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Monday, 21 September 2009
German participation in the Middle East , Contents Topic: Gm - German Items
German participation in the Middle East
Contents
Items
Units
German Units 605th Machine Gun Company (MGC)
The War Diary of the 605th Machine Gun Company from departure at Berlin on 27 March 1916 to the unit’s capture during the Battle of Romani, 5 August 1916.
Bir el Abd, Sinai, 9 August 1916, Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein Account Topic: Gm - German Items
Bir el Abd
Sinai, 9 August 1916
Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein Account
General Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein
[From: Kress, Mit den Tèurken zum Suezkanal, 1938, Plate facing p. 48.]
The German General charged with the defence of Beersheba was General Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, commonly called Kress. He wrote his book Mit den Tèurken zum Suezkanal [With the Turks to the Suez Canal] in 1938.
Kressenstein, Friedrich Freiherr Kress von, Mit den Tèurken zum Suezkanal, 1938.
The next day [8 August] our centre and right wing were engaged in a short but very violent artillery duel, wherein again the Austro-Hungarian Batteries excelled with their accurate firing performance. On the left wing, the situation for Major Dohlmann was at times very critical. The rapid moving Smith’s Column bypassed Dohlmann so that by the afternoon, he was facing a front from the east. I sent him the order to return to Hod um Vayhelhilm when darkness fell. To assist Dohlmann in his task, I sent him the battalion commanded by Major Marr. The rest of the 1st Expeditionary Force took over the night in the line of Bir el Abd – Hod um Vayhelhilm. On the morning of 9 August five brigades of the enemy on horseback attacked us at Bir el Abd. At 1 p.m. the skirmish proved costly and ended with the withdrawal of the British. The success of the day was in most part thanks Refit Bey, who with his Infantry made a few gutsy and successful counter-attacks. In addition there was excellent shooting from our artillery.
On the evening of the battle, our 15 cm battery had only about 75 rounds, the 10 cm battery over 95, the Austro-Hungarian batteries about 11 or 22 and the Turkish mountain batteries had a total of over 200 rounds. The Army Command promised ammunition from the Flack trains to resupply the Austrians and the other batteries, but they arrived without any ammunition. Of this seems to have been Djemal appeared to be out of touch with the reality on the front, otherwise he would probably not sent me a telegram expressing his dissatisfaction with that I had withdrawn to Bir el Abd.
Fortunately, both the British and our forces had reached the end of their endurance. They probably realized that I had my troops still firmly in hand and that they would not be able to cut us off from our line of retreat, or take our heavy artillery. One of the British generals said the failure of the British offensive happened because the Turks could march as fast as his men would ride. In fact, the superiority of the British mounted troops and their mobility was offset by the long time they needed to water their many animals.
On our extreme left wing, over the next few days occurred few minor skirmishes with the enterprising and well-run Smith’s Column
Bir el Abd, Sinai, 9 August 1916, Liman von Sanders Account Topic: Gm - German Items
Romani and Bir el Abd
Sinai, 4 - 9 August 1916
Liman von Sanders Account
The German General charged with the overall command of Ottoman forces was Liman von Sanders who wrote an account of his service in a book called Five years in Turkey, which was published in 1927.
Liman von Sanders, Five years in Turkey, 1927.
The instructions of the expeditionary corps (they came by way of Constantinople, but I do not know who originated them) required an advance so near to the canal that the long range guns could stop the passage of ships.
The instructions I have never understood. The question arises at once how long this interruption by artillery was to last. If it was to be a prolonged one, which alone was of Substantial value, it entirely depended on whether the British would tolerate it, or whether the Turko-German troops could enforce it. The former as well as the latter had to be answered in the negative, without question.
The instructions were neither fish nor fowl; they reminded one of washing the hands without wetting the fingers.
There were other circumstances which prevented the execution of the Operation.
Colonel Freiherr von Kress had no illusions about the Situation, On July 4th, ten days before the advance, he reported:
During the past months the British with all immense expenditure of men, material and money, have erected a complete system of defence to the east of the canal with numerous excellent communications of every kind, and are awaiting us there with a force many times superior to our small expeditionary corps.
Any one who has had the responsibility in a difficult situation knows that in war it is sometimes necessary to carry out hopeless undertakings. The leader is helped over the difficulty by the bitter "must" and by the tiny spark of hope that some miracle will intervene in his favour.
The advance was made in three columns in several echelons to minimize the difficulties of water supply, the obtainable quantity at each place being limited. The laborious march led through undulating dunes in the sand in which the foot sank to the ankle. The marches were restricted to the night on account of the heat, and to escape observation of enemy aviators.
After a march of seven days, the entrenched camp of Romani, forty kilometres cast of the canal, was attacked an the 4th of August. The main attack was to be made against the least fortified west front of the camp.
The Turko-German attack failed completely, because the force used was too small, because its approach was known to the British, and because the expeditionary corps was completely exhausted when it reached the enemy. This time the British had not been playing football.
Instead of turning the enemy's flank, the flank of the expeditionary corps was turned by the skilfully led British cavalry, and by the reinforcements arriving from Kantara by rail. In the end the corps succeeded in breaking away from the enemy, who at first pursued hotly. In the attack and in the retreat to El Arish the corps lost about one-third of its strength.
This was the second and last Turkish enterprise of any consequence against the canal and against Egypt.
The roles were now exchanged. Heretofore the Turks had been on the offensive and the British on the defensive; now began the strategic offensive of the British in the sense of Lord Cromer's memorandum, heretofore referred to. The execution of the British plan was purposeful, and was carried out without haste and with the help of great experience in colonial wars. The British also gained valuable help by winning the Arabs to their side.
