staff Egyptian Expeditionary Force
War Diaries
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