Gallipoli Campaign - 1915

Bridges Disembarkation Orders, 18 April 1915, Part 1

 
DISEMBARKATION ORDERS

By Major General W. T. BRIDGES, C.M.G., Commanding 1st Australian Division.

Transport A11 Minnewaska, 18th April, 1915.


Transfers before leaving Lemnos.

1. - The transfers shown in Table "A" attached are to be made before leaving LEMNOS.

Sequence of disembarkation.

2.(i) The sequence of disembarkation is given in Table "B" attached; approximate hours at which disembarkation will begin are shown in this table,

Tables showing the composition of "tows", and the number of troops to be embarked in each, for the disembarkation of "A" echelons have been issued to military transport officers. Commanding officers will detail troops to tows accordingly.

Beach control personnel.

3. - The detail of the military beach control personnel and beach parties is shown in Table "C" attached.

Hold Parties have been allotted to transports; when they have not been detailed the work will be carried out by personnel of the last echelon to land.

Extracts from Paragraphs 59 to 63 of the Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations are issued herewith (Table "D") and explain the arrangements for clearing the beach.

Forming-up places and rendezvous.

4. - Four forming up places and two rendezvous will be selected by

Major DJ Glasfurd, General Staff, 1st Australian Division
Major CH Villiers-Stuart, General Staff, A & NZ Army Corps.

These officers will land with the first portion of the covering force. They will draw from the beach parties the necessary personnel for guides and to mark forming-up places and rendezvous.

Order of dress; articles to be landed.

5. –

(i ) Troops will land in service dress.

(ii) Horses will be landed harnessed.

(iii) Infantry battalions will land all entrenching tools under regimental arrangements.

All wire cutters are to be carried.

Canvas water bags issued to units will be filled and taken ashore.

(iv) Engineer units will land all tools and explosives.

(v) Mounted units will land the canvas trough equipment in their possession.

(vi) All vehicles will be placed in boats so that they can be landed pole leading.

All vehicles will be with their authorised loads, less articles landed with "A" echelons, before troops begin disembarkation.

(vii) Planks will be landed from the LAKE MICHIGAN to assist in unloading vehicles from horse boats on shore.

(viii) Grapnels a empty sacks for crossing wire entanglements will be landed with No. 2 Field Company.

Conduct of troops in boats

6. -- Silence will be observed in the boats, no one is to stand up; rifles are not to be loaded; magazines will be charged and cut offs closed; rifles will be carried in the hand and not slung. Equipment will be loosened and shoulder straps unbuttoned. On arrival at the beach all troops are to remain seated in their boats until the naval officer, or petty officer, in charge of the boat, gives the order to land.

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Gallipoli Campaign - 1915

Bridges Disembarkation Orders, 18 April 1915, Part 2

 
DISEMBARKATION ORDERS

By Major General W. T. BRIDGES, C.M.G., Commanding 1st Australian Division.

Transport A11 Minnewaska, 18th April, 1915.

Rations

7(i) A hot meal will be arranged for all troops as late as possible before leaving their ships.

(ii) Troops will land with the current day's rations and two iron rations. The iron rations are for consumption on the second and third days.

(iii) Under Army Corps arrangements seven days' suppies will be landed - that for the lst Australian Division will be taken over subsequently by the Officer Commanding Divisional Train who will arrange for landing the necessary supply details from the Atlantian.

Ammunition

8(i) Infantry will carry two hundred (200) rounds on the man: artillery and engineers  fifty (50) rounds per man; A.S.C twenty (20) rounds per man.

(ii) Machine guns and belt boxes will be carried by hand; (3,500) rounds per machine gun will be carried in belt boxes.

(iii) The regimental reserve now in possession of units will be left in regimental vehicles and landed with them.

(iv) 176 rounds per gun will be landed with each battery.

(v) Arrangements have been made by the Army Corps to 1and a reserve of small arm and gun ammunition on the beach. The DADOS will take over from this depot the ammunition for the Division.

