Brigade Scouts

Obituary

Frederick Allan Dove

The following obituary was extracted from the Commonwealth Military Journal, 1914, p. 241:

The Late Major Frederick Allan Dove, DSO.

There went over to the Great Army, on the 9th December, 1913, Major Frederick Allan Dove, scholar, soldier, and gentleman. Of that great military quality, courage, he had abundance, and with it the sound commonsense which made his services during the South African War, 1899-1902, so appreciated. But physical courage is, after all, an animal characteristic; moral courage and fortitude are much higher qualities. Of moral courage Major Dove had no lack, and the fortitude with which he fought for long against a painful illness is a shining example of the power of the mind over the body. The notes upon the subject of the gold medal essay for last year, which will be published in the July number of the Journal, were found in his portfolio at the Sydney Hospital, and they show that to the last his mind struggled to give all that it was capable of for the benefit of the forces in whose interests alone he served.

Major Dove was born on the 20th December, 1867, and became second lieutenant (volunteers) in 1897; lieutenant in 1898; captain in 1899; and brevet major in 1903. In 1900 he went on the unattached list, and in the following year he transferred to the reserve of officers. On the 1st May, 1906, he joined the Administrative and Instructional Staff with the rank of captain, and on the 1st October, 1911, he received his substantive majority. From the date of his appointment to the permanent forces until the 30th June, 1911, he served on the Instructional Staff of the 2nd Military District; was Director of Equipment at Head-quarters from the 1st July, 1911, to the 30th June, 1912; and on the 1st July, 1912, he was appointed to the Instructional Staff of the 3rd Military District - an appointment which, unfortunately, ill-health precluded him from taking up.

In 1899 the late Major Dove went to South Africa as a lieutenant in the only infantry contingent despatched from New South Wales. The contingent was mounted in South Africa, and became “E" squadron of the lot New South Wales Mounted Rifles. lie took part in operations in Cape Colony, south of the Orange River, including the action at Colesberg in February, 1900; operations in the Orange River Colony, February to May, 1900, including actions at Houtnek, Vet River, 5th and 6th May, and Zand River; and operations in the Transvaal in May and June, 1900, including actions near Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Diamond 17i11, 11th and 12th June. On the 26th February, 1900, he was wounded at Mader's Farm.

For his services he was mentioned in despatches (London Gazette, 16th April, 1901), and earned the coveted distinction of the Distinguished Service Order. The following extracts from reports submitted by Captain (now Lieutenant-Colonel) J. G. Legge and Captain (now Colonel) W. Holmes, D.S.O., throw an illuminating light on Major Dove's gallantry and coolness in action:- "After a reinforcement of guns, on the 22nd February, our force advanced west, and another force from the camp attacked the Boers on the south, and gave them a heavy shell fire. Lieutenant Dove did an excellent piece of scouting on the right with his division, and drove off the Boer patrols, thus rendering the advance of the guns possible." (Report of Captain Legge, February, 1900). “28th April. In camp, Israel's Poort. - Detailed Lieutenant Dove and 25 men to scout in the vicinity of Thoba Mountain and Houtnek. Lieutenant Dove was instructed to locate the position of the Boer laager. In this duty he was eminently successful, and received the commendation of General Ian Hamilton and Colonel De Lisle. As a result of this reconnaissance the battle of Houtnek was fought two days later. 30th April. Marched at daylight and came into collision with the enemy, who were strongly posted at Thoba Mountain and Houtnek. Lieutenant Dove and 25 men were detached from my command for scouting work." (Report of Captain Holmes, April, 1900).

In 1902 he again went to South Africa as captain and adjutant of the 3rd Battalion Australian Commonwealth Horse, a fine regiment commanded by Colonel R. Wallace, which, however, arrived in South Africa only a month before the peace of Vereeniging.

The military forces of the Commonwealth have, in the death of Major Dove, suffered a great loss, but they are richer for the services he has rendered them, and richer for the footprints he has left on the sands of time.

