"At a mile distant their thousand hooves were stuttering thunder, coming at a rate that frightened a man - they were an awe inspiring sight, galloping through the red haze - knee to knee and horse to horse - the dying sun glinting on bayonet points..." Trooper Ion Idriess
The Australian Light Horse Studies Centre aims to present an accurate history as chroniclers of early Australian military developments from 1899 to 1920.
The Australian Light Horse Studies Centre site holds over 12,000 entries and is growing daily.
Contact:Australian Light Horse Studies CentreLet us hear your story:
You can tell your story, make a comment or ask for help on our Australian Light Horse Studies Centre Forum called:
One of the most complete set of Light Horse unit signals at Gallipoli belongs to the 3rd Light Horse Brigade. Signals provide a window into the unvarnished form of history. These are the comments made by people who had important needs that required immediate attention. As such, they tell a story about a campaign that existed before the occurence of the newspaper reports leading to the Official Histories and all the other works that followed. Since they do not originate in a vacuum, it is the immediacy of the signal in a dense communication transfer that gives it a unique currency. It is a moment in time. We need all the other items such as the War Diary, Routine Orders and lastly, the published books to get a fully appreciation of the humble signal.
To ensure that this appreciation is available to many, over the coming months, a series of signals will be posted commencing from April till December.
Signal, 26 April 1915 to 8th LHR regarding movements at Heliopolis
Yanıkdağ trots out the usual qualitative complaints of unfair treatment in that the German and Austrian POWs received preferential treatment and cites anecdotal evidence to substantiate his case. This is of course a matter of perception. The actual facilities given to the Ottoman POWs are a matter of record and to be found in the files of the POW camps. Food requisitions, roll numbers and sickness lists tend to be well documented as they all incurred an expense on the Imperial public purse and thus had to be carefully accounted. No on is able to prove one way or the other a qualitative charge but there is definite evidence of quantitative treatment and from the records, there appears to be little difference of treatment.
Of more substance in Yanıkdağ's thesis is the reliance of British statistics to make a further claim. Yanıkdağ at p. 150 goes to Statistics of the Military Effort, 1914-1920, (London: HMSO,1922), and cites pp. 630, and 635.
Here is the charge: The Imperial British forces held 150,041 Ottoman POWs during the Great War. Of this number, 10,742 Ottoman POWs died from various reasons. Now for the kicker. The British Statistics clearly state that the most common cause of death amongst the Ottoman POWs was pellagra disease. This insidious killer was specifically caused by a niacin deficiency. And here Yanıkdağ thinks he is on a winner as this is finally a qualitative charge. Yanıkdağ compares the death rate by this disease with the Ottoman POWs which came to 7.1% while the Austrian and German POWs suffered mortality rates of 2.9% and 2.6% respectively. Yanıkdağ believed that this was conclusive quantitative evidence of preferential treatment, especially in matters of diet.
While it may appear to be the ace in the hole, the reality of pellagra is a bit different. The onset of pellagra requires about four to five years to become fatal. Since the bulk of the prisoners were taken in 1918 and released in 1920, a two year window at best, it is difficult to understand the process of food being the determinant. It would appear as though those who died of pellagra had already contracted the illness at least two or more years prior to captivity. This would not have been recognised by the British authorities who fed the Ottoman POWs the same rations their own troops received. There is no doubt that this was a dreadful diet which most people would find difficult to consume at the best of times. However, since the Ottoman POWs were afflicted with pellagra as a pre-existing illness and related to their pre-enlistment and service diet, it is disingenuous to lay the blame upon the Imperial authorities because they happened to be the last link in a chain. This was a fault of the Ottoman Government for failing to distribute a public health message regarding niacin deficiency to the general Ottoman population and thus prevent it in the home. It was a failure of the Ottoman armies to ignore the problem and provide a diet that was impoverished in niacin. The British authorities were the last link who also failed to do anything.
On this charge, there was nothing deliberate but a chain of neglect that originated in the various households of the Ottoman POWs prior to the war.