Disposal of unfit personnel and animals etc.

9. - ( i ) All men unfit for disembarkation will be transferred to the stationary hospital before leaving MUDROS; those becoming unfit subsequently will, as opportunity offers be transferred to the transport CLAN McGILLIVRAY, by the military transport officer of the transport.

(ii) Unfit animals will be left on transports in charge of a party detailed under regimental arrangements.

(iii) After tho disembarkation of "A" echelons military transport officers will see that remaining personnel is divided in proper prorortions to the "B" and "C" echelons.

(iv) The extra blankets will he baled, labelled, and left on transports in charge of military transport officers, who will apply for instructions as to their disposal before ships are finally cleared.

(v) Hold parties, military transport officers, and their signals parties, will remain on board until all echelons are landed. They will then be transferred under divisional arrangements to the DERFFLINGER, taking with them any sick remaining in their transports.

C.B.B. WHITE

Lieut.Colonel 1st Australian Division.

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Citation: Gallipoli Campaign - 1915, Bridges Disembarkation Orders, 18 April 1915, Part 2

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Gallipoli Campaign - 1915

Questions to the Turkish General Staff, Part 1

During 1919, after the defeat of Turkey, a unique opportunity was opened up for CEW Bean to question the members of the Turkish General Staff about the Gallipoli Campaign. Bean presented a list of 111 questions. In June 1919, he received the answers. In the following transcription, the answers given by the Turkish General Staff will be qualified by the questions asked by Bean.

Questions 1 – 4

1. Where were the Turks expecting us to land?

2. Were they expecting us to land troops at Gaba Tepe?

3. Were they expecting us to land at Ari Burnu?

4. What did they think our intentions as to landing were?

The landing was expected from Seddulbahr and Gaba Tepe, also landings were expected a n the Asiatic side, and on the North of the Peninsula in the Gulf of Xeros. No landing was expected at Anzac. The Turkish Staff thought that the British intention had been to land at Gaba Tepe and that the landing at Anzac was made in error.

Our appreciation of the situation was that attempts would be made to take the forts by surprise attack and so open the Straits.

Questions 5 - 6

5. Approximately at what date did they first hear of our proposed landings?

6. When were they expecting the force at Mudros to land?

The Turkish General Staff considered that after the failure of the Naval attack of March 18th, a combined naval and Military attack would be made to endeavour to open the Straits, join the Russians, and separate the East from the West. We had information by the end of March that 50,000 British, Australian, and New Zealand soldiers, under General Hamilton, and 30,000 French, under General D'Amade, were concentrating in Mudros, but the date or week of the landing was unknown.

Questions 7 - 8

7. On April 25th what forces were there between Ari Burnu and Gaba Tepe? And where?

8. How many troops did they amount to in all and what were the numbers in reserve, and where were the reserves?

On April 25th, between Anzac and Gaba Tepe - in other words between Anafarta Asmak and Kum Tepe - there was the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment with its centre at Gaba Tepe. 1 Q.F. Mountain Battery of the 8th Artillery Regiment was attached to this Battalion. The other two battalions formed the reserve. They were under cover of the olive trees in Maidos. The 19th Regular Division was in the area Bighali - Mal Tepe. At Ari Burnu point there was a Coy of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, and the whole of the above-mentioned Mountain Battery.

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Citation: Gallipoli Campaign - 1915, Questions to the Turkish General Staff, Part 1 

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Gallipoli Campaign - 1915

Questions to the Turkish General Staff, Part 2

During 1919, after the defeat of Turkey, a unique opportunity was opened up for CEW Bean to question the members of the Turkish General Staff about the Gallipoli Campaign. Bean presented a list of 111 questions. In June 1919, he received the answers. In the following transcription, the answers given by the Turkish General Staff will be qualified by the questions asked by Bean.