Margot Z. Simington, 'Dove, Frederick Allan (1867 - 1913)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 8, Melbourne University Press, 1981, pp 328-329.

DOVE, FREDERICK ALLAN (1867-1913), soldier and teacher, was born on 21 December 1867 in Sydney, son of Daniel Dove, contractor, and Annie Bell. He became a pupil-teacher at Newtown Public School in 1883 and after graduating from Fort Street Training School in 1888 taught for the next eleven years at several Sydney primary schools, including Fort Street, Crown Street and Camperdown. His soldiering began in 1897 when he was commissioned second lieutenant in the 5th Infantry Regiment (Volunteers); he was promoted lieutenant in 1898 and captain in 1899.

After the South African War broke out Dove joined the New South Wales Infantry, the only infantry contingent recruited in the colony, as a lieutenant. His company joined the 1st Australian Regiment at Cape Town in December 1899 and for two months served with the Kimberley Relief Force. In February 1900 the company was converted to 'E' Squadron, New South Wales Mounted Rifles, and, commanded by Captain J. G. Legge, accompanied Major General R. A. P. Clement's column via Colesberg to Norval's Pont, Orange River, and to Bloemfontein. Legge reported that on 22 February 'Lieutenant Dove did an excellent piece of scouting … with his division, and drove off the Boer patrols, thus rendering the advance of the guns possible'. Four days later Dove was slightly wounded at Maeder's Farm. Under Captain W. Holmes his unit then joined General (Sir) Ian Hamilton's column for operations at Pretoria and Diamond Hill.

In April, during the advance on Houtnek, Dove's successful reconnaissance of enemy positions and his command of a detachment which held an advanced post for a whole day earned Hamilton's praise. When Holmes was wounded at Diamond Hill on 12 June Dove was promoted captain and led 'E' Squadron in operations against De Wet and De La Rey in the Transvaal and northern Orange River Colony. For meritorious service in South Africa he was mentioned in dispatches and awarded the Distinguished Service Order. Lieutenant-Colonel De Lisle commented: 'On numerous occasions he has volunteered for dangerous undertakings at night. He is a wonderful scout, and on no single occasion has he failed to accomplish his objective, nor has he lost a man accompanying him'.

Dove returned with his unit to Sydney in January 1901. He resumed teaching at Barmedman, New South Wales, but enlisted again next year as captain and adjutant of the 3rd Battalion, Australian Commonwealth Horse. The battalion embarked on 2 April. Peace was only two months off, however, so by August, after brief service as a staff officer of the Australian Brigade at Newcastle, Natal, Dove was back in Sydney. After serving as a brevet major in the New South Wales Scottish Rifles he was made a captain on the reserve of officers in 1904. That year, on 27 December, at the Presbyterian church, Hill End, he married Adelaide Bryant; the marriage was dissolved on 21 April 1910 with Dove as petitioner and on 11 May he married Margaret Morrison Myles at the Presbyterian manse, Waverley.

In May 1906 Dove had joined the Permanent Forces as a captain on the Administrative and Instructional Staff; he became director of equipment at Army Headquarters, Melbourne, in August 1911 and in October was promoted major. Next January he was appointed president of the examination board for first appointment and transfer of Administrative and Instructional Staff, but illness prevented him from performing his duties after April 1912. Much respected, he died in Sydney Hospital on 9 December 1913 of paraplegia from hydatids of the spine. He was buried with Anglican rites in Waverley cemetery and was survived by his wife, a seven-year-old son from his first marriage and a two-year-old daughter.

Select Bibliography

Australian Defence Department, Official Records of the Australian Military Contingents to the War in South Africa, P. L. Murray ed (Melb, 1911); R. L. Wallace, The Australians at the Boer War (Canb, 1976); London Gazette, 16, 19 Apr 1901; Town and Country Journal, 10, 17 Dec 1913; register of careers (history section, Education Dept, Sydney).