As for the differentiation in treatment between the Ottoman POWs and the Germans and Austrians as highlighted by the differential in death rates of pellagra, this may also be dismissed for similar reasons. The lower death rates of the Germans and Austrians had less to do with British teatment differentials and more to do with the pre war diet of the POWs. The only conclusion that may be reached is that both the Germans and Austrians had diets rich in niacin prior to military service and thus were able to survive the rigours of the POW camp existence far better than the Ottoman POWs.
So superficially, it would appear Yanıkdağ may have an issue but when examined under the cold hard facts, Yanıkdağ's thesis says more about the appalling Ottoman public health program prior to the war than the treatment of Ottoman POWs in British camps.
22nd Corps Cavalry Routine Order 540, 5 January 1918 Topic: AIF - Fr - 22 Corps
Apart from the War Diary which presents a reflected view of Regimental history, one of the best sources of understanding the immediate challenges facing a regiment is to be found in the Routine Orders. They are a wealth of detail.
In this case, the 22nd Corps Cavalry Routine Orders for 1918 have been highlighted to illustrate the tempo of this formation from the beginning of the year towards the end of the war. The aim is to illustrate the tumultuous year that followed ending in the defeat of Germany. Too little is known of the role regarding the Light Horse in the drama on the Western Front. This should address some shortfalls of information.
22nd Corps Cavalry Routine Order 540, 5 January 1918
22nd Corps Cavalry Routine Order 540, 5 January 1918, p. 1.
Desert Mounted Corps Routine Orders - 21 October 1917 Topic: AIF - DMC
Apart from the War Diary which presents a reflected view of Regimental history, one of the best sources of understanding the immediate challenges facing a regiment is to be found in the Routine Orders. They are a wealth of detail.
In this case, the Desert Mounted Corps Routine Orders for October 1917 have been highlighted to illustrate the tempo of this formation from the beginning of October towards the end. The aim is to illustrate the implementation of the Allenby Offensive that began at the end of October 1917 with the capture of Beersheba.
Desert Mounted Corps Routine Orders - 21 October 1917
Desert Mounted Corps Routine Orders, 21 October 1917, p. 1.
[Click on page for a larger print version.]
Of interest are the initiallings at the bottom of the page. It indicates order and precedence amongst the staff officers commanding the Desert Mounted Corps.
The following weeks will see the various pages of the Hotchkiss Machine Gun Pack for Cavalry. The Hotchkiss Gun was introduced in the Light Horse formations during the early months of 1917. The introduction of this robust and portable gun gave the Light Horse Regiments additional mobile fire power which considereably added to their ability to sustain light combat situations and defend against vastly numerically superior forces. Apart from being an excellent weapon, it was in much demand by the Turkish forces who considered the capture of a Hotchkiss Gun well worth any risks involved in the process. This is a manual produced in 1917 and illustrates the method by which the Hotchkiss Gun was packed and moved throughout the Palestine campaign.
The Australian Light Horse Studies Centre is a not for profit and non profit group whose sole aim is to write the early history of the Australian Light Horse from 1900
- 1920. It is privately funded and the information is provided by the individuals within the group and while permission for the use of the material has been given for this
site for these items by various donors, the residual and actual copyright for these items, should there be any, resides exclusively with the donors. The information on
this site is freely available for private research use only and if used as such, should be appropriately acknowledged. To assist in this process, each item has a citation
attached at the bottom for referencing purposes.
Please Note: No express or implied permission is given for commercial use of the information contained within this site.
A note to copyright holders
The Australian Light Horse Studies Centre has made every endeavour to contact copyright holders of material digitised for this blog and website and where
appropriate, permission is still being sought for these items. Where replies were not received, or where the copyright owner has not been able to be traced, or where
the permission is still being sought, the Australian Light Horse Studies Centre has decided, in good faith, to proceed with digitisation and publication. Australian Light
Horse Studies Centre would be happy to hear from copyright owners at any time to discuss usage of this item.