Questions 11 - 14

11. On April 25th what was the first report of the Ari Burnu landing?

12. Were our troops seen in the boats before reaching the shore?

13. What was the first sign seen? What was the alarm?

14. How did the news come to the reserves?

The first report was that the British troops were landing at Gaba Tepe and to the North of it. This report reached A.H.Q., Gallipoli, at 6 a.m., April 25th. An hour or two later, news arrived that landings were also being made in the Gulf of Saros, Seddulbahr, Morto Bay, Sighin Dere, Kum Kale, and Beshika. The report of the landing at Beshika was false.

Questions 16 - 20.

16. How far did the Australian troops advance at ARI BURNU or, April 25th, and how did they fight?

17. What were the casualties of the Turks?

18. What reserves were sent to CAPE HELLES and what was the strength of these reserves?

19. What Turkish artillery was there at CAPE HELLES?

20. What was the Turkish artillery at ARI BURNU on April 25th? How many land guns and ships guns were used, respectively?

At first the 2 battalions of the 27th Regiment at Maidos were sent to Ari Burnu via Kodja Dere. They started at 7.30 a.m. after the Australians had landed. A Mountain Battery of the 19th Division was sent from Bighali towards Chunuk Bahr. The Australians that day advanced as far as the Western hillocks of Kamalyeri and in the direction of Chunuk Bahr as far as the Line between Duz Tepe and Chunuk Bahr. The Australians succeeded well in throwing back our advanced troops and in reaching the points they did. Their first effort in this difficult country was beyond praise. But when the 27th and 57th Regiments began to make their counter attack, the advance was checked and the first attack broken. On counting the casualties of these two Regiments it was realised how well the Australians had fought in their efforts to hold the line they had reached. The casualties of these two Regiments during the day and following night were 50% of their strength. The two Regiments were together slightly more than 4,000 strong. The three Australian Brigades which landed were estimated at 12,000.

The Turkish. Artillery in Ari Burnu consisted of 2 Mountain Batteries of which one was captured but retaken in the counter attack.    2 Field Batteries took up positions in the afternoon but remained in observation. On 26th April, 2 more Mountain Batteries took up positions in Kamalyere. There were no Naval guns.

Questions 22 - 23

22. Where were the guns stationed later?

23. What did they think of our Naval Artillery? What did they think of our land guns?

The effect of the British Naval Artillery was moral without being material. The effect of the land guns was to force our infantry to keep out of view in the centre and also prevented free movement.

Questions 24 - 28

24. What were the first counter attacks delivered by the Turkish Force at Anzac on April 25th, April 26th, April 27 - May 1?

25. What was the idea of the Turkish Staff as to the plan and motive of our attack at ARI BURNU?

26. When did they estimate that our attack was checked?

27. What apprehension had they of any further attacks?

28. When did they realise that the British attack at Helles had been checked?

No demonstration or counter attack was made by us on the 26th April. Real counter attacks were made on the 25th and 27th April, and 1st May, the aim being to drive the Anzac Corps into the sea. In all these attacks the Anzac troops were superior in number and consequently no decisive result was obtained, though the Anzac troops were pressed back to the line that they remained in up to the evacuation of the Peninsula. The distance between opposing trenches was very small. During the counter attack of April 25th, 5 more battalions were put in to the line, and on April 27th six more were put in, making a total of 16 battalions against the 6 British brigades.

In the counter attack of May 1st, 5 more battalions joined the line. By that time the British Naval Brigade had also landed.

The tactics of the Turks were to prevent the British from landing or if not, to prevent lodgements being made.

We imagined the tactics of the Anzac landing to be as follows :

By landing in two different places the result would be more of a surprise and the allotted task effected quicker, further, by drawing more troops to Anzac the task at Seddulbahr would be more easily effected.

By holding the Kavak Tepe - Sanjak Tepe - Chunuk Bahr - Koja Chimen - Abdul Rahman Bahr line, communication between Gallipoli and the rest of the Peninsula would be cut. The command of the Straits would also be gained. The above mentioned line was marked on maps found on dead Australian or New Zealand officers.

It was realised that the attack was checked in April but it was always expected that further attacks would take place.