Further Reading:

Brigade Scouts

The Light Horse

Australian Light Horse Militia

Militia 1899 - 1920

Battles where Australians fought, 1899-1920

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Saturday, 26 December 2009 10:53 AM EAST

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Scouting or Protective and Tactical Reconnaissance, Part 1

Frederick Allan Dove

3rd Light Horse Brigade Scouts in the hills at Tripoli, December 1918

In 1910, Major Frederick Allan Dove, DSO, wrote a book on a subject he was very familiar with through practical experience called Scouting or Protective and Tactical Reconnaissance. This book set the intellectual framework for the formation of the Brigade Scouts during the Sinai and Palestine Campaigns as part of the Great War.

Dove, FA, Scouting or Protective and Tactical Reconnaissance, 1910.

PREFACE.

The Field Service Regulations (Part I. Operations) lay down the principles on which to train our troops in the subject of Reconnaissance. But there is no detail or explanation of the methods to be employed. Having made a special study of this branch of the military art, I venture to put forward in the following pages some conclusions I have formed as to methods of training, which may serve as a guide to instructors and officers.

Reconnaissance is without doubt one of the most important services in war. Its study and practice should be taken up in Australia seriously and without delay. It should not be concluded that it is entirely the duty of Mounted Troops. There is much broken and bush-covered country in the vicinity of our chief cities and coastal towns where only good Infantry could scout effectually.

Although every squadron of Light Horse and every company of Infantry should be capable of carrying out Protective Reconnaissance, there is very urgent necessity for the training of (selected) Squadron and Company Scouts.

But more than that is required. A Corps of Scouts should be organised, receive higher training, and be at the disposal of each O.C. Field Force for Intelligence purposes.

The value of good Scouts is never truly appreciated until the lack of them has led to disaster. They are '(specialists," and, as such, their organisation and training should not be left till the outbreak of war.

I am indebted for the Introduction to a distinguished soldier, Colonel H. De B. De Lisle, C.B., D.S.O., P.S.C., now holding a high Staff appointment at Aldershot, after having completed a very successful term of command with the First Royal Dragoons in India.

THE AUTHOR.

 

Introduction

From the earliest times, Military History clearly demonstrates that the success of great leaders has depended on their ability to pierce the fog of war. In other words, to obtain reliable information regarding the plans, position, and strength of the hostile forces, is more important to a General than numerical strength. Such information may be obtained in various ways, by a well-organised system of local intelligence agents, usually called Spies, by a reconnaissance by a large force or by selected Scouts. In recent times, any small group of men detached from a force consider themselves entitled to be called Scouts, and the term has been even used as a title for a hastily-raised untrained irregular unit of mounted men. Originally a Scout was a man with special training, added to a natural aptitude, keen sight and quick hearing. The word itself proves that such work was usually performed at night, for our word Scout comes from the French word ecouter, formerly written escouter, to listen.

Many instances are recorded in history of important results due to the work of individual Scouts, and even in our own time instances occur to us which must demonstrate the importance of this branch of Military training. The training of Scouts is no easy matter, and though every man should receive instruction in detached duties, only a proportion have the natural aptitude to become a trained Scout in its proper sense of the word.

Scouting has two objects, namely-protection and information.. The former duty consists in guarding a force when halted or on the march from surprise, denying hostile spies or Scouts any approach. This is the elementary work of a Scout, and these duties should be learnt by every mounted man, ass well as by selected men of other branches of the Army.

Scouting for information, is far more difficult to learn as well as to teach, and calls for great personal bravery, a quick, active brain, physical endurance, ability to find the way by night as well as by day, the aptitude to form a correct estimate, and to report in clear language without exaggeration. To find so many qualifications in one man constitutes the scarcity of efficient Scouts, but there can be no doubt that with proper training a fair proportion of Scouts will be found in every unit. In Australia there is less difficulty in obtaining good material than at Home. There, the free country life tends towards observation, and the distances between stations to endurance ; moreover, the sport which is attainable by all, instead of being closed to a few, trains the boyhood of that great country to be adept in those very qualifications which are essentials to the good Scout. The pursuit of game demands the same qualities of self-denial, powers of vision, hearing, and concealment as searching for an enemy, and those who have as boys been keen sportsmen have already laid the solid foundation, for becoming good Scouts. Many who have had no such opportunities can nevertheless acquire this art by studying the methods of other famous Scouts, or, better still, by receiving personal instruction from a Scout himself. It is therefore a great pleasure to recommend this work to all Military readers and students, because the author not only had exceptional opportunities of putting his theories in practice on active service, but proved himself a Scout of a very high order, who not only distinguished himself in reconnaissance work, but trained his subordinates to be excellent individual Scouts.