In the summer of 1916 the insurrectionary movements in Palestine and Syria supported by the Entente, gained in extent, and the Emir of Mecca had allied himself with the British and proclaimed his independence. It furnished a firm support for the systematically directed efforts of the Arabs to gain their independence.
The Battle of Beersheba, Palestine, 31 October 1917, Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein Account Topic: Gm - German Items
The Battle of Beersheba
Palestine, 31 October 1917
Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein Account
General Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein
[From: Kress, Mit den Tèurken zum Suezkanal, 1938, Plate facing p. 48.]
The German General charged with the defence of Beersheba was General Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, commonly called Kress. He wrote his book Mit den Tèurken zum Suezkanal [With the Turks to the Suez Canal] as a memoir.
The only edition of Kress’s book to emerge was published in 1938 and released in Germany. While Kress may have commanded the troops that put down Adloph Hitler’s infamous Beer Hall Putsch in which some 16 Nazi rebels were killed, Hitler’s propaganda machine saw the ironical value of this work to encourage the German people with stories of sacrifice and victory against heavy odds. It was in this context that the book was published in the standard Nazi style Gothic script which makes it difficult reading for a modern audience.
Kressenstein, Friedrich Freiherr Kress von, Mit den Tèurken zum Suezkanal, 1938, pp. 276 - 279:
[276] When dawn broke on 31 October 1917, some 30 English light and heavy batteries opened fire on the trenches between Wadi el Saba to the Beersheba - Khalasa road held by the Turkish 27th Division. Under the cover of this fire, the English 60th and 74th Divisions [277] developed their attack. Between the front line and the Wadi el Saba were weaker enemy forces near the Turkish positions. The “Smith Detachment” - an infantry brigade strengthened by the Imperial Camel Brigade – was ordered only to threaten the Turkish positions rather than attack. At Bir Esani, the English 53rd Infantry Division was available to secure and attack the forces at Beersheba if necessary but with the objective of advancing northwards to Tel esh Sheria. On the southern Beersheba front only the weaker enemy cavalry appeared.
Messages from the friendly Bedouin given to Ismed, which was confirmed by our pilots in the morning, stated that during the night two divisions of cavalry had marched through Iswaiwin and Khashim Zanna. Ismed sent the Cavalry Division to the heights northeast of Beersheba with orders to prevent an encirclement of Beersheba by the enemy Light Horsemen. One of those many conical hills in this region, Tel el Saba, controlled the surrounding area but was inadequately held so Ismed had it occupied by a battalion consisting of 300 rifles and 6 heavy machine guns. With two battalions of the remaining reserves, he moved quickly to close the broad, five kilometre gap between the left wing of his prepared position at Tel el Saba and Ras Ghannam. Only much later in the battle was Ismed able to create a new reserve by withdrawing some companies out of the quiet section between railway and Wadi Saba. We worked on the assumption that the English would not proceed against the Beersheba southern and eastern fronts but their daring did not allow us to prepare our defence.
Between 8 and 9 o'clock the English stormed the Turkish artillery observation outpost on the southwest of the perimeter. The small detachment surrendered after putting up a courageous resistance.
Displaying cool ability, the Turkish batteries laid fire over the English infantry as they worked themselves to a position of about 400-600 meters in front of the 27th Division trenches. [278] Some of the English batteries moved closer to the Turkish forward positions and destroyed the thine line of wire with pulverising fire. At 12.15 o'clock the English began the storming of the Turkish trenches which lead to heavy fighting and considerable losses. While they forced remnants of the Turkish 27th Division to retreat back to the Wadi el Saba, they remained in the Turkish trenches and established their own defensive perimeter. In view of the water supply problem, General Allenby wanted Beersheba to be taken and occupied only by the Dessert Mounted Corps - a particularly instructive case where water exerts a clear influence over planning.
Between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning by the eastern front of Beersheba enemy cavalry approached from direction Wadi el Imleih to besiege Tel el Saba, and short time later an English cavalry regiment was in the area of Khirbet um Butein and reached the Beersheba Hebron road. English patrols began feeling out the defences of the Turkish Cavalry Division; but no actual fighting took place at this part of the battlefield.
On the other hand, during the morning, with some assistance, the New Zealand brigade commenced a frontal assault against Tell it Saba. The open area provided no cover which allowed the Turkish machine gun fire to bring the attack to a stand still. Only after the English employed fresh forces and developed a comprehensive attack against both the north and south flanks of Tel el Saba, they succeeded in taking by storm the Turkish position at 3 pm. The under strength Turkish battalion entrusted with its defence doggedly held out with great courage and in so doing fulfilled its obligation. They held up two English cavalry divisions for six hours and had prevented them from expanding their outflanking manoeuvres around the Beersheba-Hebron road. Our pilots caused further losses to the English cavalry by their bombing of the horsemen.
The two Turkish battalions employed between Ras Ghannam and Tell el Saba were ordered to withdraw to positions behind Wadi it Saba [279] in the direction of Beersheba, when they were attacked of English cavalry. The English riders broke through the thin Turkish lines and carried their attack onto Beersheba. With no warning Ismed Bey and his staff were taken unawares. General Chetwode had given the 4th Cavalry Brigade the order to seize the place - an order, which the resourceful brigade commander, General W Grant, solved by a charge.
Unfortunately the destruction of the wells at Beersheba arranged by Ismed was only partially accomplished.
Note: The numbers in the brackets, eg [276], refers to the page numbers in the original German text. This allows the reader to compare the original text with the translation or quote from the above text with the correct page as if from the original text.
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