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Gallipoli Campaign

Citation: Gallipoli Campaign - 1915, Questions to the Turkish General Staff, Part 2

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Updated: Wednesday, 1 July 2009 11:29 PM EADT

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Gallipoli Campaign - 1915

Questions to the Turkish General Staff, Part 3

During 1919, after the defeat of Turkey, a unique opportunity was opened up for CEW Bean to question the members of the Turkish General Staff about the Gallipoli Campaign. Bean presented a list of 111 questions. In June 1919, he received the answers. In the following transcription, the answers given by the Turkish General Staff will be qualified by the questions asked by Bean.

Questions 29 - 31

29. What importance was attached to the head of Monash Valley, Baby 700, Popes Hill and Quinns Post?

30. What importance did they attach to our attack in the Bloody Angle and BABY 700 on May 2nd?

31. When did they begin to mine?

Monash Valley, Baby 700, and Popes Hill were looked upon as very important positions if Kojak Chimen mountain was to be menaced. It was always realised that the British effort was to take Koja Chimen. Quinn’s Post was looked upon as a poor position as it was commanded. The attack on May 2nd was evidently made to better this position.

Mining was started near Quinn’s Post after the attack on May 11th, and the mine exploded o n the morning of May 29th.

Questions 37 - 44

37. What was the Turkish estimate of the position on the Peninsular before they delivered their great counter attack on May 19 at Anzac, and why did they choose Anzac for this attack? When did this plan originate?

38. What was the plan of attack?

39. What units were employed in this attack and who commanded them?

40. Were these battalions good battalions?

41. What was the actual result of the attack?

42. Were the Turkish casualties heavy? Where were they heaviest?

43. Against what part of our line was the attack most strongly thrown?

44. What points of our line were attacked on May 19th, what was the opinion of our defence, and what guns were employed in the preparation for this attack? What was the reason for the tremendous outburst of rifle fire before midnight May 18th?

The position at Anzac was without parallel in History. The opposing trenches were so close together and the Anzac Corps line was very close to the sea, consequently they were much confined and would make every effort to enlarge their position. It was therefore better for the Turks to have the initiative and attack before the Anzac troops attacked. This they did on May 19th. If this attack succeeded, a force of some 4 of 5 Turkish divisions would be freed and available to deal with Seddulbahr. The proximity of the trenches was an advantage in making a surprise attack. The plan was to attack before daybreak, drive the Anzac troops from their trenches and follow them down to the sea.

The following troops were used in this attack:

Facing the British left: 19th Division (12 Battalions. O.C. Lieut. Col Mustafa Kemal

Facing the British left centre: 5th Division (9 Battalions. O.C. Lieut.-Col. Hassan Basri Bey)

Facing the British right centre: 2nd Division (9 Battalions. O.C. Col. Hassan Askeri Bey.)

Facing the British right: 16th Division (12 Battalions. O.C Col. Rushdi Bey.)

The whole force was commanded by the 3rd Army Commander (Maj.Gen. Essad Pasha.) The total force numbered about 30,000 rifles, The Divisions were good. The 2nd 16th were fresh divisions; the other two had taken part in all the previous fighting. Everywhere the British trenches were entered but the attack was held up by machine gun fire from the flanks and became abortive. The Turkish casualties were much heavier than was expected. More importance was attached to the capture of Lone Pine and the ground North of it. In this attack the worth of the Anzac soldiers in defence was realised; they shot well and used their machine guns to the best advantage. Our artillery was small - only 6 Mountain Batteries, 4 Field Batteries, Howitzer Battery Without much ammunition, and 1 Mortar Battery being available for the preparation of the attack.

The outburst of fire before midnight May 18th was due to the excitement of the troops. Similar outbursts used to occur on both sides.

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Citation: Gallipoli Campaign - 1915, Questions to the Turkish General Staff, Part 3

Posted by Project Leader at 12:01 AM EADT

Updated: Wednesday, 1 July 2009 11:30 PM EADT

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