In future campaigns the importance of reliable information will be even more important than in the past, and yet more difficult to obtain. The training in this branch of Military education will thus serve to increase enormously the value of the individual and to facilitate the success of the Forces of the Empire.

H. DE B. DE LISLE,

Lieutenant-Colonel,

The Royal Dragoons.

Lucknow.

Previous: Brigade Scouts

Next: Part 2, Protective Scouting 

Further Reading:

Obituary, Frederick Allan Dove

Brigade Scouts

The Light Horse

Australian Light Horse Militia

Militia 1899 - 1920

Battles where Australians fought, 1899-1920

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Saturday, 26 December 2009 3:27 PM EAST

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Scouting or Protective and Tactical Reconnaissance, Part 2

Frederick Allan Dove

3rd Light Horse Brigade Scouts in the hills at Tripoli, December 1918

In 1910, Major Frederick Allan Dove, DSO, wrote a book on a subject he was very familiar with through practical experience called Scouting or Protective and Tactical Reconnaissance. This book set the intellectual framework for the formation of the Brigade Scouts during the Sinai and Palestine Campaigns as part of the Great War.

Dove, FA, Scouting or Protective and Tactical Reconnaissance, 1910.

Method Of Study.

SCOUTING should be studied under two heads:

I. - Protective Scouting.

II. - Scouting for Information by detached Patrols.

In the text-book I. is called Protective, and II. Tactical Reconnaissance.

I will deal first with

I. - Protective Scouting.

Protective Scouting is of a precautionary nature. Upon its proper performance depends the protection of our Columns from annoyance, surprise, and ambush.

Troops within striking distance of the- enemy must throw out Advanced, Flank and Rear Guards. Each of these again pushes out smaller groups, or even individuals, to feel for the enemy. Thus the column is surrounded by a human "Screen," behind which it may march, rest, or manoeuvre, securely hidden from the prying eyes of the foe. The work of this “Screen" will be described in its relation to

(A.) The Advanced Guard.

(B.) The Flank Guard.

(C.) The Rear Guard.

(A.) The Advanced Guard Screen Of Scouts.

The distribution of the Advanced Guard into Mainguard and Vanguard is prescribed in F.S. Regs., Section 66, 3, 4. Nothing is said as to the formation of the Vanguard.

It would appear, however, that the essential subdivision should' be into a line of Observation and a line of Resistance; that is to say, into

(a) A Screen of Scouts.

(b) Supporting Troops.

When the Vanguard consists of both mounted troops and infantry, the former would naturally form the Screen of Scouts and the latter the Supports, which would still provide for their own protection by a few Scouts, who would assist to keep up connection with the cavalry patrols in their front.

1. Formation of the Screen.

It is not at all necessary that the Screen should be a complete unit, such as a troop* or squadron*. [Infantry please read "section" or "company'."] But it is essential that it should be organised into patrols, that each patrol has a leader, and that unity of action is maintained by reference to a directing patrol.

Mounted troops work best in patrols of four men, infantry in either files (two men) or fours. A line of single Scouts is weak in all those points which go to make up good screening work, viz., keeping touch, observation and communication.

There must be a leader in each patrol. By him the other Scouts are controlled, disposed, and moved as his intelligence and training suggests.

There must be a Directing Patrol. With this patrol will march an officer or N.C.O. specially detailed to maintain the correct direction. From the directing patrol all other parts of the Screen maintain touch and direction; it also regulates the average pace of the Screen in conformity with the movements of the Mainguard.

