Topic: BatzG - Gallipoli
Gallipoli Campaign - 1915
Questions to the Turkish General Staff, Part 6
The Turkish General Staff Answers
During 1919, after the defeat of Turkey, a unique opportunity was opened up for CEW Bean to question the members of the Turkish General Staff about the Gallipoli Campaign. Bean presented a list of 111 questions. In June 1919, he received the answers. In the following transcription, the answers given by the Turkish General Staff will be qualified by the questions asked by Bean.
Questions 81 - 83
81. What was the Turkish appreciation of the attack at SUVLA ( ANAFARTA)?
82. What was the Turkish appreciation of the attack on SARI BAIR?
83. What was the Turkish appreciation of the attack on LONE PINE?
From these attacks the Turkish officers appreciated the ability or the Anzac troops to act on their own initiative, to profit by the shape of the ground, and to operate in difficult country.
Questions 85 – 87
85. What was their estimate of the position after August 10th?
86. Where did they estimate the most critical position to be?
87. What was the effect of the attack on HILL 60 across the KAIAJIK AGHALA?
After the 10th August it was thought that the British would continue their attack but after the attack of 21st August, the situation became more easy.
The most important consideration was the impossibility of driving out the British from their positions with the means available to the Turks at the time.
The attacks on Hill 60 opposite Kaiajik Aghilu had no effect except the shedding of blood.
Questions 88 - 90
88. What were the Turkish intentions after September?
89. What was their preparation for the winter?
90. What opinions did they hold an to the probability of an evacuation by us of the Peninsula?
After September the policy was to obtain heavy artillery and ammunition from Germany to beat down the opposition. The same line would be held throughout the winter. The general opinion was that the British would not evacuate their positions on the Peninsula.
Questions 91 - 93
91. What they thought of our cessation of fire on the 27th, 28th and 29th November?
92. Did they think that it might be due to our evacuating?
93. When did they first begin to suspect that an evacuation was probable?
Owing to the bad weather, on the 27th, 28th, and 29th it was not realised that the fire had slackened. This bad weather had affected both sides.
On the 28th November, we made a sudden bombardment for 10 minutes. At first the British artillery replied lightly but increased their fire later - the navy joining; in.
Some British units were known to have been sent to Macedonia.
The mining of our machine gun emplacements gave no indication of early evacuation.
Questions 94 - 96
94, What did they suspect in December, as to our evacuation?
95. Did they see any movement on our part and what did they attribute it to?
96. Was there any report of evacuation at SUVLA or ANZAC during the last two days or nights of our stay?
In December the front was quiet. 2 days before the Anafarta evacuation hostile aeroplanes were very active and bombed the back areas. Hostile artillery also visibly decreased.
Questions 100 - 102
100. What was the total number of Turkish casualties on the Peninsula and how they distributed between SUVLA (ANAFARTA ) ANZAC (ARI BURNU), and HELLES {SEDDUL BAHR}, and when did the bulk of these occur?
101. What were the casualties through sickness at these places respectively?
102. When was ammunition most and least plentiful?
The heaviest losses on the Peninsula were at Seddulbahr, then Ari Burnu and Suvla.
Most casualties occurred in the early counter attacks. Casualties from sickness were very small in comparison. Ammunition was always tight.
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Citation: Gallipoli Campaign - 1915, Questions to the Turkish General Staff, Part 6
Posted by Project Leader
at 12:01 AM EADT
Updated: Thursday, 2 July 2009 3:35 PM EADT