2. - What every man in the Screen must be told.

Before the Vanguard moves off or extends to cover the front, every man in it should be told

(a) The Direction of the Advance.

This should be done in reference to landmarks if possible; the compass direction given; and attention drawn to the position of the sun, and the direction of the wind, if steady. Landmarks should be pointed out. Important topographical features known to the officer and not immediately visible to the men should be mentioned.

(b) The Frontage to be Searched.

In this matter, again, landmarks are the best guide, if available. Scouts to be efficient must have a good eye for the tactical importance of localities. All their movements should be preceded by a brief study of the features of the Country to be traversed. Frontage should never be defined in hundreds of yards, nor should the intervals between patrols or mere be fixed by any other consideration than the nature of, the country.

The Scouts must be taught that the Vanguard will always cover as wide a frontage as can be effectively searched by the numbers of men in the Screen.

Put another way, this means that the patrols will keep as far away from one another as they can, without losing touch, and without neglecting the observation of ground where even small bodies of the enemy might lie in ambush.

(c) The Directing Patrol.

The Directing Patrol should be named - e.g., "Corporal Smith's patrol will direct." The other leaders will then note their own relative position in the line. This is necessary in order to secure the first essential of Screening work,

Keeping Touch.

This term requires some explanation. The Vanguard is “in touch “with the Mainguard when it can and does maintain ready communication therewith, and is in position to fulfil its duty of reconnaissance. Should the Vanguard get so far in advance that communication is difficult, or should it diverge from its proper direction, and thus uncover the Mainguard, it may be said to have “lost touch." Similarly, a number of patrols are in touch when intercommunication is easy, there is no unsearched ground between them and they do not overlap. In the Scouting Screen touch is kept from the directing patrol. In each patrol the duties can be so allotted as to secure this. For instance, here are three patrols:

Number (3) patrol is directing; in each case he is the leader, b right flanker, c left flanker, and d rear man.

Number (2) patrol keeps touch with number (3) and number (1) patrol keeps touch with number (2). In patrols (2) and (1), the man c has the duty of looking to the touch and letting his leader know how the patrol on his left is moving, or whether it has halted, and to answer and pass on signals or messages. Should number (1) patrol get so far out as to lose touch, it is not the duty of number (2) to follow it but the leader of (2) should at once inform the commander of the Screen. He may then detach one or two of his men to take the" place of number (1) patrol and at the same time to look out for it, and if found bring it back by signal. The Commander of the Screen on his part may send out a fresh patrol if men are at hand, and if not, inform his next senior of what has happened. The fresh patrol would move in between numbers (3) and (2), and the latter would then incline out to take up the duty of the Missing number (1).

(d) To Whom and Where to Report.

Rapid passing of information to the O.C. Mainguard is of vital importance. It must be decided on the spot, having due regard to the nature of the country, whether urgent reports can be most quickly transmitted along the line of patrols to the Centre, thence down to the Support, &e., or whether patrols may save time by communicating direct to the Support. In any case the patrol will pass on to neighbouring patrols and to the commander of the Screen any information they obtain.

3. - Extending the Screen.

When the patrols to form the Screen have been told off and the necessary instructions issued, the screen may be extended:-

(1) To its full frontage from the halt, and under cover, if available; or

(2) Gradually as it advances, the patrols inclining outwards; or

(3) It may be sufficient at first to have a directing patrol and one or two flanking patrols, the remainder being held back. Later one or more patrols may be sent to either flank, the original flankers being pushed further out.

4. - Movements of the Screen.

The movements of the screen are regulated from and by the directing patrol. But everything favouring of rigidity or drill must be suppressed. The patrol leaders must have considerable latitude and be encouraged to cultivate an eye for country. The duty of all is to co-operate so as to ensure the safe and uninterrupted march of the Mainguard. The directing patrol of course is usually limited in its choice of a line of advance, because its primary function is to maintain the correct direction. The other patrols should under stand that it is their business to protect and assist the directing patrol.. But each leader chooses his own methods of so doing. The movements of a patrol should consist of a series of progressions from one point of observation to another. The intermediate advances should be quick and by the most concealed route. If thought necessary - and it may often he so-one or two men should be left at the last point until the next one is secured.

The average pace of the movement of the Screen is set from the Main Body. This must be constantly borne in mind. But, if the commander of the Screen seas that his patrols have- got into difficult country and that they cannot do their work at the pace required, he will inform his next superior, but make every endeavour to keep going until he receives further orders.

5. - The Directing Patrol.

The Directing Patrol is accompanied by an officer or N.C.O. who is charged with the duty of maintaining the correct direction. Touch is kept between this patrol and the supports by means of Connecting Files (two men). These men are in a position to pass orders up from the Mainguard or reports down from the Screen of Scouts. Their duty is very important, requiring constant vigilance. In each file, one man must particularly watch to the front and the other to the rear.

When the Screen covers a wide front, additional connecting files may be placed in rear of the right Centre and of the left Centre.

6. - Observation.

As before remarked, patrol leaders are particularly charged with the duty of Observation. But they have much to do besides. It is a good plan, therefore, to have one or two special officers or N.C.O.'s told off as "Observers." Theirs is a roving commission. They will proceed to that part of the frontage, being covered which affords the best points for observation. There they remain as long as they think fit, searching the landscape with their eyes, and using the field-glasses to examine doubtful localities or objects. When satisfied they move on to the next good outlook. They must be men of keen sight and with a sound appreciation of the tactical importance of the ground presented to their view. They will be of greatest value if they are cool and alert when the Scouts eventually draw fire vide Contact with the Enemy.

Previous: Part 1, Preface & Introduction

Next: Part 3, Communication 

Further Reading:

Obituary, Frederick Allan Dove

Brigade Scouts

The Light Horse

Australian Light Horse Militia

Militia 1899 - 1920

Battles where Australians fought, 1899-1920

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Saturday, 26 December 2009 3:28 PM EAST

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Scouting or Protective and Tactical Reconnaissance, Part 3

Frederick Allan Dove

3rd Light Horse Brigade Scouts in the hills at Tripoli, December 1918

In 1910, Major Frederick Allan Dove, DSO, wrote a book on a subject he was very familiar with through practical experience called Scouting or Protective and Tactical Reconnaissance. This book set the intellectual framework for the formation of the Brigade Scouts during the Sinai and Palestine Campaigns as part of the Great War.

Dove, FA, Scouting or Protective and Tactical Reconnaissance, 1910.

7. Communication.

No matter how well the Screen keeps touch and observes it is yet failing in its duty unless the results of observation are correctly and quickly conveyed to the O.C. Advanced Guard.

This subject may be divided into –

(a) What to Communicate.

(b) How to Communicate.

(a) What To Communicate.

The O.C. Advanced Guard wants information about the enemy or about the country. The former may be Negative, viz., that the enemy is not in a certain locality. Or it may be Positive-that the enemy has been discovered.

He then wants to know

How many of the enemy are there? Where are they?

What are they?

What are they doing?

The mere reporting "Enemy in sight in (small or large) numbers" is almost valueless. A report should run something like this:

"Left flank patrol reports being fired on by (estimated) six enemy from scrubby hill one mile beyond our left flank. Patrol has taken cover. I have sent Lieut. X. with 8 men to reinforce left flank and report later."

Capt.,

O.C. Vanguard.

Further report later:

"Lieut. X. reports-'On my party joining our left flank patrol enemy's fire ceased. A few moments after I saw 4 men galloping away from scrubby hill one mile west in a northerly direction. Have reinforced left flank patrol with 4 men, as country in front looks difficult, and am returning with others."

J. K.,

Capt.,

O.C. Vanguard.

Scouts should always report the bare farts of what they see, and not report inferences. Sound conclusions can seldom be formed from one report only. It is the business of the officer who gets many reports to collate them and form conclusions thereon.

The Scout is quite at liberty to form his own conclusions on what he sees, as a guide to his subsequent movements. I will give an instance.

Soon after sunrise one morning a patrol surprised and captured a single Scout of the enemy at the gate of a farmhouse. There were numerous horse tracks and boot marks about the gate. The farmhouse was on the slope of a low hill, and the tracks led up this hill. The leader sent back exact report of what he saw. In his own mind he concluded that a patrol or party of the enemy had assembled at the farmhouse and had very shortly before ridden off to join their commando. One man had for some reason or other been late, and was caught.

The patrol leader, therefore, ascended the hill and looked over it with much caution, ;and was rewarded by the discovery of a party of about 150 men, some already mounted and some saddling up, round a house about 600 yards away.

By lying in concealment the patrol leader and his men remained undiscovered until they were joined by a half squadron from the Support, which at once opened a lire that demoralised and routed the enemy with loss. The officer who received the first report had also concluded that there was a large party of the enemy near at hand, and had hurried up a reinforcement. It is possible that he had received other reports that confirmed him in his conclusions.

It is very important for the O.C. Advanced Guard to know whether he is opposed by cavalry, infantry or artillery, or more than one arm. Scouts should, therefore, look out for any signs which will enable them to tell definitely to what arm the enemy as seen belongs.

(b) HOW TO COMMUNICATE.

Messages and reports can be sent, verbally or written, by messenger or by signalling. Trained signallers with flags, &c., can seldom be of use u among the scouts because of the difficulty of concealing them while at work. But they should certainly be with the Supports and Mainguard.

A portable disc arrangement for doing the Morse code is now used in India, and should prove very valuable in reconnaissance, because the operator can so easily conceal himself. It is all advantage to have Scouts who can do semaphore with their arms, as there are many occasions when they will be thus able to pass on information. However, it will frequently happen that the only possible means of communication along the line of patrols is by a verbal or written message carried by a man. Therefore, this method should be practised. A verbal message is almost certain to be garbled in transmission by untrained men; but with plenty of practice it becomes reliable, because the sender learns to give it in a few carefully chosen words, and the intermediate receivers pass it on verbatim. Of course, when time permits, always write the messages.

The nature of the ground and the urgency of the case must decide the patrol leader whether to send his report along the line to the officer with the directing patrol, or to try and reach the O.C. Vanguard direct. The messengers should take precautions to conceal themselves while going and returning. Speed may be so important, however, that every other consideration must be neglected.

The signals laid down in our drill books (L.H. Manual, “Silent Drill," Infantry. Training., Sec. 49) are of use only among the Scouts themselves, and should be so used. Scouts accustomed to work together can also devise others as they find them necessary. In patrolling the regulation whistle should seldom or never be heard, and shouting of orders should i.e. prohibited.

Previous: Part 2, Protective Scouting 

Next: Part 4, Patrol Formations 

Further Reading:

Obituary, Frederick Allan Dove

Brigade Scouts

The Light Horse

Australian Light Horse Militia

Militia 1899 - 1920

Battles where Australians fought, 1899-1920

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Saturday, 26 December 2009 3:29 PM EAST

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Scouting or Protective and Tactical Reconnaissance, Part 4

Frederick Allan Dove

3rd Light Horse Brigade Scouts in the hills at Tripoli, December 1918

In 1910, Major Frederick Allan Dove, DSO, wrote a book on a subject he was very familiar with through practical experience called Scouting or Protective and Tactical Reconnaissance. This book set the intellectual framework for the formation of the Brigade Scouts during the Sinai and Palestine Campaigns as part of the Great War.

Dove, FA, Scouting or Protective and Tactical Reconnaissance, 1910.

8. - The Screen Halted.

Halts are only to be ordered by the O/C. Main Body. The command will reach the Scouts through the O.C. Vanguard.

The Screen should become at once a

LINE OF OBSERVATION POSTS.

Each patrol leader selects a suitable spot, and there establishes a Cossack Post or Group with a Sentry. One or more of the remaining men may be required to watch for signals from the neighbouring groups; if not, they should rest under cover.

9. - The Supports.

The supporting troops must be kept in a formation permitting of rapid movement to any threatened point. A line of small columns is the best, because it is not very vulnerable to a sudden outburst of fire, and also permits of the utilisation of folds of the ground, &c., for purposes of concealment during the advance. When a halt is ordered the O.C. Vanguard will decide whether to close the Supports up on to the Scouts or to halt elsewhere, but in any ease he must take up a

LINE OF RESISTANCE.

The flanks should attend to the protection of their own flanks by one or two small patrols.    One portion of the Supports must be named t direct. Connection maintained with the Mainguard by Connecting Files (two men each). The O.C. Vanguard would probably be with the directing portion of the Supports.

10. - The Mainguard.

The Mainguard is the fighting portion of the Advanced Guard. The Screen and Supports are there for its protection, and so that it can be kept well in hand until a true appreciation of the situation can be made. The O.C. Advanced Guard probably moves at the head of the Mainguard. Connection with the head of the Main Body is kept up by signallers or otherwise.

The Mainguard should throw out flank patrols.

11. - Patrol Formations.

Formations of patrols should be guided strictly by certain principles, and not by any fixed rules. The formation should provide for

Observation,

Keeping Touch,

Communication,

Concealment,

and for the Safety of at least some of the Scouts.

It may be taken for granted that an enemy awaiting our advance will allow our Scouts to approach as close as possible to his position, in order that their capture or disablement may be ensured, and that the formed bodies in rear may be at once brought under effective fire. Every thing which tends to rigidity in the line of patrols or which restrains initiative of patrol leaders gives the enemy a distinct advantage. Therefore, normal formations, and fixed intervals and distances, must not be insisted upon.

But the possible formations in which a patrol of four men may be arranged are not many, and should be studied, practised, and adapted to the occasion as it arises.

The leader has one man near him and two flankers thrown out.

(2) T-shape thus:

The leader has dropped one man back, but still has his flankers on either hand.

(3) V-shape thus:

The leader has one man with him and the flankers well advanced.

(4) Y-shape, thus:

Like the V, but one man dropped back.

(5) Cross shape, thus:

This formation the leader has gone ahead, with his flankers echeloned to the rear, and one man still further back.

(6) File, or Indian File:

I recommend (but merely as a guide) the use of the above formations under the following circumstances:

(1) Line: When a wide frontage has to be covered and the country in front can be clearly seen for some distance ; also as a preparatory formation when first extending.

(2) T and (3) V, temporary formations from line, owing to local peculiarities of ground. (2) T, places one man in reserve, as it were; (3) V, allows the leader to remain under cover observing while his flankers push ahead.

(4) Y, follows from B, or from T; it indicates suspicion of danger in from - two feelers are out, the leader is in a position of observations, anal one man is kept back out of immediate danger.

(5) Cross: This implies more danger. The leader is keeping all his men back, while he pushes on by himself to reconnoitre.

(6) File, or Indian File: For traversing hollows, gullies, etc., on a narrow front. Also to be used in thick bush or at night.

I do not wish to say anything about intervals, or distances, as these cannot be prescribed. The leader, however, should be always able to bring his men or a man up to him by a low whistle, if they are out of view, and the whole patrol must be capable of quick concentration if required. They must never concentrate in a spot exposed to view or fire from any ground which may be in the enemy's possession; cross open ground either singly or in an extended line; approach dangerous localities with one or more men kept well back.

If possible, the flankers should work round small positions affording cover before anyone approaches the front. The position of the leader should be that which gives him the best chance of doing his duty of observation.

Previous: Part 3, Communication 

Next: Part 5, Co-operation of Patrols 

Further Reading:

Obituary, Frederick Allan Dove

Brigade Scouts

The Light Horse

Australian Light Horse Militia

Militia 1899 - 1920

Battles where Australians fought, 1899-1920

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Saturday, 26 December 2009 3:30 PM EAST

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